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 Abstract 
 
A new paradigm in cognitive science has emerged called the “enactive approach”, which has 
given rise to a research program known as “neurophenomenology”. This research program 
attempts to calibrate third- and first-person methods to investigate consciousness. In his 
recent and representative work Mind in Life, Evan Thompson has put forward the thesis that 
there is a “deep continuity between life and mind”. While I remain sympathetic to the 
neurophenomenological approach as an exemplar par excellence of how the science of 
consciousness ought to proceed, I argue against this continuity thesis from three perspectives: 
(1) the nature and potential of first-person approaches to consciousness; (2) the most 
fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) the egological or non-egological nature 
of consciousness and selfhood. My argument begins by laying out the foundations of enactive 
cognitive science, the continental analysis of time-consciousness and Thompson‟s attempt to 
close the empirical gap between life and mind with the help of the neurophenomenological 
bridging strategy (dynamic systems theory). Next, I discuss the phenomenology of different 
types of (structured) experiences and the fact that continental and contemplative methods 
share a common logic. I then argue that first-person methods (i) offer prima facie evidence 
that there are perceptual and non-perceptual types of experience, and (ii) grant us “cognitive 
access” to both types of experience. Following this, I consider at least one non-perceptual 
type of experience (pure consciousness) that breaks down the dynamic and relational 
structure of time-consciousness. I argue that pure consciousness is phenomenally lived-
through but without egocentricity (subject-pole). Furthermore, a sophisticated distinction 
between (i) a minimal, core sense of (ego-) self and (ii) a non-egological but phenomenally 
lived-through subjectivity, is capable of shedding light on long-lasting debates surrounding 
the existence and non-existence of self (ātman). This especially holds true with regards to 
Buddhist philosophy and objectors to the doctrine of not-self (anatta/anātman). Finally, the 
nature of pure consciousness will lead me to challenge Thompson‟s continuity thesis, on the 
grounds that phenomenological evidence shows that the contemplative mind (pure 
consciousness) is decidedly not dynamic and intentional in structure. Thus there is a 
conceptual discontinuity between the biological domain and the phenomenological domain, 
being a decisive conceptual disanalogy between the contemplative mind (consciousness 
proper) and life. I thus conclude that prima facie: (1) first-person methods give us cognitive 
access to the objective and subjective domain of consciousness; (2) continental 
phenomenology is mistaken about the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; 
(3) consciousness qua awareness per se is non-egological. Having completed my argument 
against the continuity thesis, I will briefly recommend specific avenues for future 
neurophenomenological research to (a) adjudicate between continental and contemplative 
phenomenological views of consciousness; (b) judge whether or not Thompson‟s continuity 
thesis can be upheld; and (c) introduce new ways of studying (phenomenal) selfhood. In this 
way, I hope not only to argue against Thompon‟s continuity thesis, but to also point towards 
the potential of the neurophenomenological research program to advance our understanding 
of consciousness and phenomenal selfhood. 
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Introduction 
 
What‟s been hidden is meditation‟s role as a precision tool for exploring consciousness 
and the universe scientifically – that is, using empirical methods similar to the scientific 
method.
1
 
  
 B. Alan Wallace 
Over the last two decades first-person methods have become more popular in the scientific 
study of consciousness. A new paradigm in cognitive science has also emerged called the 
“enactive approach”, which attempts to calibrate third- and first-person methods to 
investigate consciousness. This research program is known as “neurophenomenology”. Evan 
Thompson has been identified as the standard bearer of this neurophenomenological 
enterprise.
2
 In his recent work Mind in Life, Thompson has put forward the thesis that there is 
a “deep continuity between life and mind”.3  
In this thesis, I will argue against this continuity thesis from three perspectives: 
(1) the nature and potential of first-person approaches to consciousness; 
(2) the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; 
(3) the egological or non-egological nature of consciousness and selfhood. 
          I will thus challenge the theoretic thrust of the neurophenomenological strategy to 
bridge biology and phenomenology (with the help of dynamic systems theory). However, I 
want to be clear that I remain sympathetic to the neurophenomenological approach as an 
exemplar par excellence of how the science of consciousness ought to proceed. Therefore, I 
                                                          
1
 B. Alan Wallace, Mind in the Balance: Meditation in Science, Budhdism, & Christianity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2009), 1. 
2
 John Dunne, “The Impact of How It Feels: Neurophenomenology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” New 
Scientific Approaches to the Study of Religious Experience (An experimental transatlantic videoconference held 
Friday, May 22, 2009 between EMORY UNIVERSITY: Center for Mind, Brain, and Culture and the 
Department of Religion and UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD: Centre for Anthropology and Mind; Sponsored by 
the American Academy of Religion), http://vimeo.com/6392836 (accessed July 31, 2010). 
3
 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 15. 
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intend not only to argue against Thompson‟s thesis, but to point out what 
neurophenomenology may be able to accomplish with future research at each of the above 
three levels. 
          Thompson‟s basic argument for continuity is the following: 
Premise 1:  Life: biologically “living” systems are autonomous (dynamically self- 
 organising) and relational. 
Premise 2:  Mind: phenomenologically “lived” systems are self-aware over time  
 (in this way also dynamically self-organising) and open towards alterity. 
Supported by:  The thesis of continental phenomenology that the dynamic structure of time- 
 consciousness is the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness. 
Premise 3: We can describe both the biological domain and the phenomenological  
 domain with a common dynamic model. 
Conclusion:  At a fundamental level there is continuity between life and mind. 
          My counter argument (“ca”) goes as follows: 
Premise 1
ca
:  Phenomenologically, there are different types of (structured) experiences. 
Premise 2
ca
:  First-person methods offer prima facie evidence that there are perceptual and  
 non-perceptual types of experience. 
Premise 3
ca
:  First-person methods grant us cognitive access to both perceptual and non- 
 perceptual types of experience.  
Premise 4
ca
:  At least one non-perceptual type of experience (pure consciousness) breaks  
 down the structure of time-consciousness. 
Supported by:  The neuophenomenological commitment to take first-person evidence  
 seriously. 
Premise 5
ca
:  Non-perceptual experiences are neither dynamic nor relational. 
Sub-concl. 1:  Prima facie, continental phenomenology is wrong about the fundamental  
3 | P a g e  
 
 structure of consciousness. 
Sub-concl. 2:  Dynamic systems theory cannot offer a common model of description for  
 the biological domain and the phenomenological domain. 
Conclusion
ca
:  At a fundamental level, there remains a deep conceptual discontinuity 
  between the contemplative mind (consciousness proper) and life. 
          In Chapter 1, I will lay out the philosophy of biology and life put forward by 
Thompson as the methodological theme of this paper. I will first explicate the enactive 
approach to cognitive science, and then outline Varela‟s and Thompson‟s account of life 
(premise 1 and 2). Next, I will introduce the continental view that the self-aware nature of 
mind is the dynamic structure of time-consciousness. Finally, I will explain how Thompson 
attempts to close the empirical gap between life and mind with the help of the theoretical 
component of the neurophenomenological paradigm (premise 3). 
          In Chapter 2, I will initiate my case against Thompson‟s continuity thesis by exploring 
a plateau of consensus between myself and some continental phenomenologists: that there are 
multiple types of experience that differ in structure (premise 1
ca
). In order to further explain 
“perceptual” types of experience, upon which I agree with continental phenomenologists, I 
will also discuss the objective (intentional) principle of consciousness and the distinction 
between narrow and broad intentionality.  
          Once I exhaust this common ground, I will discuss my disagreement with continental 
phenomenology on the particular issue of whether or not our subjectivity can be self-
enclosed, adding to the list of possible experiences a non-perceptual type, which continental 
phenomenologists deny. The following chapters will provide good reasons for accepting the 
possibility of such a non-perceptual type of experience (premise 2
ca
). 
          Chapter 3 will introduce the basic logic of first-person methods for the investigation of 
consciousness. First, I will argue that the phenomenological method and the contemplative 
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method have a common logic. I will also show that neurophenomenology is turning to the 
practical expertise of the contemplative method to aid the phenomenological method. I will 
then suggest that professionally trained subjects in the contemplative method have more 
precise and reliable cognitive faculties, which, in turn, make them the most suitable 
candidates to examine non-perceptual types of experience. 
           In Chapter 4, I will consider nine objections to such first-person methods. The first 
seven of these objections raise possible reasons we may not have cognitive access to the 
intentional domain of consciousness. Objections eight and nine raise possible reasons we may 
not have cognitive access to the self-aware domain of consciousness. I then devote the 
remainder of Chapter 4 to responding to the first seven objections. I will draw on the ground I 
share with continental phenomenology to argue that we can have cognitive access to the 
intentional domain of consciousness. In particular, in responding to objections four to six, I 
will consider and reject representational theories of mind (and thereby open the way for an 
alternate, non-representational theory, which I will introduce in the following chapter). 
          Chapter 5 responds to objection eight by developing an account of cognitive access that 
can expand the list of “observable experiences” to non-perceptual types. I will begin with 
additional reasons to reject representational theories of mind. This will clarify the relationship 
between the traditional mode of cognitive access to intentional experience (reflection) and the 
mode of access appropriate to the rather inaccessible domain of self-awareness. Next, I will 
re-visit both reflection and self-awareness, in order to re-define what we mean to capture by 
the notion of “cognitive access”. Finally, I will attempt to account for cognitive access by 
introducing a “Theory of Disclosing” (my alternative to the representational theories rejected 
in Chapter 4), by which I will argue, against continental phenomenologists, that we in fact do 
have cognitive access to the self-aware principle of consciousness (premise 3
ca
). 
          My final chapter, Chapter 6, discusses a non-perceptual type of experience that is 
5 | P a g e  
 
encountered by contemplative phenomenologists who rely on the contemplative method to 
investigate consciousness (premise 2
ca
). I refer to this type of experience as the “pure 
consciousness event”. The pure consciousness event lacks a subject-object structure (in a 
very radical sense) that affects both the object-pole and the ego-pole. I thus review egological 
and non-egological theories of consciousness to clarify whether or not it is meaningful to 
speak of a subjectless or egoless consciousness. I will argue that pure consciousness is 
phenomenally lived-through but without egocentricity (subject-pole). Furthermore, a 
sophisticated distinction between (i) a minimal, core sense of (ego-) self and (ii) a non-
egological but phenomenally lived-through subjectivity, is capable of shedding light on long-
lasting debates surrounding the existence and non-existence of self (ātman). This especially 
holds true with regards to Buddhist philosophy and objectors to the doctrine of not-self 
(anatta/anātman). Consequently, pure consciousness might also qualify as the invariant 
structure of consciousness, which the Mahāyāna (in tathagatagarbha doctrine) justifiably 
identifies as the (great) “Self”. 
          Finally, I will move this debate of selfhood and self-awareness to the level of time-
consciousness, which Thompson has relied on to establish continuity between life and mind. I 
will show that continental phenomenologists strongly connect selfhood and time-
consciousness, but that pure consciousness undermines this understanding, because it breaks 
down the dynamic structure of time-consciousness (premise 4
ca
). This characteristic of pure 
consciousness will lead me to challenge Thompson‟s continuity thesis, on the grounds that 
phenomenological evidence shows that the contemplative mind (pure consciousness) is 
decidedly not dynamic and intentional in structure (premise 5
ca
). Thus there is a conceptual 
discontinuity between the biological domain and the phenomenological domain. I take this to 
be a decisive conceptual disanalogy between the contemplative mind (consciousness proper) 
and life. 
6 | P a g e  
 
          Having thus established (i) that first-person methods do give us cognitive access to the 
subjective domain of consciousness; (ii) that continental phenomenology is mistaken about 
the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; and (iii) that consciousness qua 
awareness per se is non-egological, I will recommend specific avenues of future 
neurophenomenological research to (a) adjudicate between continental and contemplative 
phenomenological views of consciousness; (b) judge whether or not Thompson‟s continuity 
thesis can be upheld; and (c) introduce new ways of studying (phenomenal) selfhood. 
In this way, I hope not only to argue against Thompon‟s continuity thesis, but to also point 
towards the potential of the neurophenomenological research program to advance our 
understanding of consciousness and phenomenal selfhood. 
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Chapter 1 
The “Continuity” between Life and Mind: 
Neurophenomenology and the Philosophy of 
Life  
 
A philosophy of life comprises the philosophy of the organism and the philosophy of 
mind.
4
 
  
 Hans Jonas 
I will begin by laying out the philosophy of biology and life put forward by Evan Thompson 
in his work Mind in Life, to explain how Thompson‟s neurophenomenological approach 
attempts to account for a “deep continuity between life and mind”5 in very interesting ways. 
This will serve as the methodological theme I intend to examine in greater detail as the 
project unfolds in order to show (i) that contemplative phenomenology challenges traditional 
views on consciousness held by continental phenomenologists; (ii) that contemplative 
accounts of consciousness break away from Thompson‟s definition of “life”; and (iii) that 
such contemplative accounts of consciousness are a very promising subject for empirical 
research within the enactive paradigm of cognitive science (neurophenomenology). 
          In this chapter I will first explain the enactive approach to cognitive science. Next, I 
will outline Varela‟s and Thompson‟s account of life and living biological organisms. Third, 
I will introduce phenomenology with a focus on self-awareness and its relationship to time-
consciousness. Fourth, I will explain how Thompson attempts to close the empirical gap 
between the two, that is, “life” (the biologically living body, i.e. “Körper”) and “mind” (the 
phenomenologically lived body, i.e. “Leib”), with the help of the neurophenomenological 
                                                          
4
 Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (Evanston, Illonois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1966), 1. 
5
 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 15. 
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paradigm. It will be the task of the following chapters to build on this foundation and 
explicate claims (i)-(iii) from above. 
1.1 Enactive Cognitive Science 
In order to understand Thompson‟s ideas, we need to first understand the paradigm in which 
he operates. This paradigm is the “enactive” approach to cognitive science, which is also the 
background from which the research program called “neurophenomenology” has emerged. 
          In a general sense enaction means to perform or carry out an action. The enactive 
approach offers an account of the mind that is dynamic and embodied. It also tries to bridge 
an enactive (embodied) view of the mind and phenomenological accounts of subjective 
experience.
6
 
          The view that cognition is embodied action (enaction) was first introduced into 
cognitive science by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in their collaborative work The Embodied 
Mind.
7
 Over a decade later, Thompson reminds us in his book Mind in Life (which is a 
continuation of this project) that the aim of the first instalment was to unify a range of inter-
connected ideas into one paradigm coined “the enactive approach”.8 Thompson lists five 
ideas that define this approach.
9
 
          First, living beings are autonomous. Their autonomous agency allows them to give rise 
to themselves and also maintain themselves. This also generates their cognitive domains, 
which are enacted by them.  
          Second, the nervous system is a dynamic and autonomous system. It too gives rise to 
and maintains its own patterns of activity, which in turn generates meaning. 
                                                          
6
 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 13. 
7
 Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human 
Experience (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993), 172-180, 205. 
8
 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 13. 
9
 Ibid. 
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          Third, cognition is skillful interaction with the world; it is a sensorimotor coupling 
between organism and environment. Thus cognition is situated in a world and embodied in 
skillful activity. 
          Fourth, the world of a cognitive agent is not a predetermined domain that is fixed and 
external to the agent. An independent world is not represented inside the head. Rather, the 
world is a domain best described as a relational continuum that is determined by the way the 
agent autonomously enacts the kind of coupling it has with its environment.
10
 
          Fifth, experience is not epiphenomenal. In contrast, it is vital for understanding the 
mind, and it has to be examined carefully and phenomenologically. 
           Thompson proposes that the enactive approach has common ground with 
phenomenology when it comes to the matter of life: the enactive approach holds that a 
fundamental characteristic of biological life (the “living organism”, or “Körper”) is 
autonomy; phenomenology holds that a fundamental characteristic of phenomenal life (the 
“lived body”, or “Leib”) is “intentionality”11. Both the enactive approach and phenomenology 
agree that consciousness has to be explicated in terms of both the autonomy and intentionality 
of life. This notion of “life” encompasses both the biological and phenomenological 
components of existence – it includes biological life, phenomenal life, and the “life-world” in 
which life is situated and embodied (either biologically or phenomenologically).
12
 
          In what follows, I will discuss the autonomy of biological life and show how it is 
inextricably linked to the intentional component of our phenomenological life. I will also 
bring to light how the enactive approach attempts to close the empirical gap between 
biological and phenomenological life, by accounting for the self-awareness of consciousness 
in terms of dynamic systems theory. 
                                                          
10
 Evan Thompson and Francisco J. Varela, “Radical Embodiment: Neural Dynamics and Consciousness,” 
TRENDS in Cognitive Science 5:10 (Oct., 2001): 424-425. 
11
 Intentionality refers to the outward directedness of consciousness. I discuss this notion further in Chapter 2. 
12
 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 15. 
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1.1.1 The Enactive Approach: Autonomous and Dynamic Systems 
The enactive approach holds that self-organising processes, which involve the brain, body, 
and the environment, give rise to the mind.
13
 In order to understand what the enactive view 
means by this, we need to be clear about two central ideas enactive cognitive science 
entertains: emergence and autonomy. 
          The idea of emergence is related to processes of self-organisation and circular 
causality. According to Thompson, both of these have in common that they exhibit patterns 
of “bottom-up” and “top-down” reciprocal influence.14 This means that global patterns in a 
system arise from local interactions (local-to-global determination), but that these local 
interactions are also in turn governed and constrained by the global patterns that they give 
rise to (global-to-local determination).
15
 On the basis of this idea of circular and reciprocal 
causality, Thompson sketches a model of emergent processes that he calls “dynamic co-
emergence”. Dynamic co-emergence describes how a whole does not arise solely from its 
parts, but that the parts also arise from the whole. In this way, the whole and its parts emerge 
together – they co-emerge – and mutually determine each other.16 
          What about dynamic systems? First, a system is a salient pattern of related processes 
that can be distinguished from a background of unrelated processes. This salient collection of 
processes forms a single whole from the viewpoint of the observer.
17
 We might also wish to 
say that this is a first step towards individuation and identity (I will return to this idea as the 
discussion unfolds).
18
  
          Second, a dynamic system is just such a salient, whole and individuated collection of 
processes that changes over time. Dynamic systems theory, then, attempts to establish 
                                                          
13
 Ibid., 37. 
14
 Ibid., 38, 60-63. See also Evan Thompson and Francisco J. Varela, “Radical Embodiment: Neural Dynamics 
and Consciousness,” TRENDS in Cognitive Science 5:10 (Oct., 2001): 419-422. 
15
 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 63, 424. 
16
 Ibid., 38. 
17
 Ibid., 39. 
18
 Hans Jonas, “Biological Foundations of Individuality,” International Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1968): 233. 
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(mathematical) models that specify how a given system changes or behaves over a period of 
time.
19
 
          What is an autonomous system? To answer this question, we need to first understand 
the difference between autonomy and heteronomy. Literally, autonomy means to be self-
governed, and heteronomy means to be other-governed.  
          A heteronomous system is defined by an input-output organisational flow of 
information that is subject to external control (this is the classic paradigm of functional 
cognitive science). Thompson offers following example to illustrate a heteronomous 
system:
20
 Imagine a network that has an input and an output layer. The inputs are given to the 
system from an external observer that is outside of the system‟s organisation. The outputs are 
then interpreted in the context of a task that was imposed onto the system from outside. 
          An autonomous system differs, because it is determined by dynamics that are internal 
to the system and self-organising; the dynamic involved is self-controlling. Rather than 
having an input-output informational flow, the way the system‟s structure is self-organised 
outlines its own cognitive domain (this is the classic paradigm of enactive cognitive 
science).
21
 For a system to be autonomous, then, it must consist of relational processes that 
have three characteristics:
22
 (i) they depend on each other to realise a network; (ii) they form 
a unity to make salient a system; and (iii) possible interactions with the environment occur in 
a domain that is specified by them. 
          Thompson and Varela offer an example as a paradigm case of autonomy: the living 
cell.
23
 The processes involved are chemical. They are interdependent and generate a self-
                                                          
19
 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 39, 42. 
20
 Ibid., 43. 
21
 Ibid. See also Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive 
Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993), 85-91. 
22
 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 44. 
23
 Ibid. See also Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive 
Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993), 151-157. 
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producing network that is metabolic and builds its own membrane. This network is a unitary 
and salient system that determines a domain in which the system can interact with the 
environment. Such biochemical autonomy is known as autopoiesis.
24
 Thompson offers the 
following figure to illustrate this autopoietic autonomy:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Although autopoiesis is the paradigm case of autonomy in the biological domain, 
autonomous systems need not be strictly autopoietic. An autopoietic system is one that 
generates its own membrane, but autonomous systems need not have material boundaries. To 
see this, Thompson asks of us to consider an insect colony, its members of which form an 
autonomous network. The boundary in this case is not material, but social.
25
 Varela thus 
                                                          
24
 H. R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. Boston 
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defines an autonomous system not as something that has material closure, but one that has 
organisational closure.
26
 
1.1.2 Organisational Closure, Environmental Coupling, and Selfhood 
Varela put forward a “Closure Thesis” that says: “Every autonomous system is 
organizationally closed.”27 According to Varela and Thompson, the closure thesis does not 
mean that a system is closed off from the external world in a material or energetic sense. 
Rather, the opposite is the case. Autonomous systems continuously exchange matter and 
energy with their environment. In this way, organisational closure defines the unity of a 
system through network relations that constitute it and are circularly interdependent. Their 
interdependence also allows for reentrant and recurrent processes. Hence Thompson states 
that “an autonomous system is always structurally coupled with its environment.”28 Merleau-
Ponty, who adopted an autonomy perspective, expressed this same idea in the following way: 
Thus the form of the excitant is created by the organism itself, by its proper manner of offering 
itself to actions from outside. Doubtless, in order to be able to subsist, it must encounter a 
certain number of physical and chemical agents in its surroundings. But it is the organism itself 
– according to the proper nature of its receptors, the thresholds of its nerve centers and the 
movements of the organs – which chooses the stimuli in the physical world to which it will be 
sensitive.
29
  
The self-organising and self-producing processes of autonomous systems, then, give rise to 
organisational closure, which in turn makes the related and interdependent processes that 
govern it stand out over and against its surroundings. In so doing, the processes themselves 
define the domain of interaction through which the unified system is coupled with its 
environment. 
          In Thompson‟s eyes, an organisationally closed system defines a form of selfhood that 
                                                          
26
 Francisco J. Varela, Principles of Biological Autonomy (New York: Elsevier North Holland, 1979), 55-60. 
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 Ibid., 58. 
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 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 45. 
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co-emerges with a correlative otherness, world, or environment.
30
 Thompson provides us 
with two hierarchical examples of this.  
          First, in the case of autopoietic closure, the autonomous biological system brings forth 
a “minimal „bodily self‟ at the level of cellular metabolism”.  
          Second, in the case of sensorimotor closure, the autonomous physiological system 
brings forth a “„sensorimotor self‟ at the level of perception and action.”31 
          I want to connect these two forms of closure to our discussion on subjectivity (mind) 
and alterity (world). Hence I offer a further level of emerging selfhood: 
          Third, the case of indexical closure, an autonomous phenomenological system brings 
forth a minimal (sense of) “phenomenological self” at the level of first-personally lived-
through subjectivity. 
          According to Thompson, the first case moves from “network closure to selfhood (and 
correlative otherness)” via the help of an active cell membrane that determines and regulates 
the interaction with the outside environment. In the second, case the move happens via the 
help of behaviour and intentional action. What Thompson wishes to emphasise here is that in 
both cases the inside and outside, as well as selfhood and correlative world (environment or 
otherness), co-emerge through the dynamics of autonomy and its physical embodiment.  
          Analogously, in the third case, I want to add that the move from closure to selfhood 
occurs via the help of the insuperable boundary of first-personal givenness. In fact, the 
indexical quality of the first-person perspective is precisely defined by it being accessible 
only to the one who has it. For the subject, other modes of givenness differ, because they are 
not accessible in the same way. They are only accessible through the perspective of those 
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who live through them.
32
 When it comes to the phenomenological level, then, lived 
subjectivity and its correlative “life-world” co-emerge by virtue of the “operational” closure 
and experiential embodiment (manifestation) of the first-person perspective. 
          To capture the inter-relationship of the ideas just presented, I offer an adapted diagram 
to illustrate the first and second points from above:
33
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To clarify the third phenomenological case I have added, in which selfhood and correlative 
world co-emerge, I have adjusted Thompson‟s figure to capture this analogous scenario: 
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This third point introduces phenomenology. When we do this, we transition from mere 
autonomous systems to living systems. As Thompson points out, “the transition from 
physical structures to living structures is the transition from matter to life.”34 In this way, 
Merleau-Ponty and Thompson view the transition to living structures as the emergence of a 
new order of nature that is qualitatively distinct from the physical order.
35
 Such living 
structures have two distinct characteristics:
36
 first, the organism emerges as an individual in a 
new sense, which cannot be limited to that of physical individuality;
37
 second, the relation 
between individual (organism) and world (environment) is one characterised by meaning and 
normativity. 
          According to Merleau-Ponty, physical structures can be expressed in terms of laws, but 
living structures have to be accounted for in relation to norms: a world that means something 
to the individual.
38
 This meaning (significance) emerges when a self-pole is coupled with an 
environment-pole.
39
 If we apply Merleau-Ponty‟s view of meaning to consciousness, then 
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consciousness is not an isolated brain which stands in a causal relationship with sensory input 
and behavioural output, but it enacts the domain of possible interactions where self and world 
are structurally coupled.  
          The individual is coupled to his environment by perceptual and motor attunement to 
the environment.
40
 This sensorimotor view of consciousness is closely linked to the enactive 
approach, which holds that perceptual consciousness is a kind of skillful attunement.
41
 In the 
human case, the life-world of the person is constituted by meaningful symbols and the 
attuned and intentional actions of others, which are irreducibly normative. 
          In Merleau-Ponty‟s view, when we recognise that the generation of the self-pole is 
ontologically prior to the emergence of the internal/external dichotomy, and that the resultant 
coupling with the environment is normative,
42
 then, Thompson adds, “we can no longer 
regard life as a mechanism in the classical sense... Rather, we must then see nature as having 
a kind of inner life.”43 Moreno and Barandiaran concur. They say:  
The (self) generation of an inside is ontologically prior to the dichotomy in-out. It is the 
inside that generates the asymmetry and it is in relation to this inside that an outside can be 
established. Although the interactive process/relations are necessary for the maintainance of 
the system, they presuppose it (the system) since it is the internal organization of the system 
that controls the interactive relations.
44
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          Thompson also believes that we must consider an irreduciblly phenomenal component. 
This means that “naturalism cannot explain matter, life, and mind, as long as explanation 
means purging nature of subjectivity and then trying to reconstitute subjectivity of nature thus 
purged.”45 This argument that Thompson puts forward is “transcendental”46, but he does not 
mean to thereby justify idealism. Rather, the transcendental line of thought points out that 
whenever we ask how objects are experientially disclosed to us, we must consider the object 
as part of the “correlational structure of intentionality”47. Thus if we ask how objects are 
disclosed, then we are forced to take into account the mental acts that intend the object. When 
we do this, we recognise that this transcendental line of thought does not deny “actually 
existing reality” (the external world), but that it rejects an objectivist account thereof. It 
reasons that the way the world is given to us cannot be detached from our subjectivity and its 
intentional activities that make disclosure of the world possible.
48
 
          This gives consciousness a transcendental status. By this we mean that whenever we 
consider how it is possible for objects to be disclosed to us, we always presuppose 
consciousness as a prior and necessary condition for this.
49
 Thompson argues that there is no 
way to remove ourselves from our own subjectivity, and that it is in this sense that the 
phenomenal world is more alive than the domain in which scientific objects are found. From 
an empirical standpoint, then, mind emerges from matter and life, but from a transcendental 
(phenomenal) standpoint anything discernible is only so because it is disclosed by 
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consciousness-a-priori.
50
 
          Varela proposed a methodological remedy to research consciousness understood in this 
transcendental and phenomenological sense. He labelled it “neurophenomenology”.51 It starts 
from the transcendental recognition that experience is ineliminable and aims to integrate the 
different orders (matter, mind, and life) without reducing any one domain to another. 
Thompson continues this project and discusses the “continuity between life and mind”.52 I 
will discuss how neurophenomenologists envision this to be possible, with a close eye on 
Thompson work, which bears the standard of this research program today.
53
 
1.2 From Living Systems to Lived Systems: the Continuity between Life and Mind 
In order for us to understand Varela‟s and Thompson‟s methodological remedy to 
transcendent consciousness, we must first understand how they connect living systems and 
lived systems. If we can see the connection, then we can understand the “natural roots” of our 
phenomenology.
54
 In this way, Varela and Thompson attempt to account for the two 
fundamental principles of consciousness, namely intentionality and self-awareness. Let us 
then begin with living systems. 
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1.2.1 The Living System 
Maturana and Varela proposed that autopoiesis is both necessary and sufficient to 
characterise a living system,
55
 but it must be said that they also believed that all autopoietic 
systems are cognitive systems. Recently this idea has been challenged. Interestingly though, 
objectors, in spite of their reservations, all agree with Maturana and Varela that a living 
system is both an autopoietic system and a cognitive system, but some disagree on the issue 
whether all autopoietic systems are cognitive systems.
56
 I shall not concern myself with the 
details of this debate. What I will do is pick up my case from the plateau of consensus, 
namely that a living system is both autopoietic and cognitive.  
          Thompson believes that to understand a living system as both autopoietic and cognitive 
is to establish a deep continuity between life and mind.
57
 In order to make sense of this, we 
need to further explicate the notion of cognition and how it relates to autopoiesis.  
          On the one hand, “autopoiesis” describes the self-producing network of a living 
system; on the other hand, “cognition” describes the way this network relates to (or enacts) its 
environment. In Maturana‟s and Varela‟s eyes, the relation between autopoiesis and 
cognition is twofold: (i) the emergence of an autopoietic system entails that it has a cognitive 
relation to its environment; and (ii) this cognitive relation subserves the system‟s autopoietic 
continuation. Maturana describes this as follows: 
A cognitive system is a system whose organization defines a domain of interactions in which 
it can act with relevance to the maintenance of itself, and the process of cognition is the 
actual (inductive) acting or behaving in this domain. Living systems are cognitive systems, 
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and living as a process is a process of cognition. This statement is valid for all organisms, 
with and without a nervous system.
58
 
          According to Thompson, the continuity of life and mind is not only organisational and 
cognitive, but also phenomenological. He believes that the theory of autopoiesis can bridge 
the philosophy of the organism and the philosophy of mind, because autopoiesis brings forth 
a normative relation to its environment, that is, it has immanent purposiveness.
59
  
          The notion of immanent purposiveness has two aspects:
60
 the first is identity; the 
second is sense-making. First, autopoiesis generates and sustains a dynamic identity of 
operational form in the presence of material change (e.g. the body renews itself numerous 
times throughout one life span; it undergoes material change, but maintains a dynamic bodily 
identity). Second, an autopoietic organism must make sense of its environment to maintain 
itself. According to Thompson, this sense-making (cognitive) component of living systems 
transforms the “physiochemical world into an environment of significance and valence”.61  
          Varela and Thompson believe that immanent purposiveness serves as a naturalised and 
biological explanation of purpose, because it is both cause and effect of itself (a non-linear 
and dynamic self-organisation).
62
 In this way, they put forward a theory of the minimal and 
biological foundations of intentionality: autopoiesis and sense-making. Thompson calls this 
the “natural roots of intentionaliy”,63 and anywhere below this minimal level of complexity, 
which we have identified as autopoiesis (a living system), there is no phenomenological 
disclosure of the world. 
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1.2.2 The Lived System (Body) 
The minimal sense of intentionality put forward by Varela and Thompson denotes a kind of 
sense-making, i.e. a cognitive and normative relationship of a living system with its 
environment; however, not all such cognitive relations are conscious, by which we mean 
subjectively experienced.
64
 As Thompson admits, “immanent purposiveness does not entail 
consciousness” and a minimally autopoietic selfhood does not necessarily establish 
phenomenal selfhood and subjectivity.
65
 How then can we account for such consciousness? 
          To respond to this, Jonas said that “life can be known only by life”.66 He believes that 
all living systems without exception have inwardness. Thompson concurs, and he adds to this 
that autopoiesis is that which in one stroke gives rise to inwardness and outwardness.
67
 Thus 
all life has interiority (coupled with exteriority), which is the domain of selfhood and sense-
making. According to Thompson, this interior domain (inwardness) is the precursor to the 
“interiority of consciousness”.68  
          To say that “life can be known only by life” is a transcendental proposal made from a 
phenomenological point view.
69
 It recognises the inwardness of life, and that life cannot be 
accounted for as a purely “external” phenomenon (from a purely third-person point of view). 
Thus to speak about the interior domain of a living being already represents a perspective that 
defies an objectivist view of nature purged of subjectivity. In Thompson‟s view, when we 
recognise the inwardness of life in such a way that it cannot be captured by a “purely external 
conception”, then this inwardness is what underlies his idea of a “deep continuity of life and 
mind”.70  
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          At this point, Thompson does not seek to answer the unsolved problem of how 
sentience (i.e., the feeling of being alive, and the ability to feel one‟s body and recognise the 
presence of the world) arises. However, he points out that we can only understand how lived 
subjectivity emerges from a living being on the basis of a notion of living being that is 
already constituted by inwardness (interiority), which cannot be captured by a purely external 
and objectivist account. Thus Thompson holds that consciousness has an irreducibly 
transcendental status (phenomenologically speaking) in addition to an empirical one.
71
  
          Because consciousness is irreducible, Thompson argues that we need to expand our 
definition of the “physical” and recontextualise our idea of the “body”. As Thompson says, 
“life is not physical in the standard material sense.”72 One move that Thompson makes to 
remedy this is to substitute the term “physical” with the term “body”, because it represents a 
living organism that has life, and such cannot be confined to the notion of the “physical”, as it 
is conceived in the Cartesian framework.
73
 
          To approach the subject of the body differently, then, phenomenologists distinguish 
two senses of the body: first, the body can be disclosed to us as a material thing (Körper); 
second, the body can be a lived body (Leib), that is, something that we subjectively 
experience being.
74
 Thompson acknowledges that there is a sense of discontinuity when we 
move from the view of the body as a living body (autonomous structures that stand in a 
cognitive relation to an environment via a domain of possible interaction it itself specifies) to 
the view of the body as a lived body (the interior domain of sentience and intentional 
activity).
75
 However, Thompson believes that this gap is no longer as formidable as the 
classical Cartesian gap that exists between two radically different ontologies of the mental 
and the physical, because (i) the gap is between two types of only one category of 
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embodiment; and (ii) to formulate the distinction as laid out above, we have to make 
reference to the common denominators of life and living beings.
76
 
          Thompson believes that the move from the living body to the lived body is one in 
which the lived body is the living body, but enacted in its living. From this follows that the 
challenge for the enactive approach is “to understand a lived body as a special kind of 
autonomous system, one whose sense-making brings forth, enacts, or constitutes a 
phenomenological world”.77 In what follows, then, I will discuss how the enactive approach 
attempts to account for subjectivity as a bodily phenomenon. 
1.2.3 The Dynamic Sensorimotor (Enactive) Approach and Bodily Self-awareness 
Biological autonomy entails that we relate to our environment in terms of our own dynamic 
sensorimotor constitution, i.e. our lived body; however, we must appreciate that we encounter 
our environment through our bodily subjectivity without it being an object of our experience. 
Rather, it constitutes our experience and is implicit in our encounter of the world.
78
  
          When we consider the lived body as a vehicle through which we engage with our 
environment (i.e., embodied action), Thompson reminds us that we need to consider two 
important things.
79
 First, our bodily subjectivity functions as an indexical frame of reference, 
a “null point of orientation”, which enables things to present themselves to a perspectival 
first-person point of view. Second, our lived body does not realise this function by virtue of 
being an intentional object of our experience (it is not the body-as-object). To the contrary, it 
is innate to our “motor intentionality”80 and as such enables it, rather than being itself 
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disclosed by it (it is the body-as-subject).  
          Once we take into account that our bodily subjectivity is indexical and implicit in our 
experience, we can appreciate Thompson‟s idea that “perceptual experience involves a non-
object-directed and implicit awareness of one‟s lived body, an intransitive and prereflective 
bodily self-awareness.”81 This bodily self-awareness is most of the time not present as an 
object in our experience, but tacitly present in the background, non-thematically. Sartre 
describes this form of implicit self-consciousness as “non-positional”.82  
          Thompson believes that perceptual experience ought to be explicated via a “dynamic 
sensorimotor approach”83 that is (i) supported by an enactive account of selfhood (i.e., 
autonomous systems, which we have already discussed) and (ii) enriched by an account of 
pre-reflective bodily self-awareness.
84
  
          An enactive account of selfhood is needed, because perceptual experience implies 
sensorimotor knowledge, and Thompson believes that such requires “a knower or agent or 
self that embodies this knowledge”.85 An account of pre-reflective bodily-awareness is also 
needed, because this kind of agency entails the first-personal givenness of experience and the 
presence of “ipseity” (I-ness) that constitutes this subjectivity.86 Husserl also believed that 
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such bodily self-awareness was a necessary condition of possibility for our perceiving and 
interacting with the world (“spatial”87 objects).88 
          This means that we need to explain “transitive”89 perceptual-experiences-of-something 
in a way that also takes into account that such perceptual experiences are “intransitively” self-
aware; they have first-personal givenness (being perspectival and given to “me” as “my 
experience” through an indexical “point of departure”). Hence Thompson concludes that a 
complete theory of perceptual experience includes a satisfying account of pre-reflective 
bodily self-consciousness, which is an intransitive, non-objectifying, and non-thematic 
condition that is part and parcel of our intentional mental acts.
90
 
           It is clear that at this point the so-called “body-body” problem resurfaces: How can we 
move from a living body to the lived body?
91
 Thompson believes that this gap can be 
methodologically bridged via a dynamic sensorimotor approach to perceptual experience that 
includes (i) an enactive view of selfhood (which I already discussed) and (ii) a 
phenomenological account of self-awareness.  
          In Thompson‟s view, the enactive approach (via neurophenomenology) unifies these 
two important components, because it links the mind sciences and phenomenology in a 
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“mutually illuminating way”.92 In the next section, I will build on the ideas presented so far 
and focus on how phenomenologists think about self-awareness. I will then discuss how 
Thompson intends to theoretically account for self-awareness with the help of the 
neurophenomenological paradigm. 
1.3 Self-awareness: The Subjective Principle of Consciousness 
The notion of self-awareness points to the feature of our experience that is conscious in its 
most basic sense. By this I mean that experience does not happen in a vacuum, but is 
consciously lived-through by us and as “ours”. Conscious experience is thus necessarily and 
pre-reflectively self-aware. It is built into subjective experience.
93
 We are also not only aware 
of the intentional objects of our experience, but we are also aware of features of our 
experience, namely the ongoing activity of the experiencing itself and what it is like.
94
 Sartre 
explained this phenomenon as follows: “Every positional consciousness of an object is at the 
same time a non-positional consciousness of itself.”95 Let us look at some examples that 
illustrate this subjective principle of consciousness. 
          Consider the case of visual experience. You see a bunch of flowers standing on the 
dinner table. In this act you are visually aware of the bunch of flowers; however, you also 
experience your seeing. This aware experiencing is innate to the experience. It is an implicit 
component that does not require reflection, i.e. it is pre-reflective and inbuilt.  
          Now consider a case in which you try to recall the experience of seeing the bunch of 
flowers a few days later. You re-present the experience in your mind by calling forth the 
image from memory. In this case, you will notice that the two instances have different 
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qualitative features. In the first instance, when you visually experience the bunch of flowers, 
it presents itself to you effortlessly and spontaneously. In the second instance, when you re-
present the image from memory, the experience requires more effort, it is not spontaneous 
and will demand a lot more focused attention. In this example, we notice that our intentional 
experiences have different features that change the way it is for us to live through them. This 
aspect corresponds to the intentional quality of an experience (the way living through an 
experience is like for us) that is present alongside the intentional matter of experience (what 
the experience is about, the object).
96
  
          Another example is the case of lucid dreaming that makes salient the waking/dreaming 
contrast.
97
 It does this because in these experiences, subjects become aware that they are in a 
dream state with more or less stability – sometimes also with control over the dream content. 
As Thompson and Dunne argue, what is important about these occurrences is that they force 
us to distinguish between awareness and the contents of awareness, that is, “awareness qua 
awareness” and “awareness qua content”.98 In strong cases of lucid dreaming subjects are 
aware of the contents of their dreaming as changing; however, they are also “aware of the 
dream state as a state”.99 This shows that we cannot equate awareness with the contents of 
awareness. Thus experience is not “transparent” or “diaphanous”,100 contrary to the claims of 
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many representationalists. Rather, it is aware of the mode in which experiencing is occurring 
(pre-reflectively self-aware).
101
 Consequently, this implicit awareness, which is a kind of self-
consciousness,
102
 allows us to be aware of constitutive features of our experience. We are 
pre-reflectively state aware. 
          Our inbuilt pre-reflective self-awareness of experiencing also allows us to attend to 
features of our experience and in this way become aware of them.
103
 This feature-awareness 
is not the same as simply directing our attention to the objects of our experience. We can be 
aware of what there is to see (e.g., the bunch of flowers), but we can also pay attention to 
how this act of seeing feels, or how this seeing is experienced by us. This capacity enables us 
to become aware of features of our experience that are normally not a part of our conscious 
experience (they are implicit and pre-reflective). Aspects of our experience that were 
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unthematic and in the background are now made explicit, thematised, and brought to the 
foreground of our conscious experience.
104
 
1.3.1 Self-awareness and Time-Consciousness 
Phenomenologists hold that there is a close connection between self-awareness, bodily 
awareness, and time-consciousness.  
          First, intentional experiences are constituted by a pre-reflective self-awareness. They 
are first-personal (given to “me”) and have a distinctive way of being lived-through – there is 
something it is like to undergo such experiences: they actually do phenomenally occur to a 
subject, and their phenomenology is one of being owned by, or belonging to, “them”.105 
          Second, this implicit awareness is closely tied to our intransitive and direct 
acquaintance with our own bodily subjectivity, that is, our lived body functions as a “point of 
convergence of action and perception”106 (the indexical “here”). This in turn is made possible 
through sensorimotor integration and the way in which the body‟s “motor intentionality”107 
situates itself in and relates to the environment.
108
 Our bodily self-awareness is therefore not 
an object-directed observation that takes yet another object as the focus of experience (as an 
image or a type of “object-consciousness”), but it is a non-observational and pre-reflective 
lived subjectivity through which the world and intentional objects are encountered.
109
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          Third, our awareness of experience is unified across time. This includes the unity of 
our actions and their coherent phenomenal flow from one into another over time.
110
 Our 
awareness is thus experienced as an unbroken stream of experiencing.  
          The temporal and unified quality of our awareness-of-experiencing is referred to as 
“time-consciousness”. It comprises two components: (i) our awareness of “temporal”111 
objects; and (ii) our awareness of our own temporally extended experiencing. The former is 
identified as “outer” time-consciousness and the latter as “inner” time-consciousness.112 
          Husserl argued that consciousness must transcend the punctual now, and thereby be 
conscious of the immediate past and future to allow for a coherent flow of experiencing.
113
 
For James, too, the basic unit of experienced time was not a “knife-edge” present, but a 
“duration- block”,114 which is a kind of temporal field that comprises present, past, and future 
modalities.
115
 Husserl tried to provide a structural analysis of such time-consciousness that 
consists of three intentional processes: primal impression (the “now-phase”), retention (the 
“just-elapsed phase”), and protention (the “just-about-to-occur phase”).116  
           We can envision this structure via the example of listening to a melody. In the now-
phase of the melody we receive primal impressions of sounding notes that have no reference 
to past or future. In the just-elapsed phase, we continue to hear the notes that we just heard; 
however, we do so in a mode of them having-past. Subjectively, the note still sounds because 
it is intentionally present, even though it is not actually so. In the last, just-about-to-occur 
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phase, we are open to the horizon of our experiencing. This phase differs from the prior two 
in that it is empty, not filled by any determinate content of notes just occurring or being re-
presented as just-past. It is a condition of anticipation. 
          In this way, Husserl (and James) account for the temporal width of our experience by 
integrating the just-past and the just-about-to-occur into the phenomenal flow of our 
streaming experience. According to Husserl, the unified operation of this threefold structure 
underlies our acquaintance with the present, which is an experience of the present moment as 
being temporally extended. Below is a schematic illustration of this threefold structure of 
time-consciousness: 
 
          To understand how time-consciousness allows us to experience in a unified way, we 
must come to appreciate how the “retentional continuum” holds primal impressions 
intentionally in our awareness, and allows them to gradually slip away as our conscious 
experience is re-supplied with new impressions. This retentional continuum, then, comprises 
the just-past phases of consciousness. It operates with the help of two kinds of intentional 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Retention 
 Protention 
Primal Impression 
Time-consciousness according to Husserl 
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operations.
117
  
          (i) The first intentional operation retains the phases of consciousness itself – the 
impressions, retentions, protentions – and it does so in a way that holds them properly 
connected to each other. To say that consciousness intentionally holds onto its just-past 
phases means that consciousness presents those phases to our awareness as just-past. We are 
therefore not speaking about retaining intentional objects, but about how consciousness 
retains conscious acts as phases belonging to the just-past. I shall call this operational feature 
“phase-retention” (notice the parallel here to “state-awareness” as discussed in the case of 
lucid dreaming).  
          (ii) The second intentional operation ensures that the intentional object itself is 
experienced as temporally extended; I shall call this “object-retention”. For this operation to 
be possible, however, intentional objects must be situated as belonging to previous phases of 
conscious acts (phase-retention). Thus Thompson points out that “to be aware of intentional 
objects across time, consciousness must also be retentionally aware of itself.”118 This means 
that apart from retaining objects, consciousness must also be related to itself, or in other 
words, consciousness must retain the sense of itself through time (phase-retention). In this 
way, our experiencing is constituted by the retention of just-past intentional objects by virtue 
of the retentional operations holding onto the just-past (phase-) experience as well. 
          We can see that self-consciousness is an inbuilt feature of the threefold structure of 
time-consciousness. If we reconsider the example of listening to a melody, we can say that 
our temporally extended hearing of a melody is accompanied by (or only possible because of) 
our awareness of our ongoing experience of this melody. According to Husserl, this kind of 
experiencing is made possible because of the threefold structure of time-consciousness. It 
entails a past-present-future continuum of experiencing in which we experience temporal 
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objects (intentional acts) while also being “implicitly co-aware” of our ongoing and 
temporally extended stream of experiencing.
119
 
          At this point of our analysis of time-consciousness we encounter a problem: If we wish 
to account for our capacity to coherently experience over time (e.g., a melody) with the help 
of the threefold structure of time-consciousness, then we must also account for our ability to 
experience those intentional mental acts themselves. According to Thompson, it is a given 
that we can become aware of our experiences (intentional acts) as unfolding in time. This, in 
turn, entails that they too have temporal character.
120
 If we do not wish to invoke the 
threefold impression-retention-protention model again to explain our experience of 
intentional acts themselves, then we end up having to posit a further consciousness to account 
for coherence and duration of experience. This leads us into an infinite regress. How can we 
stop this regress? 
          The dominant interpretation of how Husserl responds to this issue tells us that he 
posited a further consciousness, which he called the “absolute consciousness” or “the 
absolute flow”.121 According to this account, the absolute consciousness denotes a deeper 
level of inner time-consciousness – a kind of “bedrock stratum” that is the a priori condition 
for any other form of consciousness – and is that by which intentional acts are brought to 
awareness.
122
  
          This account of the absolute flow (also conceived as the deepest level of time-
consciousness) encounters problems, however: it does not avoid the regress issue. Thompson 
raises two related questions in this respect (about absolute consciousness).
123
  
          For one, is this absolute consciousness something we experience? If not, then the 
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notion would seem purely theoretical without much empirical support or intuitive plausibility. 
If we do experience the absolute flow, then how is this brought to our awareness? Again, we 
run into the problem of infinite regress.  
          Second, are our intentional experiences objects of our inner time-consciousness? Do 
we need to introduce a subject-object duality (transitive structure)? If so, what does this say 
about the relationship between time-consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness (which 
is intransitive in structure)? 
          Thompson and Zahavi agree on the proper way to respond to these questions. They 
both conclude that time-consciousness is one and the same thing as pre-reflective self-
awareness.
124
 According to Zahavi, we actually find the most elaborate treatment of pre-
reflective self-awareness in Husserl‟s analysis of inner time-consciousness.125 To understand 
this, let us unpack their way of thinking about this issue and address the first question: Do we 
experience absolute consciousness, and if so, how? 
             According to Husserl, consciousness as a sheer flow is phenomenologically 
discernable if we attend to our experience with great care and phenomenological aptness 
(following the steps of the phenomenological method). This streaming consciousness is 
“absolute, ultimate, or original”,126 because it does not depend on any further condition of 
possibility. It is itself the deepest level. Thompson definitely supports this idea and agrees 
with Husserl that if we look close enough, we can phenomenologically identify  
a flowing or streaming belonging to our consciousness that is distinct from the objects or 
contents of consciousness, that is, from whatever our experience is about or directed toward.
127
 
Zahavi concurs: 
                                                          
124
 Dan Zahavi, “Inner Time-consciousness and Pre-reflective Self-awareness,” in The New Husserl: A Critical 
Reader, ed. Donn Welton (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 168; and Evan 
Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 325-328. 
125
 Dan Zahavi, “Inner Time-consciousness and Pre-reflective Self-awareness,” in The New Husserl: A Critical 
Reader, ed. Donn Welton (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 164. 
126
 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 324. 
127
 Ibid. 
36 | P a g e  
 
Whereas we live through a number of different experiences, our self-awareness [the absolute 
flow of inner time-consciousness] remains as an unchanging dimension. It stands – to use the 
striking image of James – permanent, like the rainbow on the waterfall, with its own quality 
unchanged by the events that stream through it. In other words, it is highly appropriate [and 
experientially possible] to distinguish the strict singularity of the lebendige Gegenwart from 
the plurality of changing experiences.
128
 
Given, then, that Thompson and Zahavi interpret Husserl to have believed that we can 
become aware of absolute consciousness (the “living present”, or “standing-streaming”129), 
how do Thompson and Zahavi avoid an infinite regress in their approach to Husserl‟s absolute 
consciousness? 
           First, Thompson emphasises Husserl‟s attempt to offer a plausible explanation of how 
the absolute flow is self-constituting with the help of its two intentional operations of object-
retention and phase-retention (it not only retains the experience of external objects, but also 
the awareness of what the experience is like for us – the phase of the experience).  
          According to this account, the stream of consciousness retains and protends itself 
allowing the stream as a whole to be self-unifying. Thompson is quick to add that the absolute 
flow is self-organising, obviously attempting to further his project of closing the gap between 
(biologically) living systems – whose dynamic, self-organising network relations enable 
autonomy and define identity – and (phenomenologically) lived systems – whose dynamic, 
flowing threefold structure of time-consciousness is self-unifying and in this way, too, self-
organising).
130
 
          Second, Husserl argues that the absolute flow does not itself move in or through time. 
While the absolute flow does have a phenomenal temporality to it, it is itself not in time. In 
this way, it stands on its own terms as the living present. This living present is the standing-
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streaming that underlies all appearances of flow, without being subject to time. Thompson 
explains that this way of thinking about the absolute flow is phenomenological, because 
we can distinguish within experience between what changes or varies and what remains 
invariant. The contents of the present moment – the particular things of which we are aware – 
arise and perish. But the present moment as a structure of awareness does not change or vary. 
No matter what we experience, it is always there, or rather always here. It is not a changing 
content of experience, but an unchanging structure of experience, the threefold structure of 
primal impression-retention-protention.
131
 
James followed the same kind of phenomenological reasoning: 
Into the awareness of the thunder itself the awareness of the previous silence creeps and 
continues; for what we hear when the thunder crashes is not thunder pure, but thunder-
breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it.
132
 
In these accounts of the stream of consciousness (the absolute flow), we can see how the 
flowing, ever-present background (that is an invariant condition of possibility) is 
distinguished from the changing contents of experience. The background is unchanging and 
unaffected, yet it is also the flow of phenomenal time, even if it is not in time itself. The 
absolute flow neither occurs in time nor moves through time, because it is the self-
constituting flow of phenomenal time itself. All temporal predicates apply only to the 
temporally extended objects that are disclosed by this a priori condition, but not to the 
absolute flow itself, whereby we experience those temporal objects.
133
  
          Third, Thompson and Zahavi both reject the problem of infinite regress with the help 
of an interesting response to the (second) question of whether intentional experiences are 
objects of our inner time-consciousness: they argue that this is not the case because absolute 
consciousness is pre-reflective self-awareness. In their view, this kind of self-awareness stops 
the infinite regress, because it is non-objectifying and intransitive (not of a subject-object 
structure). 
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          To illustrate what is meant by this, Thompson offers two examples. First, absorbed 
skillful activity does not have a subject-object structure; rather, it is an “immediate coupling” 
or “dynamic attunement” with the environment.134 Second, when we listen to a melody, at 
least in the case of absorbed or immersed listening, then our listening does not objectify 
experience. There is neither a thematic awareness of the melody as an object distinct from the 
subject, nor is there a thematic awareness of the act of listening itself. According to 
Thompson, we misdescribe our experience if we say that we experience our listening as a 
kind of internal temporal object that is distinct from our hearing of the melody.
135
  
          In their view, our experience of our listening is an intransitive (non-object-directed) 
and unthematic component of our experience. If we believe that the experience of our 
listening is one that is of an inner temporal object, then this amounts to believing that our 
hearing the melody is a transitive act that goes hand in hand with being transitively aware of 
our listening. However, if we look at our experience with a careful phenomenological eye, 
then we must acknowledge that our experience of our listening is pre-reflective, intranstitive, 
and non-thematic instead of reflective, transitive, and thematic.
136
  
          Our listening to the melody, then, comprises two aspects: (i) the hearing of the melody 
itself in a transitive way; and (ii) our subjectivity that lives through our listening in an 
intransitive way. To live through our listening in this way means that in our listening there is 
inbuilt a component that immediately manifests our experience to us without the help of 
reflection or observation. This inbuilt, subjective component is the first-personal quality of 
our experience that is implicit and not a type of object-consciousness.
137
 As Zahavi says, this 
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component “belongs intrinsically to the innermost structure of the act itself.”138 Thus the 
subjectivity of experience is its intrinsic, non-object-directed, and pre-reflective self-
awareness. 
          Both Zahavi and Thompson agree that for us to experience temporal objects, 
consciousness must be aware of itself across time. Zahavi points out that Husserl‟s account of 
time-consciousness, and its threefold structure of impression-retention-protention, is nothing 
else than an analysis of the structure of pre-reflective self-awareness (the inbuilt self-aware 
quality of our acts and experiences).
139
  
          In their view, this fundamental idea that “inner time-consciousness is nothing other 
than prereflective self-awareness”140 stops the infinite regress, because our intentional 
experiences are decidedly not objects of our inner time-consciousness (or self-awareness), but 
they are implicitly self-aware without a subject-object structure. This means that self-
awareness does not stand outside of our experience as some distinct and separate condition 
that itself requires yet another awareness.
141
 To the contrary, as Zahavi argues, this self-
awareness of experience “is an internal, non-reflective, irrelational feature of the experience 
itself, and thus the regress is stopped.” To underwrite this, I offer some additional evidence of 
Thompson‟s and Zahavi‟s position on this. 
          Thompson states:
142
  
The structure of inner time-consciousness – primal impression-retention-protention – is exactly 
the structure of prereflective self-awareness and also precisely the absolute flow. 
          Zahavi states:
143
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The absolute flow of experiencing simply is the pre-reflective self-manifestation of our experiences. 
Inner time-consciousness simply is the name of the pre-reflective self-awareness of our experiences. 
 Inner time-consciousness is the pre-reflective self-awareness of the act. 
          If self-awareness is understood in terms of this threefold structure of time-
consciousness, and time-consciousness is understood in terms of the inbuilt and pre-reflective 
nature of self-awareness in intentional experience, then the notion of absolute consciousness 
does indeed end the regress. Our subjectivity of experience, then, is retentionally aware of 
itself over time through the threefold structure of impression-retention-protention. This 
structure in turn entails intransitive self-awareness, which does not objectify our intentional 
experiences, but lives through them immediately and pre-reflectively.  
1.4 Neurophenomenology: Self-awareness and the Methodological Remedy 
I promised that I would discuss how Varela and Thompson intend to account for inner 
consciousness (i.e., self-awareness or time-consciousness) with the help of 
neurophenomenology. I will do so now. 
          Recall that Thompson believes that the gap between living systems and lived systems 
(life and mind) can be methodologically bridged via (i) an enactive view of selfhood and (ii) 
a phenomenological account of self-awareness. I have already discussed the 
phenomenological underpinnings of the notion of self-awareness; now I will draw on this to 
explicate how neurophenomenology intends to account for self-awareness. 
         To begin with, our phenomenological discussion has shown that phenomenologists, 
including Thompson, equate self-awareness and time-consciousness. Furthermore, they 
believe that an analysis of time-consciousness is nothing but a structural account of self-
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awareness.
144
 Since an analysis of time-consciousness yields a threefold dynamic structure of 
impression-retention-protention, neurophenomenology compares this to the enactive view of 
selfhood (a dynamic sensorimotor approach) and the dynamic, self-organising network of 
living systems.  
         Varela‟s strategy is to develop dynamic models of the structural invariants that 
represent “a common structural level of description that capture[s] the dynamics of both the 
impressional-retentional-protentional flow of time-consciousness and the large scale neural 
processes thought to be associated with consciousness.”145 In Thompson‟s view, it is clear 
that time-consciousness is self-constituting, and it is the task of neurophenomenology to 
demonstrate how this dynamic, self-organising structure of time-consciousness is mirrored on 
the biological level of living systems, which are also dynamic and self-organising 
(autonomous).
146
 In this way, time-consciousness is considered to be “an acid test of the 
entire neurophenomenological enterprise.”147 
          Let us take a step back and talk about what neurophenomenology is, so that we can 
appreciate just how exactly this research program promises to mirror phenomenology in 
biology.  
          Neurophenomenology is a research program for the scientific study of consciousness, 
first put forward by the late Francisco Varela in the 1990s.
148
 Within the context of cognitive 
neuroscience, this program places importance on the rigorous collection of first-person data 
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from phenomenologically trained subjects for the purpose of studying the neural dynamics of 
consciousness. This is intended as a heuristic strategy.
149
 The turn to phenomenology – and 
first-person methods more broadly considered – is pragmatic, not theoretic. According to 
Lutz, when we think about this from an experimental point of view, this denotes a going 
beyond “the just-take-a-look attitude”150 in respect to our experience.  
          With the integration of first-person methods into experimental research on 
consciousness, Varela formulates the “working hypothesis” of neurophenomenology: 
Phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their counterparts in cognitive 
science relate to each other through reciprocal constraints.
151
 
What Varela means by “reciprocal constraints” is that phenomenological analysis of (the 
structure of) experience can inform scientific research of consciousness, and that in turn 
scientific discoveries can inform phenomenological work on consciousness.
152
 In this way, 
precise first-person data constrains analytic and interpretive work on physiological processes, 
and vice versa.
153
  
          To this end, neurophenomenology synthesises three domains of knowledge:
154
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(NPh1) phenomenological analysis of the structure of experience, that is, data from   
       first-person methods; 
(NPh2) models derived from dynamic systems theory for these structures that have  
        been disclosed by first-person methods; 
(NPh3) empirical experimentation to realise these models in (biologically) living  
       systems through measurements of brain processes relevant to consciousness. 
Thus far, I have talked a lot about (1), especially about the dynamic, self-constitutive, 
threefold structure of time-consciousness (as an analysis of the structure of self-awareness). I 
have also introduced some basic concepts about living systems as they are understood by 
Maturana and Varela and other thinkers in the philosophy of biology. Living systems, in their 
view, are cognitive and autonomous systems that realise their autonomy through dynamic, 
mutually supportive networks that are operationally closed. In both the case of (phenomenal) 
self-awareness and of (biologically) living systems we find self-organisation. According to 
neurophenomenology, the phenomenal and the biological can be brought into a “reflective 
equilibrium” through dynamic systems theory, because it can conceptually re-describe both 
autonomous domains.
155
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          When we consider the task of neurophenomenology to account for self-awareness in 
this way, we see that the acid test depends on whether or not phenomenological accounts of 
time-consciousness and neurodynamical accounts of processes in the brain can be mutually 
illuminated. Therefore, the self-constituting stream of time-consciousness has to be mirrored 
at the biological level through the self-organising dynamics of living systems (in this specific 
case, neural activity).
156
 Thus the aim of neurophenomenology is to explain how the 
standing-streaming of consciousness (the temporal, flowing structure of our experience) is 
realised in the dynamics of biological processes.
157
 For Thompson, neurophenomenology is 
just one such way 
to naturalize the phenomenological account of time-consciousness by redescribing the structure 
of time-consciousness in the language of dynamic systems theory and mapping this description 
onto biological processes going on in the brain.
158
 
What is important to understand here is simply the following: The neurophenomenological 
approach rests on the framework of dynamic systems theory to develop common structural 
levels of description between phenomenal and biological processes (systems) to bridge the 
gap between life (the living domain) and mind (the phenomenal domain). 
          I believe to be able to present an interesting (and empirically promising) challenge for 
this research program by considering phenomenological accounts of self-awareness from 
contemplative phenomenologists. I will discuss how these accounts bring into question the 
continental analysis of self-awareness as time-consciousness, and in this way show that life 
and mind may not share this strong continuity that Thompson suggests after all: the 
contemplative mind and life may not have in common a (dynamical) pattern or organisation, 
continental phenomenology and neurophenomenology to the contrary. Therefore, the crucial 
pillar on which neurophenomenology rests, that is, dynamic systems theory, may actually be 
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ill-suited as a bridging strategy.
159
 
          Before putting forward the challenging accounts of contemplative phenomenologists 
(in Chapter 6), I will explore the rather vast plateau of consensus that exists between myself 
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and continental phenomenology. The aim of this is to show that we agree on a number of 
important points, namely: (i) that there are experiences with different structures; (ii) that 
“cognitive access” to our conscious life is a matter of thematising experience; and (iii) that 
we have such cognitive access to the intentional domain of consciousness. Once I have 
outlined this common ground, I will put forward a view of cognitive access on the basis of 
contemplative phenomenology that allows us to thematise self-awareness as well, a 
possibility which prominent continental phenomeonlogists deny. This will prepare us for the 
phenomenological data of a type of experience that presents a profound challenge for 
continental phenomenologists and Thompson‟s project to account for continuity between life 
and mind. 
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Chapter 2 
Structures of Experience: Intentionality, the 
Mind-World Relation, and Self-awareness 
 
That not all experiences are intentional is proved by sensations and sensational 
complexes.
160
 
 Edmund Husserl 
 
We are aware of what we experience without using introspection precisely because we 
have an implicit, non-objectifying, pre-reflective awareness of our own experience as we 
live it through... the awareness in question is not based on reflectively or introspectively 
turning our attention to our own experience. It is, rather, built into our experience as an 
essential part of it, and it is precisely this which defines our experiences as conscious 
experience.
161
 
 Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi 
This chapter will discuss basic phenomenological ideas about the structure of experience and 
the plateau of consensus that exists between my views and that of continental 
phenomenology. The main point I will make is that I agree with representatives of continental 
phenomenology on the fact that there are experiences with different structures. While we 
have a lot of common ground, however, we also disagree on one crucial point, namely to 
what extent we can expand the list of different types of experience. I disagree with 
continental phenomenology on the particular issue of whether or not subjectivity can be self-
enclosed. This disagreement decides to a large degree whether or not the enactive paradigm 
can account for continuity between life and mind. 
          In this chapter, I begin by introducing the phenomenological concept of intentionality, 
and I will discuss how intentionality connects subjectivity with the world. This is necessary 
for three reasons: (i) through understanding intentionality we come to understand how 
phenomenologists think about the structure of experience; (ii) when we consider 
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intentionality in this way, we discover that there are different types of intentionality (narrow 
and broad), which (iii) are important concepts to explain how phenomenologists think about 
self-awareness and the possible types of experience. 
         Next, I will present how continental phenomenologists conceive the relationship 
between intentionality and self-awareness. The conclusion they come to re-affirms that 
subjectivity is never self-enclosed but always open towards alterity (otherness). Thus I will 
leave behind the plateau of consensus with continental phenomenologists, because this 
conclusion excludes an important type of experience (which I will discuss in more detail in 
Chapter 6). 
          Finally I will outline different types of experience that can be distinguished on the basis 
of our treatment of intentionality and self-awareness. I will also put forward an additional 
type of experience that continental phenomenologists have heretofore denied, because they 
have relied on philosophical analysis above practical expertise to examine conscious 
experience. I will conclude this chapter by reviewing the ground I share with continental 
phenomenology and point out how we disagree on the nature of subjectivity. In the chapters 
that follow, I will argue for my own view in greater detail.  
2.1 Intentionality: The Objective Principle of Consciousness 
I agree with continental phenomenologists that to discuss intentionality is in part to discuss 
the nature of the mind itself, because intentionality is rightfully considered to be one of the 
central “structural” features of the mind (I emphasise the point “one of”; it is not “the” central 
feature). When phenomenologists talk about intentionality within the context of the mind, it 
is important not to confuse the word with its ordinary meaning of “intention”, which is a 
volitional phenomenon of the human psyche (i.e., “to have a purpose in mind when acting”), 
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and does not in itself explain any essential structural feature of the mind.
162
 Intentionality for 
our purpose describes a structural feature of consciousness and how the mind discloses 
phenomena to our experience. The etymology of intentionality indicates what is meant by 
this: it means to attend to or point to a target, as with a bow (the term is derived from the 
Latin verb tendere).
163
 Thus the mind is understood to direct itself towards the objects it 
discloses to the subject, and in this way, it is conceived to point beyond itself and to 
“transcend”164 itself.165  
          Phenomenologists speak about intentional experiences by referring to mental or 
intentional acts, in other words, acts of perceiving like remembering and imagining. This 
conceives our mental life to be a dynamic process of consecutive intentional acts, energised 
by a kind of intentional striving that finds fulfilment when the intentional objects are 
disclosed to the subject. In this context, intentionality is a kind of impersonal and non-
volitional striving, being a function of the mind to disclose that which transcends (is exterior 
to) the subjectivity of the subject.
166
 
2.1.1 The Correlational Structure and the “World” 
If we understand our mental life to be governed by mental acts that are the very acts they are 
because of the objects they intend, then it follows that for us to properly conceive 
intentionality, we cannot consider mental acts or the objects they intend in isolation. 
Intentionality, then, necessarily has a correlational structure.
167
 From the viewpoint of 
continental phenomenology, this correlational structure describes the invariant architecture of 
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our mental life, the way it is structurally constituted and made up. 
          In the phenomenological language of Husserl, the two poles of intentional act and 
intentional object are called “noesis” and “noema”: the noesis-noema correlation.168 The term 
noesis denotes the mental acts that constitute objects. To constitute an object means to 
disclose or present an object in a certain way, that is, as the phenomena are “manifest” to our 
awareness. The term noema denotes the object in its givenness. It is the intended object as it 
is presented or given to us in experience.
169
  
          To phenomenologically analyse the mind properly means to take both the objective and 
subjective correlate of mental acts into account. Thus the intentional nature of mental acts 
must be understood in such a way that the relata are considered to be inseparable. An 
intentional act, then, cannot be properly analysed without also considering its objective 
correlate, the intentional object – and vice versa.170 Brentano referred to this dual (but 
inseparable) relation between an experience and its object as the “dyadic relation”.171 When 
we take this dyadic relation seriously, we appreciate that to clarify the nature of intentionality 
means to clarify the relation between mind (subject) and world. From a phenomenological 
perspective the mind is not isolated and separate from the world (I will discuss this idea in 
more detail below). 
          It is important to be clear about what we mean by “world”. I agree that, 
phenomenologically speaking, the world must be understood as that which presents itself to 
us as the “othered”. It is that which transcends the subject and is experientially conceived as 
the exteriorised context towards which consciousness is directed and intentionally related. 
Thompson offers following definition of “world”:  
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From a phenomenological standpoint, world has to do with the idea of transcendence, that is, 
of something that exceeds our ability to encompass it, and it is like an ever receding horizon; it 
is always open to further disclosure.
172
  
This means that the intentionality of consciousness is a special relation that holds between the 
subjectivity of consciousness and the “othered” (object). This relation holds whether or not 
the object “exists” (in the common sense). Husserl comments on this. He says: 
If I represent God to myself, or an angel, or an intelligible thing-in-itself, or a physical thing or 
a round square etc., I mean the transcendent object named in each case, in other words my 
intentional object: it makes no difference whether this object exists or is imaginary or 
absurd.
173
  
What Husserl is saying is that consciousness can be directed towards “unreal” objects with an 
analogous structure as sense perception.
174
 That which consciousness intends is the world of 
the subject, and it is this ability of the mind to concern itself with objects, which may or may 
not “exist”, that allows the transcendent (the world) to manifest and present itself to the 
subject through first-personal experience.  
2.1.2 The Self-transcendence of Subjectivity 
A further point upon which I agree with the phenomenological tradition is this: When we 
discuss the nature of intentionality, it is important to distinguish between two kinds of 
intentionality, narrow and broad.
175
 
          Narrow intentionality refers to the vectorial capacity of consciousness, its object-
directedness. Experiences that are object-directed are those experiences in which we are 
typically conscious of something. Whatever mental act is involved, it is always about 
something – the object (which need not exit). The etymology of “object” also indicates this; it 
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means “something that stands before us”.176 Experiences that have a narrow intentionality are 
thus experiences of something as distinct from our sense of a present subject. A few examples 
of this kind of experience is thinking of something; remembering something; imagining 
something; wishing for something etc. 
          Object-directed experiences are a “transitive” kind of consciousness, because the 
function of consciousness to intend an object has a subject-object structure.
177
 The subject-
object structure is granted by virtue of the transcendence of that which cannot be 
encompassed by the subject – the exterior world of experience. Thus intentionality is 
characterised by difference and distinction in contrast to self-awareness, which is 
characterised by some form of identity.
178
  
          The subject-object structure of intentionality entails that the intentional relation is 
“aspectual”. For intentional directedness (i.e., “object-directed intentionality”) to be aspectual 
means that the subject-object structure, which implies that the subject has vectorial access to 
his world, is necessarily perspectival.
179
 This perspectival quality is known to us via the 
indexical “I” which is the locus of our experience. It is a first-personal self-reference that is 
non-objectifying and acquaints us with ourselves without object-discrimination.
180
 As Zahavi 
points out, “„I‟ is not only a condition of possibility, but is in an important sense the 
anchoring point of the person‟s entire system of reference.”181 We might also wish to say that 
object-consciousness presupposes that there is a subject confronted with experience, and that 
this sense of “here” and “I” is necessary for objects to be encountered as such. In this way, 
indexical reference determines a subjective point of view on the world that has its own 
perspectival mode of presentation. From this follows that intentional directedness (e.g., 
                                                          
176
 Ibid.,23. 
177
 Ibid. 
178
 Dan Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Alterity (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1999), 15. 
179
 Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and 
Cognitive Science (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 114. 
180
 Dan Zahavi, “First-Personal Self-reference and the Self-as-subject,” Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2007): 
602. 
181
 Dan Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Alterity (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1999), 24. 
53 | P a g e  
 
perception) is by nature an indexical kind of experience.
182
 Thus the aspectual givenness of 
our first-person point of view is necessary for us to experientially access the “other” (the 
world).
183
 
          Broad intentionality is not defined in terms of the object-directedness of narrow 
intentionality. Rather, it is defined as a kind of “openness to the world”184. It involves the 
world in a way that allows the subject to be affected by it, although the subject might not 
“thematically”185 attend to his world.186 I also agree with phenomenological philosophy on 
this very important point that there is a significant range of experiences which cannot be 
defined in terms of object-directed (narrow) intentionality. 
          Intentionally broad experiences might also be thematic, but not object-directed. 
Examples are everyday experiences which have no salient subject-object structure. Such 
experiences do not have intentional objects; they are not “about” distinct phenomena in the 
subject‟s world. They are not directed toward objects that transcend the subject, as things that 
stand over and against himself as a distinct subject. To these kinds of experience belong 
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moods, feelings of pain, nausea, objectless anxiety, depression, boredom, and skillful 
activity.
187
  
          Nevertheless, phenomenologists insist that we include such non-object-directed 
experiences within the concept of intentionality, because they wish to emphasise that even in 
these kinds of instances, consciousness remains open to what is other: it is not self-enclosed. 
Rather, consciousness discloses our embeddedness in the world (our embededneess is 
revealed by how our interior subjectivity is framed and affected by our world).
188
 Let us then 
review some examples of broad intentionality. 
          Consider a mood; for example, the case of depression. It does not vectorially access the 
world in the same way as other directed emotions do (e.g., the feeling of sympathy for 
another human being). But it does reveal how we are embedded in our world, because it has a 
world-involving nature – it colours how things are presented to us, and in this way influences 
the way we receive the world and react to it. 
          A different example of an intentionally broad experience is Sartre‟s famous case of 
feeling eyestrain.
189
 Imagine you read late into the night until you eventually feel fatigued. 
You notice this first when your eyes begin to tremble, followed by a blurriness of the words 
on the page in front of you. This feeling first manifests intransitively. It has no intended 
object. But your bodily feelings are not self-enclosed or without openness to the world 
because your immediate environment discloses itself in a very specific way through this 
feeling – just like moods and depression. Therefore, bodily feelings have a world-involving 
character. We might also wish to say that in such instances consciousness is not self-
contained. 
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          The world-involving character of intentionality compelled Merleau-Ponty to believe 
that subjectivity is not and can never be a self-enclosed mental realm, but that it is necessarily 
co-dependent with and inseparable from world.
190
 Subjectivity orientates itself to that which 
it is not. In this way, as Zahavi puts it, subjectivity has “openness toward alterity, a 
movement of exteriorization and perpetual self-transcendence”.191 This interplay between 
activity and passivity describes how an ongoing “operative intentionality”192 (broad) 
underlies object-directed intentional experience (narrow). We can illustrate this discussion on 
subjectivity and intentionality thus: 
       Subjectivity 
 
 
        Openness to     Movement towards 
(Broad Intentionality)         (Narrow Intentionality) 
 
 
 Alterity      Exteriorisation 
 
 
  Self-transcendence 
          (World) 
 
          To review the discussion so far: According to phenomenologists, intentionality is one 
central feature of consciousness. By considering the structure of intentionality, we understand 
the structure of our experience. To this end, I discussed the “correlational structure” of 
intentionality, which comprises the intentional act (noesis) and the intentional object 
(noema). In the eyes of continental phenomenologists, there are different types of experience, 
namely those that have an intentionally narrow (subject-object) structure and those that have 
an intentionally broad (no subject-object) structure. Experiences that are intentionally broad 
remain open to the world, leaving subjectivity with an ongoing operative intentionality that 
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connects it with the “life-world” of the subject.  
          From the viewpoint of intentionality, then, subjectivity is never self-enclosed – but 
what about self-awareness, the other important feature of consciousness? Does this analysis 
hold true in the case of self-awareness (time-consciousness) as well? I turn to this question in 
the next section of this chapter. 
2.1.3 The Relationship between Self-awareness and Intentional Experience 
In this section I will clarify how phenomenologists think about the relationship between self-
awareness and intentionality. In order to do so, I will draw on my prior treatment of self-
awareness and inner time-consciousness in Chapter 1. This will help us come to a greater 
appreciation of how self-awareness, time-consciousness, and intentionality inter-relate. It will 
also clarify the position of Thompson and Zahavi on the openness of subjectivity in such a 
way that my disagreement with them will become more salient. In this way, I will show just 
how important the openness of subjectivity is for these phenomenologists. However, I 
strongly disagree with their thesis. 
          According to Thompson and Zahavi, self-awareness and inner time-consciousness (pre-
reflective self-awareness) can never appear on their own – without intentional experiences.193 
Zahavi tells us that we should not understand the relation between the absolute flow (inner 
time-consciousness) and intentional acts as a relation between two utterly distinct domains of 
subjectivity.
194
 Intentional experiences (acts) are not given to us by some other part of 
subjectivity, but through inner consciousness, which belongs intrinsically to the very 
structure of the intentional acts themselves. Therefore, inner consciousness cannot 
independently exist from intentional experience.
195
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          Thompson also argues that pre-reflective self-awareness streams (being structurally 
one and the same thing as inner time-consciousness), and that this streaming is due to the 
inflow of impressions from intentional acts,
196
 acts which are, according to Zahavi, also 
characterised by inner consciousness (they are inherently self-aware).
197
 Thus inner time-
consciousness, or the temporal flow of self-awareness, cannot subsist coherently over time 
without the threefold structure of impression (the inflow of intentional acts)-retention-
protention, which is an invariant component of consciousness. Thompson says:  
Prereflective self-awareness is streaming because it is constitutive of the streaming of flowing 
experiences themselves, not a pure and empty awareness that appears on its own. By the same 
token, it is standing because it is an ever-present and unchanging feature of consciousness.
198
 
From Thompson words we can extract the understanding that absolute consciousness is 
always present in conscious experience, and necessarily so; however, it is itself not operative 
without intentional acts and the continual inflow thereof as primal impressions, which are 
retained and anticipated by our consciousness.   
          Zahavi holds the same view: While we can identify the standing-streaming (the 
absolute flow), this should not be understood as something that exists apart or independent 
from intentional experiences. He says: 
It is highly appropriate to distinguish the strict singularity of the lebendige Gegenwart from the 
plurality of changing experiences. But, of course, this should not be misunderstood. 
Distinguishability is not the same as separability. We are not dealing with a pure or empty field 
of self-manifestation upon which the concrete experiences subsequently make their entry. The 
absolute flow has no self-manifestation of its own, but is the very self-manifestation of the 
experiences (emphasis mine).
199
  
What Zahavi wishes to underline is that the self-givenness of the flow, our experience of the 
standing-streaming, is the pre-reflective self-manifestation of intentional experiences (acts), 
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and any analysis of inner time-consciousness or pre-reflective self-awareness is therefore not 
an analysis of any additional awareness that stands over and above our mental acts. The 
correlational structure of intentional experiences comprises the object and the intentional act, 
which are intrinsically given to us in the first-person perspective. They are self-aware.
200
 
          Zahavi believes that the very infrastructure of consciousness is temporality. Not only is 
consciousness inherently temporal, but it is only through it being temporal that it can be pre-
reflectively aware of itself.
201
 This is so because there can be no inner time-consciousness (or 
pre-reflective self-awareness) without temporal content. Zahavi says: “Time-consciousness 
never appears in pure form, but always as a pervasive sensibility, as the very sensing of the 
sensations.”202 Thus the “enduring tone” of our experience only occurs as a conjoint 
phenomenon that includes our subjectivity and the world: it is the streaming flow of 
impression, retention, and protention of temporal content. 
         Consciousness in this sense is necessarily intentional (relational) and open towards 
alterity. This entails a movement to exteriorisation and a tendency to self-transcendence. For 
consciousness to be perpetually self-transcending means that it continually turns to that which 
exceeds its own boundaries, or to that which denotes its external environment. In this way, 
consciousness has an exteriorised outlook. Pre-reflective awareness is thus neither irrelational 
nor self-sufficient. Intentionality and self-awareness can never be exclusive alternatives: self-
awareness should not be understood as a dimension of subjectivity that can be so preoccupied 
with self that it excludes the external world, or, to use Zahavi‟s own words, “impedes the 
contact with transcendent being.”203 To the contrary, subjectivity is actually open towards 
that which it is not, and it is only in this encounter with the Other that subjectivity can reveal 
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itself to itself. What is phenomenally disclosed in our experience, then, is not a subjectivity 
that is entirely self-enclosed, but openness towards alterity and self-transcendence.
204
  
          In Zahavi‟s view, self-manifestation (self-awareness) and hetero-manifestation 
(disclosure of the world and the Other) are inseparable. This in turn means that we cannot 
attend to our subjectivity and the Other at the same time. We cannot simultaneously be 
directed toward the outside and the inside. According to Zahavi, it is a fundamental principle 
of consciousness that subjectivity cannot withdraw from its relation to the Other:  
Even if consciousness could turn its attention so completely toward itself that everything else 
were excluded, it would not escape the confrontation with Otherness.
205
 
In Zahavi‟s eyes, then, the subjectivity of consciousness is never self-enclosed, but open to 
otherness and to that which its interiority cannot encompass. In this sense, self-awareness 
goes hand in hand with narrow and broad intentionality. If our intentional experiences are not 
object-directed, then they are at least open to the world and affected by it.  
          From the viewpoint of traditional, continental phenomenology, then, the self-awareness 
of consciousness is never self-sufficient and self-enclosed:
206
 “Self-awareness and self-
identity are incompatible determinations”, because self-awareness always presupposes a 
minimal fissure (a self-othering) that gives rise to duality.
207
 This polarisation of reality in 
turn is the birth of the “ego-self”.208 This self (or self-awareness) needs intentionality and the 
confrontation with something different from itself in order to be self-aware. If intentionality 
were not present, then Zahavi believes that self-awareness (and the self for this matter) would 
dissipate as pure nothingness.
209
 To avoid this, the self-awareness of subjectivity must depend 
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against its relation to that which transcends the bounds of its identity.
210
  
          I disagree with Thompson‟s and Zahavi‟s view that subjectivity is never self-sufficient 
and self-enlosed. This is our point of disagreement despite a lot of consensus about the nature 
of consciousness. I will argue against this claim by pointing out that continental 
phenomenology does not have the practical expertise in first-person methods to substantiate 
its claims about the fundamental structure of self-awareness. To this end, I will argue that we 
can in fact have “cognitive access” to a type of experience that they have denied us on the 
basis of philosophical reflection. My next three chapters are devoted to this. Chapter 3, 4, and 
5 will discuss first-person methods and the idea of “cognitive access”. Chapter 6 will then 
introduce in greater detail the type of experience that challenges continental phenomenology 
and Thompson‟s attempt to account for continuity between life and mind.  
          In the next sections, I will first outline the types of experience that belong to the 
plateau of consensus. I will then add to this list the type of experience that I wish to consider 
in the chapters that follow. 
2.1.4 Modes of Intentionality and Types of Experience 
The consensus is that there are perceptual kinds of experience, and that these kinds of 
experience can be further subdivided into endogenous and exogenous types of perceptual 
experience. What is not agreed upon is whether there are non-perceptual kinds of experience. 
This is the type of experience I wish to consider as a case of phenomenological counter-
evidence to the thesis that subjectivity must always be open towards alterity. 
          I begin by observing that there are subject-object structured experiences and 
subject/aspect structured experiences. Next, I will introduce perceptual types of experience 
and the difference between exogenous and endogenous ones. Following this, I will leave the 
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plateau of consensus and add to the list a non-perceptual type of experience. Finally, I will 
clarify what relationship the types of experience have to the modes of intentionality (narrow 
and broad), and thereby distinguish heteronomous from autonomous experiences. This will 
help to outline my precise disagreement with continental phenomenologists. 
          My first observation, which I make with the help of Yandell‟s brief pointers in the 
matter,
211
 is that we can distinguish between two kinds of experience that present themselves 
to us: some of them have a subject-object structure whereas others have a subject/aspect 
structure.  
          Experiences with a subject-object structure appear to the subject as presentations of 
something that is clearly distinct from the subject himself, but there are also experiences that 
do not display such a structure; they do not seem to the subject as presenting anything that 
might exist apart from him. Rather, such experiences seem to be conscious states in which the 
subject “discovers” or “discerns” some aspect of himself (whatever this may or may not 
contain). A subjective experiential condition is “encountered” by or “disclosed” to the subject 
either in an objectified manner (via a process of self-othering) or in and through the lived 
subjective condition itself.   
          These initial considerations already indicate that phenomenology needs to distinguish 
between (three) types of experience: the exogenous-perceptual type; the endogenous-
perceptual type, and the (non-orthodox) non-perceptual type.
212
 Continental phenomenology 
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accepts perceptual types of experience, but not non-perceptual types. 
          An exogenous-perceptual experience is one in which a subject seems to be aware of 
something that exists independent of him. It is oriented towards an object relative to the 
subject. This kind of experience could also be described as a kind of “outer perception”. It 
would be veridical if and only if it would were an accurate (where accuracy is truth) 
conscious event that actually grants acquaintance to realities and states of affairs that do in 
fact exist external to the subject (e.g. the world). Therefore, the conscious event has truth-
value by virtue of being an accurate and authentic instance in which realities or states of 
affairs are disclosed to the subject.
213
   
          In contrast, an endogenous-perceptual experience is one in which a subject seems to be 
aware of something that is internal to him (possibly an aspect). It pertains to the subject 
himself (although via an “objectifying activity”214). To capture this kind of experience we 
might wish to draw from Husserl‟s own terms, such as “inner perception”215 or “immanent 
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perception”216. Yandell also discusses this kind of inner perceptual experience; he says: 
“Experiences all have subjects, though not all have [external] objects.”217 This is so because 
some experiences do not typically require objects for their lived-through quality to obtain. 
These kinds of experience, again, may or may not be veridical just like exogenous-perceptual 
experiences, because they might correctly present something to the subject‟s awareness, or 
they might do so misleadingly. 
          Now I wish to consider the non-perceptual type of experience. It differs markedly from 
the other two kinds of perceptual experiences, because exogenous- and endogenous-
perceptual experiences maintain a distinction in their phenomenological structure between 
subject and object, but a non-perceptual kind of experience collapses this completely.  
          Continental phenomenology does not accept this type of experience. Nevertheless, I 
contend that such experiences are possible and that they involve a higher level of immediate 
acquaintance than we have of our own mental life (if we understand our mental life to 
constitute “transcendent”218 objects). This is so because bringing the content of our own 
conscious states thematically to our own awareness normally requires of us to direct the gaze 
of our consciousness at the intended object/content by objectifying it (“othering” it). 
Therefore, such conscious acts give rise to a perceiving subject and a “transcendental 
object”219 – an object which stands outside of the self-enclosed pure subjectivity of the 
subject such that it escapes and transcends its closure.   
          Objectifying conscious acts distance the object cognised (or, in phenomenological 
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terms, the object “intended”) from the cognizing subject. Locke referred to this in An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding as “reflection”.220 Reflection is our ability to turn our 
attention inward upon ourselves in order to make our internal mental operations contained in 
our minds the very objects of our attention. This capacity to reverse our attention towards our 
internal mental life is now referred to in phenomenology as the “reflection model” or 
“reflection theory” of the mind.221   
          Non-perceptual experiences are different, because they do not give rise to a dualistic 
structure. Instead of creating a gulf between subject and object via an objectifying activity, 
non-perceptual experiences break down this duality and replace it with a non-dual state of 
immediate epistemic acquaintance. In this non-dual state there exists neither a sense of one‟s 
own subjective consciousness nor a sense of an independent, external object, which 
transcends the closure of the non-dual state.
222
  
          Such lived-through conscious experiences have also caught the attention of some 
analytic philosophers who have decided to enter epistemological discussions of 
contemplative states of consciousness. A very good example of this is when the analytic 
philosopher Alston considered such a non-perceptual and non-dual experience, which he 
identified as an extreme type of experience. He explains: 
[This] extreme [type of] experience in which all distinctions are transcended in an 
undifferentiated unity is properly thought of as absolute immediacy. If no distinctions can 
be made within the seamless unity, then there is no possibility of distinguishing the 
experience involved from the object of awareness. Indeed, the immediacy here is more 
absolute than in one‟s awareness of one‟s own conscious state. There we at least have the 
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distinction between subject and object, but even that drops out in the kind of ...experience 
reported.
223
 
Alston‟s observation astutely recognises that endogenous-perceptual experiences are like 
exogenous-perceptual ones. Perceptual kinds of experience have in common that our 
awareness of our own mental life is dualistically and transitively structured, which is unlike 
the non-dual and intransitive structure of non-perceptual experiences.   
          Thus whenever I speak of a subject having an experience, I mean to include exogenous 
(outer) and endogenous (inner) lived-through perceptual events as well as lived-through non-
perceptual (non-dual) conscious states. My approach thus contrasts with that of continental 
phenomenologists, who limit the concept of “experience” to perceptual (intentional) types of 
experience. Therefore, from my point of view, an “experience” denotes a conscious state in 
which (1) a subject seems to be aware of an object external to him; or (2) a subject seems to 
be aware of an aspect of himself in an objectified manner; or (3) a subject seems to 
consciously live through a non-perceptual state that immediately acquaints him with realities 
and states of affairs (in an intransitive but thematic fashion) that do not transcend the 
subjective, self-enclosed condition of the non-dually lived-through conscious state.
224
 
          To sum up, I have distinguished between two kinds of experience that present 
themselves to us: subject-object (transitive) structured experiences and subject/aspect 
(transitive or intransitive) structured experiences. I also distinguished between perceptual 
(exogenous and endogenous) and non-perceptual types of experience. How, then, do the 
different modes of intentionality (operative/broad and object-directed/narrow) relate to these 
distinctions? 
          First, I classified subject-object structured experiences as exogenous-perceptual kinds. 
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They function with the help of a narrow (object-directed) intentionality. The objects thereof 
may or may not “exist” in the common sense use of the term. Perceptual experiences are 
defined by the clear vectorial nature of the subject-to-object relation in which phenomena 
appear to the subject as distinct from his own subjectivity. They transcend the subject 
because we have two clear distinctive relata involved: the subject and the world towards 
which subjectivity is directed. Such experiences have a dualistic structure. Therefore, our 
subjectivity in perceptual kinds of experience is open and perpetually moves towards self-
transcendence.  
          Second, this class of exogenous-perceptual experiences also includes experiences 
defined by a broad intentionality, despite their lack of a clear-cut subject-object structure (the 
fact that they are intransitive). There are two reasons for this: (1) Broad intentionality still 
functions as a kind of operative openness to the world, because it is affected (if not at times 
defined) by it. Thus broad intentionality has a cognitive relation with its environment, which 
is a minimal sense of perception. (2) The experiences are not about the subject solely or 
independent of the “world”. Hence the nature of broad intentionality is that of subjectivity not 
self-enclosed. I will discuss each of these reasons briefly in turn. 
          (1) Thompson defines cognition as “the behaviour or conduct of a system in relation to 
its environment”.225 He uses this definition in the context of biologically (self-organised) 
living systems. In this context, cognition has two levels: the first allows the system to 
assimilate compounds from the environment for purposes of ordinary functioning (e.g. 
metabolic assimilation); the second enables the living system to draw on novel elements of 
the environment to effect change in its own structure.
226
 Broad intentionality is cognitive in 
this (analogous) sense. The minimal perception is about the condition of the subject (e.g. a 
mood or bodily feeling), which is a result of its relation to his (transcendent) world. In this 
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minimal sense a perceptual relation exists that also has two levels: first, the subjective 
condition of the person can non-thematically draw on the background context of his world for 
everyday functioning (e.g. absorbed skillful activity); and second, his subjectivity can be 
affected by the external environment such that it effects change in this lived-through 
experience. All this can be operative with the help of broad intentionality. 
          (2) This in turn supports the second reason that “broadly intentional” experiences are 
exogenous and perceptual, because experiences in which broad intentionality is operative are 
not self-enclosed, and they may not be about the subject himself considered independently of 
the world. The subject remains open to and influenced by his embeddedness in the world, and 
his experience, although not “about” anything in particular, may be due to external conditions 
or “about” his relationship with the world. Therefore, experiences with both narrow and 
broad intentionality are heteronomous, that is, other-determined. 
          Third, when we think about how different modes of intentionality relate to different 
types of experience, we must also consider endogenous-perceptual types of experience. These 
types of experience also have a dualistic structure because subjects are aware of something 
that is internal to them, but via an objectifying activity (a process of “self-othering”). This 
introduces the notion of an “inner” or “immanent” perception as well as a dualistic structure. 
Hence endogenous-perceptual types of experience operate with a broad intentionality. 
          Fourth, I considered experiences resembling a subject/aspect structure, which are 
completely self-determined and independent of a transcendent world or any exteriorisation, 
including distinct objects of any kind; they are completely devoid of intentional structure, 
both narrow and broad. These non-perceptual kinds of experience are self-enclosed such that 
the subjective experiential condition is “encountered” by, or “disclosed” to, the subject in and 
through the lived subjective condition itself. Such experiences have a non-dualistic structure, 
and are therefore autonomous. 
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          I disagree with continental phenomenology on the question of whether or not the fourth 
category of autonomous experience exists (and whether we can have “cognitive access” to 
such experiences). The default position of phenomenologists is that there are only 
heteronomous experiences (of the perceptual type: intentionally narrow and broad; 
endogenous and exogenous). In the reminder of this thesis, I will to argue that from a 
phenomenological point of view, we must acknowledge the available phenomenological 
evidence that autonomous experiences are prima facie possible; and that this fact warrants the 
attention of both continental phenomenology and Thompson‟s neurophenomenological.  
         To this end, in chapters 3 and 4, I will discuss first-person methods. In Chapter 5, I will 
introduce the idea of “cognitive access”. I will argue that we do have cognitive access to non-
perceptual types of experience. Finally, in Chapter 6, I will introduce this type of experience 
in greater detail, and consider its consequences for continental phenomenology and 
Thompson‟s continuity thesis. 
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Chapter 3 
To Observe the Phenomena:  
A Synthesis of Phenomenological and 
Contemplative Methods 
 
When Hindu and Buddhist Philosophers reflected on states of consciousness achieved in a 
variety of meditative states, they were practicing phenomenology.
227
 
  
 David Woodruff Smith 
In this chapter, I intend to introduce the basic logic of first-person methods for the 
investigation of consciousness (both continental and contemplative) in order to show: (i) that 
in methodological matters, as continental phenomenology holds, first-person methods give us 
adequate “cognitive access” to all experiences that fall under the intentional principle of 
consciousness (perceptual types of experience); and (ii) that we also have the relevant 
cognitive access to experiences which fall under the self-aware principle of consciousness 
(non-perceptual types of experience), continental phenomenologists to the contrary. I believe 
that this fact allows us to examine both the objective and subjective domain (principle) of 
consciousness. Phenomenologists accept the former possibility, but not the latter. 
          I believe that continental phenomenologists do not accept this because they emphasise 
philosophical analysis over practical expertise when they investigate consciousness first-
personally. Contemplative phenomenologists, in contrast, focus on the practical component 
of the phenomenological method and develop this to a high level of excellence. In this 
chapter, I will discuss in greater detail this decisive difference between continental and 
contemplative phenomenology, because the contemplative method is a platform that (i) 
enables us to extend the domain of “observable experiences” and (ii) clears the way for non-
perceptual types of experience.   
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          I will start this chapter by pointing out the importance of first-person methods in the 
study of consciousness, and the role they play in neurophenomenology.  
          Next, I will introduce the phenomenological and contemplative method respectively. I 
will point out that (i) neurophenomenology is turning to the contemplative method to aid a 
component of the phenomenological method that has not received adequate attention, namely 
the pragmatic approach to experience itself; (ii) both the phenomenological method and the 
contemplative method share a logic; (iii) professionally trained subjects in contemplative 
methods have at their disposal cognitive faculties that are more precise and more reliable – 
attention is thus a trainable skill – which is a fact that (iv) makes contemplative 
phenomenologists most suitable to examine non-perceptual types of experience.  
          I will follow this up with two closely related chapters. Chapter 4 will consider 
scepticism about first-person methods, and outline nine objections to the possibility that first-
person methods are a suitable approach to studying the intentional (objective pole) and self-
aware (subjective pole) domain of consciousness. The first seven objections focus on the 
intentional domain of consciousness, and objections eight and nine focus on the self-aware 
domain of consciousness. In Chapter 4, I will respond to the first seven. Then, in Chapter 5, I 
will respond to objection eight, advancing a “Theory of Disclosing” as an account of 
cognitive access, and thereby expanding the concept of “observable experiences” to include 
non-perceptual types of experience. These two chapters will set the stage for Chapter 6, 
where I will respond to objection nine. 
3.1 Phenomenological and Contemplative Methods in Perspective 
A complete science of mind must be built on the foundations of a theory that can account for 
subjectivity and consciousness.
228
 In the contemporary climate of the mind sciences this is a 
truism. To do this, we need to include lived experience in our theoretic and scientific study of 
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consciousness. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch are correct to point out that to ignore this, or to 
even deny the truth of our own experience, renders our theoretic and scientific study of 
ourselves without a subject matter.
229
 Thus it is important to put the phenomenological and 
the contemplative method, both of which are concerned with the reality of conscious 
experience itself, into comparative perspective. 
          There are good reasons to include lived experience into the study of consciousness: (1) 
no “scientific” third-person data is possible without it; and (2) first-person phenomenological 
data put constraints on our theoretical and methodological work.  
          The second point is very important, because in my final Chapter I will put forward 
available prima facie phenomenological evidence for the existence of non-perceptual types of 
experience. Since neurophenomenology is committed to phenomenology as a partner in the 
scientific study of consciousness, and because this commitment puts constraints on our 
theoretical and methodological work, neurophenomenology must take seriously the data we 
have available. I will show that Thompson and other collaborative researchers in fact show 
concern about this, and for good reason. 
           Let us consider the first reason to include lived experience into the study of 
consciousness. When we wish to investigate consciousness, our third-person data is actually 
meant to be about the subject‟s first-personally lived-through experience, and the information 
we get from the technology of the brain sciences is meaningless if not correlated with the 
subject‟s subjective reality. We only value observations of functional processes that happen 
in the brain because we suppose that they correlate with subjective lived-through realities 
determined on other, experiential, and first-personal grounds.
230
 The experiential dimension 
thus contributes meaning without which we would merely describe biological activity, and by 
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itself this would not inform us in ways we would need it to for our explanatory concerns. 
Therefore, the meaning of third-person data is dependent on us first having access to first-
person data.   
          This brings us to my second reason to phenomenologically guide our scientific 
endeavours. Phenomenological accounts direct and constrain our theoretical and 
methodological efforts.  We need to first have a clear understanding of what we wish to 
explain – the explanandum – before we consider explanatory proposals. Until we clearly 
demarcate the “terrain of the explanandum”231 no explanation can make any sense. It is 
obvious, actually, that researchers rely heavily on subjects‟ “introspective” reports as well as 
their own first-person experience.
232
  
          The research program called neurophenomenology recognises that first-person data is 
indispensible and demonstrates how this insight can be used to our advantage. 
Neurophenomenology stresses the importance of accessing accurate first-person data from 
phenomenologically trained subjects in order to qualify and quantify the biological processes 
relevant for consciousness. The first-person data that becomes available in turn helps to 
uncover novel third-person data that was disqualified as “noise” beforehand.233 Hence 
detailed phenomenological accounts, integrated into experimental protocols of cognitive, 
neuroscientific research, inform our investigations into consciousness.  
         Neurophenomenology also holds that precise phenomenological data extracted from 
first-person methods “provide strong constraints on the analysis and interpretation of the 
physiological processes relevant to consciousness”234. This also holds true for contemplative 
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knowledge.
235
 Thus theories that outright deny the truth of our own experience, including that 
of contemplative practitioners (for example, continental phenomenology), have the onus of 
providing powerful arguments in their favour, and making salient the falsehood of the 
intuitions involved. This means that they have to offer cogent error theories, which excludes 
aporetical, ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses and the outright denial of our otherwise reasonably 
held default stance. 
         If first-personal data is so important, how then do we go about examining lived-through 
experience in a rigorous first-person manner? To answer this question, I will now consider 
the basic logic of two developed and disciplined first-person approaches employed in 
philosophical phenomenology and contemplative phenomenology to investigate 
consciousness.
236
 I will begin with the continental, phenomenological method and then turn 
to the contemplative method. 
3.1.1 The Phenomenological Method 
Like ordinary scientific thought, the phenomenological method wishes to avoid subjective 
bias. To accomplish this it approaches its domain in a controlled and objective manner. It is 
objective in the sense that it offers an account of subjective experience rather than a 
subjective account of experience, which are not one and the same thing. Frequently, thinkers 
are confused about this point, because they believe that they can get a grip on subjective 
experience by turning it into some object that can be investigated via third-person methods. 
But being objective in the scientific sense is not limited to third-person approaches; rather, it 
is about avoiding prejudice and cultivating disinterestedness. To accomplish this, science 
employs methodological steps to control its practical work. This is also true of 
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phenomenology.
237
 
         The phenomenological method consists of three consecutive and carefully delineated 
phases: (1) the epoché; (2) the phenomenological reduction; and (3) intersubjective 
corroboration. 
          The first step, the epoché, is best described as a phenomenological attitude. It replaces 
what Husserl called our “natural attitude”238 that governs our everyday life in which we are 
naive and uncritical. In this natural attitude we unreflectively posit the world as something 
existing “out there” and independently of us.239 While we walk in the world that we 
encounter, we focus on specific things: “thematic” matters (i.e., things that are an immediate 
theme of our conscious attention). We are also straightforwardly immersed in, and open to, 
the world as the “unthematic” context of our living and acting.240 This uncritical and 
straightforward immersion in the world phenomenologists refer to as our commonsensically 
naïve default position, in other words, our natural attitude.  
          The crucial first step in the phenomenological method is to replace this natural attitude 
with a more cautious one: the epoché. The term epoché is derived from Greek scepticism and 
indicates its function, namely to refrain from judgment. It means to suspend and bracket our 
natural attitude, including our theoretical beliefs about the world we otherwise uncritically 
posit and hold to correspond with an “objective reality”. 
          While the phenomenological attitude (the epoché) brackets our naive commonsense 
attitude towards reality, its aim is neither to abandon nor to deny our natural attitude, nor to 
exclude the reality we so apprehend from consideration; but rather, to put it aside and 
neutralise it, so that we may attend to the very experiences themselves that are found therein. 
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Reality is not rejected, but dogmatic attitudes are put aside so that reality may be studied 
directly, just as it is given to us.
241
 In this way, the epoché makes possible a genuinely 
philosophical treatment of the subject, because it is critical as well as non-dogmatic in its 
approach. It neither takes “objective reality” for granted, nor rigidly rejects it.242 Hence it 
avoids replacing the natural attitude with just another biased metaphysical view. 
          Once the epoché is successful we take the second methodological step, i.e. the 
phenomenological reduction. Here we direct our attention to phenomena (incl. the world) as 
we experience them. The idea is to attend to the “correlational structure of our 
subjectivity”243 and the appearance of the world strictly as it phenomenally manifests to us, or 
we might wish to say, as it is disclosed to our awareness.  
         The phenomenological reduction denotes a further shift to a more radical philosophical 
attitude in which we analyse this correlational interdependence of particular structures of our 
subjectivity and particular modes of appearance.
244
 The notion “reduction” means that we 
redirect our attention away from our uncritical and unthematic, natural mode (attitude), and 
towards the way phenomena appear to us. This means that the phenomenological reduction is 
a “leading back” (re-ducere) of our everyday mode of unexamined experiencing to the 
phenomena themselves as a reflective theme of our attention. With this reflective move we 
are no longer interested in what things are in some metaphysical and theoretical context, but 
how they appear to us, precisely as immediately disclosed in our experience, and hence as the 
strict correlates of our lived subjectivity.
245
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          To review, the epoché and the phenomenological reduction are performed in the first-
person. As a whole, the phenomenological reduction comprises two basic steps. The first step 
brackets our natural attitude, and the second leads attention back to the phenomenological 
attitude that focuses on how reality is disclosed to us. This process corresponds to the epoché, 
which is a trainable mental skill that (a) suspends unthematic immersion in experience and 
(b) redirects attention to how things appear to us, making them the theme of our reflective 
and analytical attitude. This in turn relies on our capacity to voluntarily direct our attention, 
stabilise it in a given mode of presentation, and sustain it in this mode with the purpose of 
encountering experience in a renewed fashion: with heightened awareness and sensitivity.
246
  
          Following these first two steps, phenomenologists seek to intersubjectively corroborate 
their findings via phenomenological descriptions. The main concern with this step is to 
replicate discoveries and to assess the degree to which the correlative structures they have 
discerned are universal and intersubjectively sharable. To do justice to this challenge of 
describing subjectivity, the pragmatics of articulation focus on depicting experiences as they 
are lived-through, rather than as they are hypothesised to be on the basis of a priori 
commitments or experientially unguided theories.
247
 To accomplish this, subjects are first 
trained to consistently apply referential terms that they themselves choose for their own 
“cognitive contexts” (their phenomenal invariants) before their first-person knowledge is 
correlated to phenomena that are objectively observable. Only once this first step is 
successful will the process begin to carefully calibrate first-person data with third-person 
data. In this way, first-person knowledge is intersubjectively shared and crosschecked, as 
well as novel third-person data discovered that accounts for the biological and cognitive 
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processes underlying the subjects‟ lived-through phenomenal dynamics.248  
          Thus the phenomenological method is a first-person approach to the study of lived 
experience. It attempts to make first-person knowledge intersubjectively sharable and thereby 
allows for further confirmation or disconfirmation. The lived-through subjectivity becomes 
accessible via reporting that can be calibrated with third-person data by integrating the three 
methodological steps of the phenomenological approach into the experimental protocols of 
scientific research. It is thus objective in two senses: (1) it is critical and without prejudice, 
i.e. it brackets biases prior to rigorously attending and analysing experience; and (2) it can be 
shared, crosschecked, and calibrated with third-person methods. This makes 
phenomenological descriptions both intersubjectively as well as “interobjectively” (third-
personally) accessible. 
3.1.2 The Contemplative Method 
There is a new current in phenomenology that seeks to refine the pragmatics of the epoché to 
investigate consciousness. To this end, the dynamics of the epoché are explored as they are 
encountered in other traditions. One example of this is the phenomenological philosophy and 
contemplative mental training of Buddhism.
249
 This novel trend is responding to a neglected 
component of phenomenology, because phenomenology has to a large extent focused on the 
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philosophical rather than the psychological attitude of the phenomenological method. Thus it 
has emphasised theoretical analysis over the pragmatics of the epoché as the necessary live 
component of the investigation of consciousness. In contrast, the pragmatics of the epoché in 
contemplative traditions (for example, the practice of mindfulness-awareness in the Buddhist 
tradition) are far more developed.
250
 The reason for this is that they have established very 
detailed and well-refined guidance protocols for mental cultivation.
251
 They are also 
phenomenologically and philosophically very precise in conceptualizing the states of 
consciousness they focus on in their first-personal investigation.
252
 
          The generic development of first-person methods by drawing on contemplative 
techniques of other traditions is one of the most important and innovative currents in 
contemporary cognitive science. It is also a direct response to a pointer William James gave 
in his classic work The Principles of Psychology over a century ago: 
The faculty of voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention, over and over again, is the 
very root of judgment, character, and will... An education which should improve this 
faculty would be the education par excellence. But it is easier to define this ideal than to 
give practical directions for bringing it about.
253
 
James‟s ideal, to be able to train and refine concentration, is a skill contemplatives hone with 
great care and have also done so for the past three millennia, East and West.
254
 Hence the 
basic idea of this new trend is to draw on the skill and experience available in other traditions 
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to “augment”255 the epoché of the phenomenological method. In this way, contemplative 
phenomenology is becoming a partner to the scientific study of consciousness.
256
 
          When contemplative practitioners attend to and philosophically reflect on states of 
consciousness they have encountered, they practice phenomenology.
257
 Most important is the 
experiential and immediate approach of contemplative practitioners to the first-personal 
investigation of consciousness. I want to consider such approaches by comparing the 
common logic of such contemplative work with the epoché.  
         The epoché has three intertwining phases: (1) to suspend beliefs and other operative 
theoretical constructs that are habitual, and adopt an unprejudiced attitude; (2) to redirect 
attention to the qualities of the experiencing process itself moment by moment; and (3) to “let 
go” and adopt a receptive stance that allows for novel discoveries to be made in the field of 
experience.
258
  
          Contemplative mental cultivation shares the same basic logic, although various 
traditions might adopt different mechanics in their procedures.
259
  
          First, they deeply question our habitual way of contextualizing the world, and also 
frequently adopt a dis-ontological stance to avoid reifying things, immanent or 
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transcendent.
260
 They put aside our commonsensical considerations about reality to allow 
their own investigations to teach them, on the basis of experience.
261
 Because experience 
takes precedence over theory, the processes we find are not “constructive” but “de-
automative” and “de-constructive”, enabling the subject to release and unhitch experience 
from preconceptions.
262
  
          Second, they employ various techniques to develop attention as a precise instrument of 
observation, i.e. concentration that does not succumb to erratic shifts of excitation and laxity, 
so that a single-pointed focus can be maintained without being distracted.
263
  
          Finally, they instruct contemplative practitioners to “forget”, “lay aside”, “put behind a 
cloud of forgetting”, “cease”, “restrain”, or “put to rest”,264 willful and disturbing influences 
so that novel discoveries become possible. 
          New discoveries can be made when first-person researchers subject themselves to 
intense contemplative mental training, because a suitable tool for observing “mental” 
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phenomena is employed: a kind of telescope for the mind analogous to Galileo‟s use of the 
telescope.
265
 Just as Galileo initiated a scientific revolution, possibly the greatest to date, by 
directly observing celestial phenomena, so the scientific revolution of the mind sciences 
would require the development of suitable first-person methodologies to observe mental 
phenomena.  
          Galileo had a huge impact because he offered science for the first time a tool to observe 
with great precision celestial phenomena, which were objects of scientific inquiry previously 
only studied by recording the terrestrial correlates of celestial phenomena. This is also known 
as folk astronomy or astrology, and the naked eye observation of the heavens. However, 
Galileo was not satisfied with this and attended directly to the celestial phenomena by virtue 
of developing a tool suitable for more precise astronomical observation. 
          If we develop skillful attention via contemplative mental training to rigorously inspect 
the (mental) phenomena of consciousness, then we are engaging in a similar project. We offer 
more professional methods for empirical research on the basis of experience and observation 
that are more systematic, accurate, and reliable than folk observation.  
          The view that observational astronomy and contemplation are analogous holds in many 
respects, even though they are disanalogous in their epistemic modes (i.e., third- vs. first-
person operations). First, as already noted, contemplative traditions offer approaches to 
mental cultivation that are well developed, systematised, and rigorous in application. Second, 
we also know that persons who are professionally trained in first-person methods (in 
particular subjects who are professionally trained in formal practices of meditation) enjoy 
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noteworthy changes in their cognitive faculties as well as an increase in precision and 
reliability.
266
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         We can appreciate that contemplative professionals have more accurate and reliable 
cognitive capacities at their disposal when we consider the case of “field-independent” 
perception. Batson and Ventis define field independence as “the ability to perceive objects as 
they are, without having that perception distorted by either environmental cues or habitual 
modes of seeing.”267 Pelletier measured the effect meditation has on perception by presenting 
trained and untrained individuals with complex cognitive tasks that required of them to resist 
preconceptions and familiar cognitive contexts, which provided reality orientation, in order to 
succeed.
268
 Even the more conservative scholars Batson and Ventis, who evaluated Pelletier‟s 
research, concluded that the meditators demonstrated decisively more accuracy than the non-
meditators in the relevant tests.  
          The results are even more convincing when we consider that all participants were non-
meditators at the outset and were subjected to the tests at the very start of the study: no 
member of any group differed in their test results at that point. Batson and Ventis conclude 
that “meditation enabled [the subjects] to see things more for what they were, independent of 
personal preconceptions and distracting environmental cues.”269 The results of this research 
were possible after only three months of training in meditative techniques and cannot be 
compared to professionals who might have as much as 5,000 to 50,000 hours training, 8 to 12 
hours a day, 7 days a week, for months or years on end.
270
 This shows that it is possible to 
refine our cognitive capacities through rigorous contemplative training, and that the analogy 
of a telescope of the mind holds, that is, that subjects professionally trained in first-person 
methods do have at their disposal cognitive faculties that are more precise and more reliable.  
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          I contend that contemplatives are not only more accurate and reliable when they attend 
to perceptual kinds of experience, but also when they attend to non-perceptual kinds of 
conscious states. They have the capacity to disclose more accurately non-intentional, pre-
reflective conscious states that pertain to the subjective pole of consciousness (not its 
“intentional acts”271).      
          This kind of acquaintance raises questions about the role of self-awareness and how 
self-awareness can reflexively know itself, possibly even without re-introducing a subject-
object dichotomy. I will argue that this is possible. What is important now is the following: A 
non-perceptual experience cannot be consciously apprehended by objectifying mechanisms 
of mind or consciousness. If that were the case, a phenomenologically transitive structure 
would be re-introduced, and we would by definition not be dealing with a non-perceptual 
kind of experience. In this case, we would indeed have to conclude that there are no such 
experiences, as many philosophers believe. 
          However, if we accept that non-perceptual kinds of experience do exist and can be 
consciously attended “to”, or maybe “in”, for lack of a better vocabulary, then we can safely 
say that such conscious “attending” can only be achieved by refraining from habitual 
tendencies to objectify awareness. Meditators are trained to do this. They are trained to “settle 
down”272 the activities and fluctuations that continuously provoke objectifying intentions, so 
that intransitive and pre-reflective states of consciousness can be brought “to” or disclosed 
“to” awareness.  
                                                          
271
 Intentional acts are instances of consciousness in which objects are intentionally (vectorially and 
directionally) attended to. Such acts comprise both the object that is intended (the “noema”) as well as the act of 
intending (the “noesis”), i.e. that which the subject brings to the act of intending. This act is considered to be a 
distinctly identifiable mental phenomenon, although not a separated one. I discussed intentional acts in my 
section on the “intentionality” of consciousness. See Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology 
and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 24-25. 
272
 B. Alan Wallace, Contemplative Science: Where Buddhism and Neuroscience Converge [Chapter 7. 
Śamatha: The Contemplative Refinement of Attention] (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 142-148. 
Shear offers some further points about the processes operative in contemplative mental training. See Jonathan 
Shear, “Closing the Empirical Gap,” in Explaining Consciousness: The “Hard Problem”, ed. Jonathan Shear 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997), 372. 
85 | P a g e  
 
          In fact, as Deikmann,
273
 Forman,
274
 and Batson and Ventis have pointed out,
275
 
contemplative practices are processes of “de-automatisation”: they deconstruct old 
automatised perceptual patterns that stop the supply of stimuli and mental content to 
awareness such that it can recede into its “natural state”, or its own “space of awareness”.276 
Batson and Ventis conclude that “the meditator is able to break down his or her present 
reality. Approaching one-pointedness, the current cognitive organization begins to 
disintegrate... its role is eliminative, not constructive.”277 Consequently, if non-perceptual 
experiences do exist that are devoid of constructive processes, then the contemplative 
practitioner is in the most suitable position to “observe” such phenomena. I will argue below 
that contemplative practitioners do indeed have access to such states.  
          To sum up, I have introduced the phenomenological and contemplative method 
respectively, and I pointed out (i) how neurophenomenology has turned to the contemplative 
method, because the phenomenological method has not given adequate attention to the 
pragmatics of the epoché; (ii) that both the phenomenological method and the contemplative 
method have methodological steps in place that share a logic; and (iii) that professionally 
trained subjects in contemplative methods have at their disposal cognitive faculties that are 
more precise and more reliable, which (iv) make contemplative phenomenologists most 
suitable to examine non-perceptual types of experience. 
          In the next chapter, I will respond to some sceptical challenges to first-person methods. 
I will follow this by arguing in Chapter 5 that contemplative practitioners do in fact have 
“cognitive access” to the relevant non-perceptual types of experience. 
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Chapter 4 
Scepticism about First-Person 
(Phenomenological) Approaches 
 
Physicality turns out to be not at all essential to what it is to be “scientific”. For, as 
scientists and philosophers of science have both so often brought out, it is not ontological 
considerations such as the physicality of objects referred to that properly decide whether 
or not a claim is scientific, but methodological considerations of whether the claim can be 
(or has been) intersubjectively corroborated and/or falsified according to the proper sorts 
of experimental protocols. Thus the independence of the observer that is paradigmatically 
relevant to scientific methodology, and thus science itself, is that of truth of conclusions, 
rather than that of objects referred to.
278
 
  
 Jonathan Shear 
 
Inside and outside are inseparable. The world is wholly inside and I am wholly outside 
myself.
279
  
 Merleau-Ponty 
An important question is this: How well can the phenomenological method succeed in 
accounting for intentional states (the objective pole) and for self-awareness (the subjective 
pole)? In this respect, many questions (objections) can be raised about the ideas I presented in 
the last chapter. Some of the most important are:  
          (1) Is the phenomenological and contemplative approach discussed here merely a 
revision of introspection, a project which has already failed in the eyes of our scientific 
community? 
          (2) There is nothing that can be really referred to as introspective observation, because 
the notion of “observation” presupposes the distinction between the thing seen and the seeing 
of it (just like in our extrospective, scientific models); however, for “introspection” there is 
no way to make this separation.
280
 Thus Comte rightfully asks: “The organ observed and the 
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organ observing being, in this case, identical, how could observation take place?”281 
           (3) Both non-introspective reports about the world as well as introspective reports 
have been demonstrated to be unreliable. Why then consider “inner perception” as a 
systematic approach to the study of mental phenomena? 
          (4) Does phenomenology (philosophical and contemplative) view the mind as having 
its referential powers independent of the world? In other words, is the mind completely self-
contained?
282
 
          (5) Does the epoché mean that we bracket the transcendent (exterior) spatio-temporal 
world (the “other”), and in so doing we account for internal mental representations only, or 
does the epoché mean that we continue to investigate the transcendent (exterior) spatio-
temporal world, however, with a different attitude?
283
 
          (6) Is the noema (the intended object) an internal mental representation, which opens 
the gates to idealism, or is the noema the manner in which intended and actual objects are 
given to us?
284
 
          (7) Does not meta-awareness, that is, the reflection or monitoring of conscious 
experience itself, change the experience in question? How can we then study experience as it 
is actually given to us?  
          (8) Can introspection, which relies on a subject-object dichotomy of a reflectively 
operating consciousness, apprehend non-reflective, intransitive self-awareness – the very 
foundation of our subjectivity? Does not reflection on pre-reflective subjectivity change its 
structure? How then can self-awareness be consciously attended to?  
          (9) Philosophers have pervasively argued against the possibility that consciousness can 
persist without any objectifying processes. They have also frequently commented on the fact 
                                                          
281
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that they are unable to locate any such phenomenon when “searching” the mind.285 Does this 
not demonstrate the falsity of the methodological possibilities present here, for example, the 
prospects of encountering a raw condition of “awareness per se”? 
          Objections one to seven question what kind of access we can have to the intentional 
feature of consciousness (object-pole). Objections eight and nine focus on our cognitive 
access to the self-aware feature of consciousness (the ego-pole). I will respond to objections 
eight and nine in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
address in turn the first seven objections.  
4.1 Objection 1: Introspection is a Failed Project  
Are phenomenological and contemplative first-person methods merely a variant form of the 
introspective project, which failed and was abandoned in the early 20
th
 century? The answer 
is decidedly: No. Why is this? To answer this question, we must first understand what kind of 
introspective project is being referred to in this objection. 
          A formal “introspectionist school” first appeared in the latter half of the seventeenth 
century and lasted until the first decade of the 20
th
 century. One of the most notable 
associated names of this school is that of German physiologist and psychologist Wilhelm 
Wundt.
286
 Wundt faced the challenge of presenting a model of introspection that could 
observe subjective phenomena analogously to the well-established scientific model that could 
extrospectively observe physical phenomena. To do so, he constructed an introspective 
method that approximated the conditions of external perception. Thus he went to great 
lengths to control the external conditions of introspection:
287
 Subjects were only allowed to 
attend to simple visual stimuli and report within the confines of a pre-existing theoretical 
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framework expressed in rules and cognitive prescriptions. The presentation of stimuli was 
brief and exactly timed; the reactions of the subjects were recorded.  
          In this system, the practice of introspection was separated from philosophical 
introspection and contemplative first-person methods, which were designed just for the 
purpose of attending to conscious experience. In contrast, introspective psychology 
differentiated itself by restricting its introspective observations to simple perceptual stimuli, 
and only under manipulated conditions and external restraints. This excluded all mental 
phenomena that displayed more complexity, such as thoughts, feelings, volitions, or mental 
imagery, etc. The “inner observations” were framed by a monumental volume of rules and 
regulations that transformed the practice similar to an esoteric rite.
288
  
          We can respond to the comparison of the first-person methods I presented earlier with 
Wundt‟s classical introspective psychology in several ways. First, the phenomenological and 
contemplative approaches to experience I discussed start by “bracketing out” theoretical and 
metaphysical commitments prior to attending to experience, in contrast to determining the 
internal investigations in terms of them.  
          Second, the practice of introspection I just outlined above investigated to confirm the 
theories individual researchers established a priori. Thus the researchers of different labs 
constructed theoretical views independently of each other, and translated their theories into 
strict rules and protocols that defined the external conditions in which the “introspection” 
practices were executed. In this way, subjects were trained to attend to their observations so 
that they would confirm the theories.  
          The methods I presented stand in contrast to this: They put experience over theoretical 
commitments, and they have methodological steps in place to secure to the best of their 
ability that an objective, unbiased attitude can be maintained in their investigations. 
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Additionally, the methods themselves are designed to “unhitch” experience from 
preconceptions and habitual modes of cognitive functioning, such that attention is refined and 
reality attended to as it is, or at least in a decisively more accurate way. Hence the methods I 
have presented deconstruct, de-automate, and eliminate external influences (i.e., they increase 
“field-independence”) rather than construct, mediate, and pre-define the experiences to be 
had, by introducing external conditions and constraints to ensure control over cognitive 
functioning (i.e., they increase “field-dependence”). 
          Third, the introspective school trained their subjects to respond to stimuli under 
external constraints, so that internal observations became a “search” for what the theories 
predicted. Nowhere in this process do we find the training of attention skills in and of 
themselves as a means to attend to experience as it is. Rather, subjects were trained to attend 
to experience as it should be via the help of the pragmatic mechanisms that actualised their 
pre-existing theoretical commitments in pragmatic form. Hence we do not find in the 
introspective school the project of refining mental alertness and attention skills proper as a 
tool for observing the phenomena in themselves and as they present themselves to the subject 
– which would make novel discoveries possible, as it is the case in the common logic of 
phenomenological and contemplative methods.  
          Therefore, (i) the first-person methods I presented earlier and the methods of the 
introspectionist school differ markedly in how they logically operate and how they are 
practically realised; (ii) most of the disagreements that compromised the introspectionist 
school were due to clashing a priori theories and a flawed operational logic of their 
pragmatics.
289
 It is wrong to assume that these theoretical and practical errors also apply to 
the decisively different operational logic and pragmatics of phenomenological and 
contemplative first-person methods. 
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4.2 Objection 2: Introspective Observation is Impossible 
Comte and Searle argue that the very notion of observation is a fallacy, because first-person 
phenomena cannot be observed at all: first-person observations are in fact themselves that 
which is supposed to be observed. The traditional observer/observed distinction cannot be 
upheld in the case of introspective observation. Hence it does not conform to our scientific 
models that rely on just this distinction between observation and the thing observed. I quote 
Searle‟s rather surprising conclusion on this: 
I cannot observe my own subjectivity, for any observation that I might care to make is 
itself that which was supposed to be observed; consciousness is not known by 
introspection in a way analogous to the way objects in the world are known by 
perception.
290
 
 My first response to this is that a considerable body of empirical knowledge generated in the 
field of cognitive development tells us a different story. I refer in particular to how young 
children develop a “theory of mind” and the commonsensical mental/physical distinction of 
adult awareness, which does not exist in earlier stages.
291
 While “childhood realism” is still 
debated today, there is a platform of consensus upon which this debate is being conducted 
that is decisive for my purposes here.
292
  
          First, the cognitive structure of earlier stages is significantly different from the later 
emerging adult awareness. Second, the earliest stages have no clear distinction between 
mental and physical phenomena; all phenomena are equally “real” or “unreal” to the subject. 
Third, young children come to have various sorts of experiences throughout their cognitive 
development. Fourth, they learn to integrate a subset of their experiences to accord with the 
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features of physical objects. Fifth, the young children discover that the behaviour of other 
people sometimes supports their integrations (i.e. classifications) and sometimes not. Sixth, 
they generate the distinction between public physical objects (i.e., extrospective phenomena) 
and private mental objects (i.e., introspective phenomena). Finally, the young children 
become progressively proficient in sorting out their experiences according to these formed 
categories of mental and physical, but not without errors in the learning process.  
          To sum up, we distinguish between the mental and the physical on the basis of a 
cognitive development in which such a distinction was originally absent. We eventually form 
habitual and automatic modes that distinguish for us between the two categories on the basis 
of a process reliant on criteria that grants intersubjective access and crosschecking.
293
 What 
does this empirical data on cognitive development tell us about Searle‟s analysis of 
introspection? 
          If we understand cognitive development in the manner outlined above, then we must 
conclude that Searle‟s account of introspection is mistaken. Recall that Searle argued that 
internal observation is an incoherent concept, because the very notion of observation 
presupposes a distinction between the act of observation and that which is observed, but, 
according to Searle, this distinction is absent in first-person experience of mental phenomena. 
The empirical data that we have available on our cognitive development indicates to the 
contrary that introspection (internal phenomena) and extrospection (external phenomena) are 
in fact not so different in kind as Searle makes them out to be. Note that a child has to 
actually learn through investigation and intersubjective corroboration which experiences are 
to be categorised as mental and which as physical. 
          This analysis of cognitive development in turn supports a more straightforward 
response to Searle: It is arbitrary to claim that the content of an experience – which can also 
                                                          
293
 Ibid. 
93 | P a g e  
 
be described phenomenologically (e.g., as “seeing a golden pattern resembling that of a 
golden statute”) – can only be observed and subsequently investigated if and only if the 
experience is genuinely of an external, sensory object, that is, an experience of the 
exogenous-perceptual kind. As we have seen, endogenous- (observation of internal, mental 
objects) and exogenous-perceptual instances (observation of external, “physical” objects) 
actually do not differ in the way Searle specifies: experiences are what they are and can be 
attended to whether or not they are internal or external. Thus both mental and physical 
experiences 
can be observed, examined, evaluated, and judged (correctly or not) to be objective [an 
exogenous- or endogenous-perceptual kind of experience] or subjective [a non-perceptual 
kind of experience], quite independently of whether it ultimately turns out that it is an 
objective one (with an object different form the experience itself [a perceptual kind of 
experience]) or not.
294
 [Emphasis added] 
If the above analysis holds, then the category of “observable experiences” is decidedly 
broader than Searle is willing to acknowledge, just as common sense would dictate. It is not 
only the case that “observable experiences” are broader, but they are broader than “objective 
experiences” (perceptual kinds of experience) and, according to cognitive developmental 
research, also prior to the mental/physical distinction. Thus Shear correctly points out that it 
is a fallacy to hold that mental phenomena themselves cannot be displayed by introspection 
analogously to how the physical world can be displayed by perception; and it is also an error 
to restrict the notion of observation to perception alone [perception].
295
 
          Shear‟s conclusion confirms and is confirmed by my analysis of different structures of 
experience, namely perceptual (endogenous and exogenous) and non-perceptual ones. From a 
phenomenological point of view, endogenous-perceptual experiences, which are about 
internal mental phenomena, maintain a subject-object intentional (i.e., directed and vectorial) 
structure. These are analogous to exogenous-perceptual kinds of experience that have the 
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same structure, but have external (e.g., physical) phenomena as their objects. Thus the 
observations of mental and physical phenomena are structurally analogous. Therefore, we are 
justified to hold that the notion of observation is coherent (and also necessary) in the case of 
external physical phenomena as well as internal mental phenomena, Searle to the contrary. 
          The actual issue is not the mental/physical divide, but whether first-person methods can 
examine perceptual kinds of experience (internal or external) that have a subject-object 
structure without changing the experiences too much; and how such methods can attend to 
non-perceptual kinds of experience that do not display a subject-object structure, also without 
changing their structure. 
          Gallagher and Zahavi point out that the phenomenological method is decidedly 
different from the traditional model of introspective observation, which requires taking 
experience itself as its object. They say:  
First-person reports of this [phenomenological] kind are not introspective reports, if we think 
of introspection as a matter of reflective consciousness. They are nonetheless first-person, 
pre-reflective reports expressive of experience.
296
 
To appreciate this we need to distinguish between two kinds of reports.
297
 The first is a report 
about the world, for example, did the truck drive by or not? The second kind of report is 
about experience itself, for example, what is it like to experience the truck driving by? In the 
first instance, similar to Wundt‟s approach to introspection, we approach reports by focusing 
on external conditions, or measuring reaction times, or we might wish to examine the neural 
correlates in the brain that accompany the experience – all third-person considerations. In the 
second instance, in contrast, we are concerned with the actual phenomenology of the 
experience from the first-person point of view. We can now ask: How does the subject know 
that the truck drove by? Does the subject introspect his experience? We might also wish to 
ask, how can the subject report her experience if he does not introspect?  
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          Gallagher and Zahavi respond to this last question by pointing out that the tradition of 
phenomenology explains how we are aware of experience without reflecting upon it.
298
 
According to the phenomenological tradition, we are aware of our experience without the 
help of introspection, because there is an inbuilt self-awareness in experience, which is what 
makes our experience a conscious experience. Hence we know our experience as we live it 
through without the requirement of a second-order introspective cognition, which would have 
to take experience as its object. This self-aware experience – the fact that I know the bus 
drives by in the very moment when the first-order experience occurs, it is already aware in 
the very happening of the experience – is implicit, non-objectifying, and pre-reflective 
(already operative prior to the act of reflection). On this view, when I am asked whether I see 
the bus drive by, then I can answer yes without backtracking my experience.
299
  
          I will further articulate this idea of implicit awareness in Chapter 5. For now I want to 
emphasise the following point: If we are interested in studying experience from the first-
person point of view, that is, from a phenomenological point of view, then the attention to 
what it is like to experience does not require us to use classical introspective observation that 
separates the act of observation from that which is observed (the experience itself). This is a 
very important point, and it will also play an important role in understanding how 
phenomenological and contemplative methods can examine, for example, the subjective pole 
of consciousness (self-awareness). Thus the phenomenological approach distinguishes itself 
from classic introspection both in its logic (it focuses on first-person phenomenology, rather 
than third-person correlations) and its pragmatics (it attends to experience without 
introducing second-order observations).  
          However, we might also wish to respond to this challenge in a different way and affirm 
the importance of a second-order introspective observation, a kind of “meta-awareness”. If 
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we choose this route, then we have to offer a good response to objection seven, which 
expresses the worry that such acts of observation would change the very experiences we wish 
to examine.  
4.3 Objection 3: Introspective Observation is Unreliable 
A sceptic of introspection may argue that both non-introspective reports about the world as 
well as introspective reports have demonstrated to be unreliable. Why then consider “inner 
perception” as a systematic approach to the study of mental phenomena? 
          First, non-introspective reports have proven overall reliable as long as the stimuli that 
experimenters present to their subjects are above threshold.
300
 Reliability only decreases 
when subjects are presented with stimuli close to threshold and have to offer quick reports 
thereof. Reports become even less reliable in the presence of disturbing external and internal 
factors. However, I have already discussed that subjects who have trained their first-personal 
attention skills are able to perceive more field-independently, that is, they can attend to more 
complex and ambiguous phenomena more precisely in the presence of distracting influences. 
          Second, textbook history fails to tell us that the rival schools of classical, 
introspectionist psychology agreed as a whole on descriptions of introspective 
phenomenology, but disagreed on theoretical and causal interpretations.
301
 As I have already 
discussed, the introspectionist school internally disagreed, because it was committed to 
theories over phenomenology. What do we learn from this? The important lesson is that first-
person approaches to experience are not useless methods for collecting first-person data, i.e. 
descriptive accounts of lived-through experience, and that psychology has to be more careful 
in discerning the difference between phenomenological projects to describe experience and 
theoretical projects to explain causal relations.  
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          Studies that have demonstrated subjective reports to be unreliable have done so only by 
requiring of subjects to report on the causes of their mental events, not because they offered 
phenomenological descriptions.
302
 Hence experimental subjects need to (i) learn how to pay 
attention to their cognitive processes and (ii) avoid giving causal-explanatory conjectures.
303
  
          If we view subjects as offering their beliefs about experience whenever they provide 
first-person statements about experience, then we misunderstand the role of first-person 
methods, and our interpretive strategy is misguided.
304
 To then further test whether the 
subjects “beliefs” are in concordance with the world and brain activity amounts to assuming 
analytical isomorphism; for example, we assume if we are dealing with mental images that 
the subpersonal activities in the brain (of which we are not conscious) must be depictive 
themselves. Dennett goes a step further in this project of equating descriptions of experience 
with beliefs about experience (beliefs which have no phenomenology). He quickly denies that 
the subpersonal experiences are depictive in the first place; rather, we falsely claim to have 
conscious experiences – we are misled and bewitched by defective modes thinking.305  
          If we do not buy into the idea that we only believe we experience and do not actually 
live through experiences consciously, and if we learn from history that there is a difference 
between describing how we experience and forming beliefs about the causes of our 
experience, then we can confidently say that first-person methods, which attend to experience 
phenomenologically, do fulfil their necessary function. As Thompson points out, “first person 
methods are methods that foster [the] ability to be present to one‟s own experience,”306 and 
contemplative practitioners demonstrate that this ability is a trainable skill which can become 
more accurate. Such training would be analogous to Galileo‟s attempt to refine the telescope, 
                                                          
302
 Ibid. 
303
 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 307. 
304
 Ibid. 
305
 Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1991), 406. 
306
 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 302. 
98 | P a g e  
 
which he rigorously applied to the observation of celestial phenomena. In this case, we attend 
to mental phenomena via refined attention skills instead of forming beliefs about our 
experience, or trying to account for the causes of our experience. Hence we choose to be 
present to our experiences and accurately report what it is like to undergo them.
307
 To 
conclude, phenomenological and contemplative first-person methods are decidedly not 
unreliable. 
4.4 Objections 4 to 6: Representationalism and Phenomenology 
To respond to objections 4 to 6, we must first discuss how phenomenology and 
representationalism differ in the way they conceive of the mind and intentional experience. 
My goal in this discussion is (i) to offer some background information that will allow me to 
show that objections 4 to 6 rely on a theory of mind that is not applicable to phenomenology, 
which makes it irreproachable to these matters; and (ii) to offer reasons to reject 
representationalism in order to open the way for an analysis of cognitive access that includes 
non-perceptual types of experience.
308
  
          Representationalism is an umbrella term for an alternative, non-phenomenological 
account of intentionality. This concept of “representation” is frequently referred to in analytic 
philosophy and the cognitive sciences.
309
 If we want to make progress in this project, it is 
important that we understand the difference between a phenomenological and a non-
phenomenological account of intentionality. I reject representational theories of the mind and 
consciousness. 
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          When analytic philosophers talk about “mental representations”, most assume that 
intentionality is representation. Siewert says: “Often, it is assumed: to have intentionality is to 
have content. And frequently mental content is otherwise described as representational... – 
and intentionality (at least, as this applies to the mind) is seen as just another word for what is 
called „mental representation‟.”310 Such a representation provides us with indirect access to 
something, i.e. it represents rather than presents something to our experience. Our contact to 
the object of our experience is therefore derivative and mediated through an intermediate 
entity.
311
 This mediating entity is considered to be a mental structure, such as a concept, an 
image, or a thought which has semantic properties. This content mentally “refers”, correctly 
or incorrectly, to the objects of experience. In this way, the representational content has truth-
value and truth-conditions.
312
  
          The mental structures which serve as mediating entities between subject and world are 
held to correspond to subpersonal, physical, and neural processes in the subject‟s brain.313 
This is also called analytical isomorphism,
314
 that is, the idea that we can only explain 
experience if there is a one-to-one correspondence between the phenomenal content of our 
personal experience and the subpersonal activity of the underlying neural processes 
(representations).
315
 The underlying structure is subpersonal, because it does not account for 
the phenomenon from the viewpoint of the whole person. An example of this is when we try 
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to explain the experience of mental imagery by pointing out neuronal processes on which the 
experience supposedly depends. Instead of attributing to a subject the experience of a three-
dimensional object, we describe an area of the subject‟s brain that has a certain 
electromagnetic pattern.
316
 The former is a personal and the latter is a subpersonal account. 
          Phenomenological analysis operates on the personal level, because it focuses on the 
constitutive features of experience as they are lived-through by the whole person. It intends to 
account for what it is like for the person to have a given experience. In contrast, mainstream 
cognitive science focuses on the subpersonal level, because it describes physical and/or 
functional processes that do not take into account the experience of the whole person – they 
do not take into account the first-person perspective. 
          Mental representations (content) are intermediate entities (corresponding to neuronal 
processes in the brain) often referred to as “mental images” or “sense data” etc.317 To 
understand this more clearly, consider following analogy for representational content: 
Compare the difference between perceiving the “beehive” (New Zealand parliament) and 
taking a look at a photo of the beehive. In both cases we are directly related to the object of 
our experience – we are intentionally related to the beehive in an object-directed manner. 
However, in the first instance we are immediately confronted with the beehive itself, and in 
the second instance we are only indirectly related to the beehive. Our intentional relation to 
the beehive is through an intermediate entity, in this case a picture, which is analogous to a 
pictorial representation that refers us to the actual object.
318
  
          The above analogy helps to see that representational content is not the object in itself, 
and it is definitely not the object of our cognition. Rather, mental content is that by which we 
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cognise and are aware of objects in the world.
319
 Intentional experience is representational in 
the sense that our access to the world is mediated by bridging entities that have descriptive 
content, i.e. they represent the world to us, and they represent the world to us in a particular 
way.  
          Considerable effort has been put into the attempt to naturalise intentionality by first 
accounting for intentionality in terms of representations and then accounting for our mental 
content (representations) in terms of subpersonal neuronal activity in the brain (non-
intentional activities). One aim of representational theories is therefore to make the problem 
of consciousness more tractable to a physicalist view of nature.  
          However, it is a contentious issue whether or not mental representations require the 
external world for their existence. Some believe they are independent of the world 
(internalism), others believe that our mental contents depend on the world, or possibly even 
include it (externalism). Interestingly enough, most proponents of representationalism are 
committed to some version of content externalism, which puts pressure on reductive accounts 
of mental states.  
          Internalism is the view that a subject‟s beliefs and experiences are determined only by 
internal factors of the subject. By this I mean what happens within his skull; his experience is 
causally “brainbound”.320 Mental content that is so constituted is considered to be 
“narrow”.321 For mental content to be narrow means that it is “individualistic” and not 
dependent on its environment.
322
 Consequently, what happens in the subject‟s physical and 
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cultural environment plays no role in defining his beliefs and experiences. In this respect, the 
meaning-content of a given experience is its object. Internalism, then, holds that experiences 
have an intentional relation to their objects solely on the basis of the subject‟s internal 
structure. The referential powers of the mind are independent of the world. Thus internalism 
implies the self-containedness of the mind.
323
 
          Externalism is the view that a subject‟s experiences are at least influenced by his 
environment, if not wholly determined by it.
324
 Mental content is not purely in the head, but it 
is constituted, at least in part, by what actually exists in the physical and cultural world.
325
 
Such content is defined as “broad” and “anti-individualistic”.326 This means that the mind 
extends into the environment, because its content is dependent on it. In this way, the identity 
of the mind is intertwined with the world; our experiences are of or about objects just because 
the external environment is what it is and not different; changes in the world are therefore 
accompanied by changes in our mind. In this way, the world is part of the content of our 
mind: our mental acts involve the world.
327
 
         We are now in a better position to flesh out the difference between represenationalism 
and phenomeonology.  
          On the one hand, representationalism is motivated by the intuition that it is difficult to 
conceive how our experiences can present us with objects without the help of some 
representational mediation. It is therefore assumed that the objects we cognise are outside our 
consciousness, but inside our minds we have representations (mediating entities that function 
as signs) that refer to those objects which exist in the outside world. Hence it is through the 
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internal objects only that we are conscious of external ones.
328
  
          On the other hand, phenomenology is decidedly anti-representationalist. The idea that 
consciousness is a kind of box that contains representations – which in some way or another 
resemble the objects of the outside world – is referred to by Zahavi as the “homunculus 
model”.329 Already Husserl, who inaugurated the phenomenological tradition we know today, 
pointed out that this leads to an infinite regress. How does the subject know that his 
representations in fact represent the external facts? Husserl explained the issue as follows: 
The ego is not a tiny man in a box that looks at the pictures and then occasionally leaves his 
box in order to compare the external objects with the internal ones etc. For such a picture 
observing ego, the picture would itself be something external; it would require its own 
matching internal picture, and so on ad infinitum.
330
 
This means that representationalism does not solve the problem of how we have cognitive 
access to the world, but merely removes the issue with further abstractions, which requires 
further regressive problem-solving to remedy their explanatory emptiness (as we will see 
later in this chapter, the same issue arises for representationalism in respect to self-
awareness).  
          According to Husserl, we must consider that a picture or a sign is not the object in 
itself. This is a problem. Representations can only refer to something else if, for example, a 
picture is consciously apprehended as a picture.
331
 Thus the representational quality of such 
intermediate entities holds only because of a “special” kind of cognitive apprehension. 
However, such cognitive apprehension is only possible if we in fact first perceive, and only 
once we have done so, can our apprehension function as a sign or mediating entity. The 
representational quality that our “bridging” entities gain is therefore subsequent to prior 
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apprehension. This is another reason to reject representational theories of perception, because 
they presuppose what they try to explain.
332
 
           From a phenomenological point of view, perception is not an encounter with 
intermediate entities of objects, but a confrontation with the objects themselves. For Husserl, 
this is the defining feature of perception: it presents us with the objects of the world in their 
very “bodily presence”.333 Thus phenomenology views the case in which something appears 
to us in perception as a presentation of the object given and not as an indirect, mediating 
representation, image, or sign of some sort that refers to something else.
334
 According to 
Thompson, intentional experiences (mental acts) should not be understood as states that have 
content, but they should be viewed as acts that have directedness. While the view that 
intentional experiences are directed acts can be reconciled with the view that intentional 
experiences are states that have content, it is nevertheless a worthwhile distinction to make, 
because it indicates a theoretical orientation that critically differs from representational 
theories of mind.
335
 
          The phenomenological account of intentionality is a kind of “direct perceptual 
realism”.336 This approach acknowledges that perception is transactional,337 that is, subject 
(body) and world (environment) are coupled in such a way that perceptions are not operations 
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performed purely in the head, but a kind of skillful cognitive activity that includes the 
environment.
338
 In this view, mental acts are not only dependent on the environment, but they 
are processes that are not internal in the first place; rather, they are processes that include the 
external environment as part and parcel of the act.
339
 Thus the mental acts of a subject are 
directed to the world and involve the world; mental acts do not have content in the sense of 
mediating entities between subject and environment. 
4.5 The Mind Without, the World Within 
We are now in the position to re-evaluate the internalist and externalist distinction and to 
consider the phenomenological position on the mind-world relation. I contend that the 
phenomenological mind cannot be captured by either the internalist or externalist thesis about 
mental content because it is too complex; rather, it transcends the analytical divide. 
Therefore, the phenomenological mind defies the very internalism-externalism framework.
340
  
           The phenomenological view is very similar to the enactive approach in cognitive 
science to explain meaning and cognition.
341
 According to the enactive view, “autonomous 
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systems”342 bring forth or enact meaning through interacting with their environment in a 
reciprocal fashion. Hence the “inner” and the “outer” are not spheres that exist independently 
of or prior to this process. The spheres are domains that are mutually specified through the 
enactive relation that exists in the structural coupling of a given system and its 
environment.
343
 
          In an analogous fashion, phenomenology views the mind-world relation via the 
correlational structure of intentionality (the noesis-noema correlation). This relation is a 
dyadic object-approach (presentational) instead of a triadic mediation-approach 
(representational).
344
 What is important about the dyadic approach is that the transcendent 
object (noema) is presented/given to us through the intentional activities of consciousness 
(noesis). This means that the object/world falls within the phenomenological domain. This 
domain or continuum is defined by “the structures and conditions of possibility for 
phenomena [which] are antecedent to any divide between psychical interiority and physical 
exteriority, since they are... of the dimension in which any object – be it external or internal – 
manifests itself.”345 In this way, transcendental phenomenology is defined by its will to reach 
out to that which cannot be enclosed by subjectivity; it extends the mind into the 
environment. A mental act includes both the intentional act as well as the intentional object. 
Therefore, that which presents itself as genuinely transcendent (it is “exterior” to subjectivity) 
is also phenomenologically immanent.
346
 
          The phenomenological mind cannot be identified with internalism, if by this we mean a 
kind of Cartesian materialism.
347
 In this view, the mind is identified with the brain, which is 
considered to be independent of the world and a self-contained organ. But this is decidedly 
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false from a phenomenological point of view, because a mental act consists of an inseparable 
dyadic structure of both the intentional act as well as the intentional object. Mental acts do 
not have content that can be identified with subpersonal and physical entities which refer to 
the outside world (i.e., intermediated entities), but mental acts are directed to and in this way 
dependent on the objects that are phenomenologically constituted. 
          Consequently, we cannot make the kind of simple divide that is endorsed by the 
internalist/externalist debate. This division is rather artificial and problematic. Internalism 
requires that there is a gap between mind and world, but externalism argues to the contrary 
that the world is not outside of the mind. If we follow the externalist intuition to its end, we 
must conclude that its intuition that mind and world are inseparable entails that reference 
(mediation) is determined by factors internal to this whole: the phenomenological continuum 
of mind-world. It is therefore hard to see how this radical kind of phenomenological 
externalism distinguishes itself from a kind of internalism that holds reference to be solely an 
internal matter of the mind, a mind that is defined in a sufficiently broad sense.
348
  
           Thus the phenomenological mind is more complex than the internalist/externalist 
divide can account for. It encompasses the whole phenomenological domain of mind and 
world. Accordingly, we should reject the chasm between a self-contained mind and a 
mindless world, and we should neither conceive the subjective as inside the mind nor the 
objective as outside of it.
349
  
          From this discussion follows that the noema (the intended object) is decidedly not an 
internal mental representation, but the transcendent (“external”) object that is disclosed and 
presented to us through our first-personal perspective (“interior” subjectivity). The 
“correlational structure of intentionality”350 enables the phenomenological approach to steer 
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clear from idealism, because the phenomenological mind comprises the whole mind-and-
world continuum: subjectivity is therefore self-transcending (open). 
          With the help of this discussion of representationalism, internalism, and externalism, as 
well as the phenomenological position on these issues, we are now in a good position to 
return to objections 4-6. 
 
4.6 Objection 4: The Question of the Referential Powers of the Mind 
The issue of objection 4 is whether first-person methods presuppose the mind to have the 
referential powers it has independently of the world. Are such methods solipsistic? 
          My first response is to point to the phenomenological analysis of intentionality, which 
shows that subjectivity is self-transcending, at least in most instances, especially in 
experiences that are perceptual and heteronomous (endogenous-perceptual, exogenous-
perceptual, as well as intentionally narrow and broad).  
          A proper account of mental acts requires of us to consider the complete noesis-noema 
correlational structure. Thus the phenomenological account of intentionality shows that 
paying attention to our first-person perspective from a first-person point of view does not 
ignore our embededdness with “existing reality”.351 In fact, our first-personal perspective 
includes the external world in a very radical and broad internalist sense: one that transcends 
the traditional internalist/externalist divide. Therefore, when we first-personally examine 
phenomena, we consider the objects in themselves within the context of the 
phenomenological reflection.  
          This is a direct realist account of our access to the world. The realist view steers clear 
from the idea that phenomena (intended objects) are merely mental representations 
(mediating entities in the brain that refer to the environment) and thus independent of the 
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world. When we appreciate the fact that phenomenology is not a representationalist view of 
the mind, then we can reject the potential criticisms entailed by this question. Intentional 
mental acts are coupled with the subject‟s world. 
4.7 Objection 5: Does the Epoché Exclude the External World?  
According to phenomenology, the phenomenological reflection considers the objects-as-they-
are-intended. Objection 5 expresses doubt about this. It asks: Does the epoché mean that we 
bracket the transcendent (exterior) spatio-temporal world (the “other”)? Or, does the epoché 
mean that we continue to investigate the transcendent (exterior) spatio-temporal world, but 
with a different attitude? The answer to this is that the latter is true.  
          After the phenomenological reduction (which includes the epoché), the first-person 
examination continues to attend the worldly object. The only difference here is that the 
phenomenon is no longer considered with our naive “natural” attitude; rather, we focus on 
just how the phenomenon is intentionally given to us in experience. In this way, we consider 
it as a correlate of our experience.
352
 The turn from our naive way-of-being-in-the-world to a 
reflective exploration of our experience does not entail that we “turn away” from the world; 
in contrast, it is a more radical way of paying attention to the world and how it is given to 
us.
353
 Therefore, the phenomenological reflection does not exclude the world. 
4.8 Objection 6: What about Idealism? 
          We may question contemplative traditions concerned with examining non-perceptual, 
autonomous kinds of experience first-personally: Do these approaches exclude the world and 
necessitate an internalist view of the mind? This question is difficult to answer, because there 
are many contemplative traditions with different metaphysical commitments; however, I 
contend that the concerns of this question can nevertheless be appeased. 
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          To respond to this question, I will first make a distinction between (i) methodological 
solipsism and (ii) idealism.  
          (i) Methodological solipsism shall denote a method that is employed to explore and 
account for the world by solely relying on the subject‟s mind conceived from an internalist 
point of view. In this case, the mind has referential powers independent of the world. Hence 
methodological solipsism relies solely on the subject‟s internal mind to account for the 
external world (because such “represents” and “refers” to the world).  
          (ii) Idealism denotes (a) the denial of materialistic atomism, which is a position that 
holds the ultimate constituents of reality to be irreducible, minute particles consisting of 
“physical stuff”; and (b) the affirmation that all that exists consists solely of “mind stuff”: all 
properties are mental properties. 
          I will now discuss some relevant phenomenological insights that Husserl has to offer 
on this matter. In Ideen I, Husserl points out that pure consciousness is conceivable and that it 
should be considered an autonomous domain despite the fact that consciousness would 
change if the world of objects were removed. He believes that consciousness would still 
remain unaffected in its own existence.
354
 Husserl further claims in Ideen I that consciousness 
does not depend on an actually existing world;
355
 that it is ontologically antecedent to the 
world and should therefore be considered as the Wurzel (root) and Quelle (source) of all other 
forms of being.
356
 
          At a first glance these statements of Husserl‟s seem to be hostile to an externalist view 
of the phenomenological domain (the noesis-noema continuum). However, Zahavi explains 
that this conclusion is premature. Husserl in fact does not intend “to drive a wedge between 
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the world as we experience it and the real world.”357 This means that Husserl is not arguing 
that what is given to us in our phenomenology will remain untouched when the world is 
removed from the equation. In matter of fact, Husserl argues against such an interpretation 
and believes that our experiences would change were the world to disappear. What Husserl is 
saying, then, is that it is conceivable that “some form of consciousness might be possible 
even in the absence of an objective world,”358 but not that every type of experience can occur 
in the absence of the world.
359
  
          We need to distinguish investigating consciousness simpliciter from examining the 
external world through our internal mind only (a mind that is internalist and can refer to the 
world without its existence). Such a self-enclosed mind could produce any experience 
independent of “actual existing reality” (the world). A method that would rely solely on such 
an internal mind would indeed be solipsistic; however, this is decidedly not the case. It is 
false to infer from the possibility of experiencing states of consciousness not referring to the 
world that methods employed to examine such states also entail that the world can be 
examined without its existence and purely via the inspection of “mental representations”.  
          What about the issue of idealism? Idealism is a metaphysical position about the 
ontological status of the world and reality. There are indeed contemplative and 
phenomenological traditions that uphold an idealistic metaphysical framework. We just need 
to consider the Buddhist Yogācāra school, for example. However, this ought not to be 
confused with methodological issues, because the idealistic stance is a conclusion drawn, not 
a method employed. The methods themselves remain true to the phenomenological attitude: 
to bracket metaphysical (or at times any) assumptions and to attend to the phenomena 
themselves with a critical attitude. Therefore, it is false to argue that a first-person approach 
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is methodologically solipsist, no matter what metaphysical conclusions might come from the 
examination. 
4.9 Objection 7: Does Meta-awareness Undermine Our Access to Experience? 
The issue of this objection is whether “meta-awareness” (reflection or monitoring) of 
conscious experience changes the experience in question. If this is the case, how can we 
study experience as it is actually given to us? I argue that when a first-person approach is 
employed to examine perceptual kinds of experience (endogenous and exogenous; 
intentionally broad and narrow), then the potential changes involved are trivial and do not 
compromise the project to study the experience in question.
360
 
          To understand why “meta-awareness” does not compromise examining subjectively 
lived-through experience, we have to first consider the nature of phenomenological 
reflection. From a phenomenological point of view, experiences which we subject to 
reflection acquire a new mode. They are attentionally modified. The modification process 
that reflection initiates discloses and explicates all the components and structures of 
experience that were prior implicit and unthematic.
361
 In this way, reflection thematises our 
primary experience so that aspects of it originally in the background of our attention come to 
be explicit themes of our experience. Thus reflection discloses nonthematic and implicit lived 
experience. 
          While attention is understood to be a primary act of our experience, reflection is 
viewed as a new, higher-order act of attention. Reflection changes the mode of a given 
experience from a nonthematic to a thematic mode of givenness.
362
 It alters the mode of the 
primary act. If first-person approaches are understood as second-order observational acts 
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(acts of “meta-awareness”), then the question is whether this change is too big for the primary 
act of experience to be adequately examined by reflection or introspection.  
          To address this question, I will distinguish between the quality and matter of 
intentionality. Recall that intentional experiences (mental acts) have a dyadic act/object 
correlational structure, which consist of an intentional act and an intentional object. This 
correlational structure is of service to us, because intentional experiences have two 
inseparable but distinguishable aspects (or “moments”): they consist of an intentional quality 
and an intentional matter.
363
  
          The intentional quality of a mental act defines the type of experience it is. For example, 
we distinguish between wishing, desiring, recalling, rejecting, fantasising, doubting, 
regretting, disapproving, loving, etc. We might doubt “the suitability of some advice we 
received”, or we might disapprove of “a volatile action of our neighbour”, or we can regret “a 
decision we made ten years ago”, or we feel love towards “the presence of God”. According 
to Husserl, these are cognitive differences, and these also amount to experiential differences. 
This means that different intentional qualities have different corresponding 
phenomenologies.
364
 
          The intentional matter of a mental act defines what an experience is about.
365
 It is what 
the experience is directed at. The experience is about something, be it a sculpture, a 
landscape, a dog, or some object of worship. A change in intentional matter will correspond 
to a change of how it is for us to undergo the experience. Additionally, the intentional matter 
(object) of an experience can be given to a subject‟s awareness through different modes. This 
fact holds for ordinary external objects of the physical world as well as categorical objects, or 
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even religious or mystical objects.
366
 In this way, we can be repelled by the “Presence of 
God” or intensively attracted to it, depending on the intentional quality or mode of 
presentation. 
          If we distinguish between the quality and matter of an intentional experience, then we 
can appreciate that a change in the mode of presentation – while it will make an experiential 
difference – will not change what the experience is about. It does not change the content of 
the mental act itself.
367
  
          When we consider contemplative states of consciousness, or even mystical 
experiences, then it is especially relevant that the content of an experience does not change 
when its intentional quality changes. For example, God may be presented to a subject‟s 
awareness in different and very specific modes that have different phenomenologies.
368
 While 
these differences in phenomenological quality denote cognitive and experiential differences, 
they do not imply that the experiences are necessarily about different objects. Therefore, 
experiences may be phenomenologically mediated by different intentional qualities, but this 
does not imply that the experiences are completely mediated by representational bridging 
entities, or that they may be completely constructed and thus (i) not about the same 
object/matter and (ii) merely about imaginary internal mental representations without 
reference to any “actually existing reality”.369 From this follows that even if various 
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(mystical) experiences are accompanied by differing affective qualities, it does not follow 
that these differences in intentional qualities entail a difference in intentional matter (object). 
Therefore, veridical perceptions can be “qualified” by different subjective 
phenomenologies.
370
 
          What are the implications for the phenomenological method of reflection? As Zahavi 
astutely argues, “reflection alters the mode in which the primary act is experienced, it does 
not change the content of the act.”371 Consequently, the kind of change that reflection 
introduces is in the mode of presentation, not in the intentional matter. Furthermore, the kind 
of reflection involved is best described to accentuate the structures already inherent of the 
experiences in question: it should not be held to be a process that adds new components, 
structures, or content.
372
 It discloses its theme, it does not produce it.
373
 The change involved 
is an attentional modification that discloses implicit and nonthematic aspects of experience 
that can be attended to with heightened awareness and sensitivity. I conclude that the changes 
involved when we phenomenologically reflect on experience (“meta-awareness”) do not 
compromise the project to examine experience as it is given.
374
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          To review my treatment of scepticism so far, I have responded to seven sceptical 
objections to first-person methods. I showed that the phenomenological and contemplative 
methods I presented in Chapter 3 cannot be equated with the classic understanding of 
introspection (objection 1). Therefore, the methods I have considered are not part of a failed 
project. To the contrary, I showed that it is possible to phenomenologically attend to the 
intentional domain of consciousness (objection 2), and that this act is decidedly not unreliable 
as a method to describe lived-through experience (objection 3).  
         Next, I reviewed representationalism to clear the way for a phenomenologial view of 
the mind, and to set the stage to respond to objections 4, 5, and 6. I discussed the mind-world 
relation to show that the phenomenological method is not solipsistic, because subjectivity is 
embedded with existing reality (objection 4). I concluded that the epoché does not exclude 
the world, but attends to it with a more radical, phenomenological attitude (objection 5). 
          I then approached the problem of idealism. To respond to this challenge, I 
distinguished (i) methodological solipsism from (ii) idealism. To this end, I delved further 
into the implications a “pure” (worldless) form of consciousness would have for first-person 
methods. This discussion demonstrated that the existence of a pure form of consciousness 
would not negate an externalist view of the mind. I argued that this conclusion enables us to 
affirm the existence of a pure, worldless form of consciousness, as well as our ability to first-
personally examine it, without falling prey to methodological solipsism or metaphysical 
idealism. 
          Finally, I responded to objection 7 by showing that even if meta-awareness alters 
intentional experience, this does not pose an issue for us to examine lived-through intentional 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Bohr and others have also recognised the parallel that exists in this respect to the observation of mental 
phenomena. Thus, the problem that the observer invariably alters the observed processes is no news in modern 
physics, and this fact has not prevented quantum physics from “becoming the most successful physical theory in 
the history of science.” Now, if this observer participation problem is no reason for us to reject the physical 
sciences, why should this be reason for us to reject the possibility of a science of mind based on the observation 
of mental phenomena? For a longer discussion of this see B. Alan Wallace, Hidden Dimensions: The 
Unification of Physics and Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 37-43. 
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experiences and their intentional matters. Thus, in the case of intentional experience (only), 
the impact of observation does not compromise the project of studying conscious experience 
form a first-person point of view.  
          In my next chapter, I will continue to address the issue that acts of observation impact 
what is observed; however, I will do so with a focus on the self-aware ego-pole of 
consciousness, rather than its intentional object-pole. This is the challenge of objection 8.  
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Chapter 5 
Self-Awareness: First-Person Methodologies 
and the Theory of Disclosing 
 
So far as I can see, this [philosophers‟ difficulty in conceiving of cognitive states whose 
content are unlike that of sense perception] simply evinces a lack of speculative 
imagination.  Why suppose that the possibilities of experiential givenness, for human 
beings or otherwise, are exhausted by the powers of our five [intentional] senses?
375
 
 William Alston 
We are now left with question eight: Can phenomenological reflection reveal the pre-
reflective structure of self-awareness?           
          As I pointed out earlier, the actual issue of first-person methods is not the 
mental/physical divide, but whether such methods can examine perceptual experiences 
(internal or external), which have a subject-object structure without changing the experiences 
too much; and how such methods can attend to non-perceptual kinds of experience, which do 
not display a subject-object structure, also without changing their structure.  
          This chapter is dedicated to answering this question by putting forward the “Theory of 
Disclosing” as an account of cognitive access.  
          I offer the following strategy to approach this task: First, I will offer some final reasons 
to reject representational theories of mind which will (i) make us aware of how problematic 
the issue of reflection really is and (ii) show how we should conceive the capacity of 
consciousness to be self-aware. 
          Second, I will re-visit both reflection and self-awareness. I will discuss how Sartre 
distinguishes between two different kinds of reflection and re-define what the notion 
“cognitive access” intends to capture. 
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          Finally, I will introduce the “Theory of Disclosing” as an account of cognitive access, 
so that we can expand the list of “observable experiences” and make room for non-perceptual 
types of experience. I will argue that we do have cognitive access to non-perceptual 
experiences, continental phenomenology notwithstanding. 
5.1 A Final Critique of Representational Theories of Mind 
I will now give some final reasons for rejecting representationalism.
376
 This will serve our 
understanding of reflection and self-awareness for the proceeding discussion.  
          Representationalism is a theory of mind. When we think of the requirements for such a 
theory of consciousness then it  
has to account for the first-personal or egocentric givenness of our conscious states, and has to 
respect the difference between our consciousness of a foreign object, and our consciousness of 
our own subjectivity. Any convincing theory of consciousness has to be able to explain the 
distinction between intentionality, which is characterized by a difference between the subject 
and the object of experience, and self-consciousness, which implies some form of identity.
377
  
In the last three decades, the most prominent way to account for self-awareness (our 
consciousness of our own subjectivity) in both cognitive science and analytic philosophy of 
mind is via “higher-order representation theories” of mind, which account for self-awareness 
in terms of intentionality.
378
 To explicate this, I will first distinguish between two ways of 
speaking about an experience being conscious, and then utilise this distinction to explain 
what higher-order theories of self-awareness exactly are. Finally, I will show that such 
accounts of self-awareness are impoverished. 
          There are two different ways of speaking about an experience being “conscious”:379 (i) 
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we can speak of experience being conscious of things; and (ii) we can speak of an experience 
being conscious simpliciter. The former is a transitive structure of consciousness and the 
latter an intransitive one that refers to phenomenal consciousness in the sense of what it is 
like to live through a certain experience (e.g., state-awareness).  
          According to higher-order theories, self-awareness (intransitive consciousness) is 
relational.
380
 This means that a mental state is transitively conscious due to a (higher) second-
order representation about that state; this can be a higher-order thought or a higher-order 
perception.
381
 This means that when we speak about a mental state being intransitively 
conscious (simpliciter), what we mean to say is that we are simply transitively conscious of 
it.
382
 Phenomenal consciousness is therefore conferred by object-directed conscious states 
(intentional mental acts).
383
  
          Gallagher and Zahavi compare this way of thinking about consciousness to a spotlight 
that illuminates mental states; mental states which are not illuminated by a higher-
representation operate in the dark.
384
 Illumination in this context is the “conscious-making” 
feature of “meta-mental states”. Thus mental states become conscious states because higher-
order states (meta-mental states) take them as their objects. Gallagher and Zahavi summarise 
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this basic formula of higher-order theories as the idea that “a conscious state is a state we are 
conscious of.”385 
          According to Carruthers, who is a proponent of such higher-order representations, 
beings that do not have the cognitive capacities for such higher-order states are not 
phenomenally conscious.
386
 Consequently, animals and young children have no phenomenal 
interiority and subjectivity. This also means that they are unaware of the existence of any 
kind of experiencing: they lack the feature of “what it is like” to feel and live through 
experience. 
          If this is not in itself a sufficient case of reductio ad absurdum, then I will discuss three 
further problems for higher-order representational theories of mind.  
          First, representational theories of mind are associated with the transparency thesis of 
awareness. Thompson defines this thesis as follows: “We are not aware of (intrinsic mental 
features of) our experience, but only of the objects and properties presented by 
experience.”387 For this reason, the conscious-making feature must be another additional 
awareness that takes a given mental state as its object – experience is not conscious 
simpliciter.  
          The problem with this thesis is that it does not take into account a fundamental aspect 
of our subjectivity, namely its first-personal mode of givenness, that is, that there is 
something it is like to live through experience.
388
 We do not only hear the notes of the 
melody, but we also live through our listening of it. In Thompson‟s own words, the 
“transparency of awareness thesis neglects precisely the prereflective self-consciousness of 
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subjective experience.”389 This critique is a phenomenological one.390 It recognises our 
capacity to be state-aware (as in the case of lucid dreaming). State-awareness implies that 
there is something it is like, in very distinct sense, to undergo experience, and that this can be 
thematised. The fact that we can become conscious of it in this thematic way implies a prior 
unthematic (pre-reflective) acquaintance with it.
391
 
          The second critique is a logical one. If mental states are conscious because they are 
taken as objects by (higher) second-order mental states, then the (higher) second-order state 
needs a further (higher) third-order state for itself to be conscious – for it is only object-
directed intentionality which can confer consciousness onto a lower-level state, that is, our 
being conscious of a state is the conscious-making feature of that state. This leads to an 
infinite regress. Now the typical response of higher-order proponents has been to “bite the 
bullet” and stop the regress at the third-order state. 
          This leads to the third problem for higher-order representation theories, which is both 
logical and intuitive. Typically, representationalists will halt the regress by accepting the 
existence of a dead end, that is, non-conscious mental states.
392
 The second-order state, then, 
is conscious by virtue of it being the object of a non-conscious third-order perception or 
thought. 
          The problem in accepting this kind of a dead end is explanatory vacuity.
393
 First of all, 
it does not logically follow that a given mental state is conscious because of it being the 
object of a non-conscious mental state. To the contrary, we might wish to ask just how an 
unconscious process can transform another unconscious process in to a conscious one? This 
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is highly unconvincing and counter-intuitive. Zahavi raises the same question from a 
phenomenological point of view: “How can the fact of being the intentional object of an 
unconscious second-order state confer first-personal givenness or „mineness‟ on an otherwise 
unconscious first-order mental state?”394 The problem we encounter here is logically 
analogous to the hard problem of consciousness, and has resulted in the rejection of positions 
that offer empty explanations, circularity, or simple denial of empirical facts (e.g., that we in 
fact consciously experience).
395
  
          The “hard problem” can be phrased as the following question: How does dead matter 
give rise to conscious experience? In this context we can ask the same question about higher-
order theories: How does a “dead mental state”396 give rise to a conscious mental state? In 
response, higher-order representation theories have three options, all of which are either 
logical or intuitive defeaters, or both: (i) to accept an infinite regress of higher-order states; 
(ii) to accept the dead end of explanatory vacuity, as well as the counterintuitive notion that 
unconscious processes magically give rise to conscious experience; or (iii) to admit that the 
higher-order state is itself already implicitly conscious (which is circular, and also contradicts 
the very notion of a “higher-order”, because this requires of phenomenal consciousness that it 
be produced when a higher-order state transitively takes a separate lower-order state as its 
object).
397
 
                                                          
394
 Dan Zahavi, “First-Person Thoughts and Embodied Self-awareness: Some Reflections on the Relation 
Between Recent Analytical Philosophy and Phenomenology,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 
(2002): 15. 
395
 David J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” in Explaining Consciousness: The Hard 
Problem, ed. Jonathan Shear, 9-30 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997), 15-16; and David J. 
Chalmers, “Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness,” in Explaining Consciousness: The Hard 
Problem, ed. Jonathan Shear, 379-422 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997), 380-387. See also 
Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 303-311. 
396
 In this context the term “dead” serves to qualify things or conditions that have no phenomenality. It thus 
contrasts with the notions “alive” or “lived”, because these terms are used in this thesis to qualify phenomenally 
lived-through realities that are accompanied by conscious experience. A “dead mental state”, then, is one that 
does not reach the threshold of awareness; it is not consciously experienced. 
397
 The subject-object structure of this process entails that the lower-order state is not conscious in and of itself. 
See Dan Zahavi, “First-Person Thoughts and Embodied Self-Awareness: Some Reflections on the Relation 
124 | P a g e  
 
          I conclude that representational theories of mind are flawed, and that it be best we 
reject them. This opens the gates for a phenomenological analysis of consciousness within the 
context of my own “Theory of Disclosing”, an account of experience that is presentational 
rather than representational.
398
 
          As I have just shown, we cannot conceive the conscious-making feature of self-
awareness to be the intentionality of consciousness, because we encounter an infinite regress. 
For this reason, it is important to clarify how a presentational theory can work in respect to 
self-awareness. The problem, then, is how we can access consciousness simpliciter, without 
relying on intentional, reflective acts. Recall that self-awareness is the conscious-making 
feature, not because it is reflected upon by a higher-order (intentional) state, but intrinsically. 
How, then, can we access this domain? To answer this question, we must explore in more 
detail the relationship between reflection and self-awareness, and clarify what we mean by 
“cognitive access”. 
5.2 Reflection and Self-awareness 
We have already paid attention to pre-reflective self-awareness as an unthematic and inbuilt 
feature of intentional mental acts (perceptual kinds of experience). We have also clarified that 
it is this (intransitive) self-aware capacity of consciousness that confers phenomenal 
consciousness on our mental life: it is our conscious-making feature. Finally, we have 
discussed how continental phenomenologists insist that this self-awareness cannot exist 
without intentional mental acts, but that it pervades all of them as an invariant structure of 
experience. Continental phenomenologists thus conclude that subjectivity is open and that it 
is intentionally broad – in this specific sense (i.e., open to the world and the Other).  
          So what about non-perceptual kinds of experience (which are self-enclosed and without 
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subject-object structure)? In my final chapter, I will discuss in more detail just such an 
experience, but for my current purposes I want to isolate self-awareness for heuristic 
purposes, so that we can talk about such experiences coherently. What do I mean by this?  
          It is a vital question for phenomenology whether or not we can examine the pre-
reflective domain of consciousness, in other words, whether or not we can gain knowledge of 
our conscious life.
399
 This is relevant whether or not we consider self-awareness to be 
dependent on intentional acts. Thus, even if self-awareness is necessarily open (in the sense 
that it requires intentional acts, but is itself non-intentional), the question remains whether or 
not we can thematise this pre-reflective self-awareness, which is – and remains – an implicit, 
pre-reflective, unthematic, and intransitive phenomenon. For purposes of this kind of 
discussion, then, I will treat pre-reflective self-awareness simpliciter – rendering the issue of 
whether or not self-awareness is dependent on intentionality for its occurrence as secondary. 
Heuristically, then, self-awareness shall be a phenomenon in itself (non-perceptual). 
          We can distinguish between two forms of self-awareness: pre-reflective and reflective. 
The former is implicit, non-relational, non-objectifying, and an immediate form of self-
acquaintance. The latter is explicit, relational, and a kind of objectifying awareness that 
makes the unthematic, pre-reflective awareness its attentional theme.
400
 This kind of 
reflective self-awareness is best described as an intensified self-awareness, one that is 
accentuated through reflection.
401
  
          This notion of reflection is important because in Husserl‟s eyes it denotes a kind of 
“internal perception”,402 and it is only through such reflection that we can know of our own 
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subjectivity. “Perception”, in this context, is a kind of thematic examination, one that can 
yield knowledge, rather than mere awareness. According to Husserl, lived-experiencing is 
always conscious, but this does not entail that it is thematically experienced and known. In 
this way, he affirms that such a thing as tacit self-awareness is a part of phenomenal life, but 
he denies that this kind of self-awareness yields conceptual knowledge of our own 
subjectivity.
403
 Reflection is therefore methodologically important for Husserl, because, in his 
view, it gives us the relevant cognitive access to yield knowledge of our lived-experience, 
because it is thematic. 
          While reflection discloses and thematises experience, we run into problems to disclose 
or thematise pre-reflective self-awareness via reflection, because for something to be 
thematically disclosed it must already be present, even if it is present unthematically. Hence 
for self-awareness to encounter itself, it needs prior acquaintance with itself (it is conscious 
simpliciter).
404
 Thus reflection seems unable to thematically access the domain that is pre-
reflective. To explain this differently, if we wish to examine pre-reflective self-awareness, we 
have to attend to it; however, such attending implies objectivation. Consequently, our 
innermost subjectivity “will always evade our theoretical gaze and remain inaccessible for 
direct description and investigation.”405 Does Sartre‟s insight that “to know is to make oneself 
other”406 indicate that the process of reflection must falsify the subject matter of pre-
reflective self-awareness? Does this deny us cognitive access to “lived consciousness”?407 
          I do not think so. Let us first consider Sartre‟s distinction between pure and impure 
reflection. Sartre will identify the notion of reflection we have been talking about so far as 
impure reflection. Such reflection operates with an epistemic duality. The duality arises from 
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a process of objectivation. Two things come from this objectifying process, however: (i) the 
epistemic duality makes it a type of knowledge; and (ii) it gives rise to the salient subjective-
pole of consciousness, that is, the ego.
408
 
          In contrast, pure reflection thematises the reflected in an unadulterated and unfalsified 
manner: “Reflected consciousness does not appear as an object and is not given 
perspectivally as a transcendent entity existing outside reflecting consciousness.”409 Thus, 
according to Sartre, the given is of “absolute proximity” and “its knowledge is a totality”. 
There is a sense of immediacy and intimacy about this acquaintance. However, Sartre also 
believes that pure reflection does not yield any novel discoveries, that is, we do not learn 
anything new through such reflection, because all it can do is disclose and thematise that 
which is already (implicitly) present: the absolute flow of pre-reflective self-awareness. This 
lack of new insight leads Sartre to suggest that we should not call it knowledge, but employ 
the term “recognition” to capture this kind of direct, immediate, non-objectifying, and non-
conceptual self-acquaintance.
410
  
          I shall not quarrel with Sartre‟s choice of terms, because, for our phenomenological 
purposes, all we need is some kind of cognitive access to pre-reflective self-awareness, which 
is a matter of thematic examination. In sum: Cognitive access is for our purposes a subject’s 
thematically lived-through acquaintance with a given state or state of affairs that is disclosed 
to him with “first-person phenomenality” 411. On this point, my position is the same as that of 
Sartre and Husserl. 
          How does this play out in respect to pre-reflective self-awareness? Zahavi believes that 
Sartre‟s distinction is very important, because it is indeed one thing to be self-aware, but it is 
also quite a different thing to come to a “philosophical comprehension” of self-aware 
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subjectivity.
412
 For Zahavi, a theoretical perspective necessarily implies the objectivation 
(falsification) of the desideratum. Thus it is not conceivable to him that we can come to a 
philosophical understanding of subjectivity through pure reflection, even though he is willing 
to acknowledge that pure reflection remains a possibility for phenomenological investigation 
(practically speaking). This scepticism leads Zahavi to question Sartre‟s idea of pure 
reflection, which seems ad hoc to him: first, it turns out that pure reflection is the only “type 
of reflection” that can disclose consciousness; and second, Sartre never clarifies how such 
reflection is possible.
413
  
          Zahavi‟s confrontation with the problem of reflection prompts him to raise the question 
whether there may be a major problem or dead end for phenomenology.
414
 For Zahavi, the 
pressing question that needs to be answered is “whether phenomenology can offer any 
alternative ways to illuminate the field?”415 In his view there is, but this pathway is 
theoretical and leads away from an empirical approach to self-awareness. He dispenses with 
an empirical approach because he believes it would result in us developing a 
“phenomenology of the invisible”.416  
          I do not share Zahavi‟s view on this. I argue that an empirical approach is possible. 
This is so because I contend our innermost subjectivity to belong to experiences of the 
“observable” kind. I will now make this idea sensible by explicating my “Theory of 
Disclosing”.  
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5.3 A Response to Objection 8: Observable Experiences and the Theory of Disclosing 
Alston put forward a “Theory of Appearing” as an account of perception.417 His focus is on 
direct experiences that fall under the rubric of “experience”, because they involve a 
presentation or appearance of something to the subject. The basic idea of his “Theory of 
Appearing” is that perception is an “awareness of something‟s appearing to one as such-and-
such”.418 This denotes a perceptual kind of experience that is analogous to sensory 
perception, because the object “comes to” the subject and presents itself as existing 
independently from him, in other words, the object transcends the bounds of the subject: it is 
an encounter with the Other. 
          It is important to consider that subjects of experience can discern the states of 
consciousness that accompany their experiences from the object that is presented to them 
(recall the case of lucid dreaming). Thus experiences have an identifiable phenomenological 
quality that is distinguishable from their content. This is analogous to the phenomenological 
distinction between intentional quality and intentional content. These can be referred to by 
the subject as subjective features that accompany given states, such as: the sense of joy and 
calm, or sorrow and regret, etc.
419
   
          If we distinguish between the modes of consciousness and the objects (content) present 
in the experiences, it helps us to understand more clearly non-perceptual kinds of experience.  
The mode of access to such experiences is absolutely immediate, which I briefly paid 
attention to when I outlined the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual kinds of 
experience. Let us recall Alston‟s case of “extreme experiences”. In such kinds of experience 
we cannot distinguish the mode of consciousness from the object of awareness. In fact, the 
“object” of awareness is nothing other than the phenomenal quality of the lived-through non-
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dual and self-enclosed subjective condition. However, such a condition should not be held to 
isolate the subjective pole unto itself, but to embrace both the subjective and objective pole 
into an undifferentiated unity or “allness” – an inclusive totality, as Sartre would say. 
          Unfortunately, Alston‟s breathtakingly simple “Theory of Appearing” is intended to 
account for no more than perceptual kinds of experience. This leaves out non-perceptual 
types of experience. Thus Alston‟s theory will not suffice for our purposes, and we need to 
consider theories that have greater explanatory power. Consequently, I will extend his theory 
to include non-perceptual types of experience. 
          Alston puts forward, for the purposes of his own inquiry, a paradigm case of 
contemplative states that goes as follows: the state is something that has been presented or 
given to the consciousness of a subject “in generically the same way as that in which objects 
in the environment are (apparently) presented to [a subject‟s] consciousness in sense 
perception”.420 He believes that contemplative states can be regarded as a mode of 
perception, from a phenomenological point of view. However, the non-perceptual type of 
experience is different:
421
 it is a reality or states of affair otherwise not accessible to our 
normal mode of experiencing which is disclosed within the self-enclosed subjectivity itself.  
What is disclosed embraces the total subject-object continuum non-dually, intransitively, 
non-objectively, and yet in a thematic manner also, unlike sense perception. This harmonises 
with Yandell‟s astute pointer that there are also experiences that have a subject/aspect 
structure in which the subject discovers or discerns something that is contained within the 
self-enclosed subjectivity of the aware condition/totality.
422
 Perceptual and non-perceptual 
types of experience have in common the fact that they are both thematic, and this is our 
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cognitive access point to lived-through experience. 
          Because non-perceptual types of experience do not contain any subject-object polarity 
(the content of the experience is not objectivised or encountered as the Other in any shape or 
form), we need to qualify the terms “of” and “to” that are used in conjunction with the terms 
“experience”, “encounter”, “acquaintance”, “disclosure”, and so forth. Through qualifying 
the terms we can make room for the “Theory of Disclosing” which incorporates within itself 
the “Theory of Appearing” in such a way that the notion of “appearance” is not limited to a 
dualistic, transitive, subject-object structure derived from exclusively perceptual models of 
experience.        
          Sartre believed that we are aware of our experiences before we reflect on them, and 
that we also have an awareness of self (ourselves) that is prior to us paying any explicit 
attention to it. In French, however, the term for self-awareness is conscience de soi, which 
translates literally as “consciousness of self”. This phrase suggest that consciousness 
objectivises itself; that it is an instance of self-othering in which consciousness takes an 
object and “artificially” creates a subject-object structure to thematically attend to itself. But 
phenomenologists such as Sartre, Shear, Forman, Gallagher, and Zahavi stress that this 
seeming implication is due to necessity of syntax only.
423
 Because it is difficult to avoid the 
“of”, Sartre qualified it with parentheses to negate its misleading implications.424 I shall 
follow his example to the extent that I will cancel out the dualistic connotation of “of”. Thus 
the “Theory of Disclosing” requires of us to tacitly qualify “of” such that we understand 
lived-through experiences in which phenomena appear “to” our awareness, or are disclosed 
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and presented “to” us, in such a way that their phenomenological structure is not confined to 
the operative subject-object duality of perceptual experience. Realities and states of affairs 
may be disclosed or presented within the self-enclosed subjective (but not necessarily 
internally isolated) condition that we live through experientially.  
          To clarify Alston‟s “Theory of Appearing”, as extended in my “Theory of Disclosing”, 
we can distinguish between four grades of immediacy: (1) Absolute immediacy that 
intransitively but thematically discloses X to the subject, where the content X is the 
phenomenal quality of his own subjectivity. This means that the subjective condition of 
acquaintance is a non-dual, non-objectivised, and self-enclosed lived subjectivity. (2) Direct 
immediacy, in which the subject is transitively aware of X through a subject-object structure, 
but not with the help of anything else. (3) Mediated immediacy, which is a form of direct 
perception. In this kind, the subject is aware of X with the help of a state of consciousness 
that is itself not perceived, but could be thematically attended to in a transitive fashion (i.e., 
objectivised, establishing a subject-object structure). If this state of consciousness is attended 
to, then it is an instance of direct immediacy. (4) Mediated perception, in which the subject is 
aware of X through his perceiving of another object. 
          According to Alston‟s “Theory of Appearing”, a subject is aware of X via the help of a 
state of consciousness that is itself not perceived (the intentional act of which we are pre-
reflectively self-aware, that is, we live through it implicitly), but can be thematically attended 
to in a transitive fashion (through objectivation only). This is the third kind of immediacy 
described above.
425
 
          My “Theory of Disclosing”, however, also includes the first kind of immediacy: a 
subject may also be aware “of” X immediately and intransitively, where X is the lived 
phenomenal domain of his own subjectivity. This means that the subjective condition of 
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acquaintance is a non-dual, non-objectivised, and self-enclosed lived-through subjectivity, 
along the lines of Sartre‟s pure reflection. To make this idea meaningful, the notion “of” is 
qualified such that our phenomenal life is not confined to subject-object dualities.  
          We may now wish to ask: How is such “pure disclosure” possible? The key to such 
disclosure is the ability to thematise pre-reflective self-awareness without (impure) reflection 
or self-othering (fissuring) consciousness. It is a way to become acquainted with one‟s own 
subjectivity without objectifying it. This is an approach to examining self-awareness that 
resembles Sartre‟s pure reflection. Unfortunately, Sartre did not explain his notion of pure 
reflection deeply enough to ground his philosophical work. I intend to remedy this. Since this 
issue is an empirical one,
426
 I will pick up on the current trend in neurophenomenology to 
draw on the robust, empirical proficiency of contemplative phenomenology, in an attempt to 
compensate for the continental tradition, which has weighted philosophical analysis over 
practical expertise.
427
  
          Contemplative practitioners are trained to (i) stabilise attention; (2) unlearn habitual 
cognitive modes of functioning; and (3) settle the mind in its “natural state”.428 Such training 
includes the ability to disengage from mental processes that proliferate objectified content.
429
 
How, then, can those steps thematise self-awareness without objectifying it? First, 
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practitioners train their attention. They can sustain a consistent and alert mental posture over 
time. Second, they learn how to thematise the invariant structures of experiences (“awareness 
per se”) in the face of changing content.430 This means they are capable of settling the mind 
into a state of thematic, pure subjectivity that is devoid of a transitive structure. Dunne et al. 
describe the culmination of this process as follows: 
At the highest level of practice, what we have described as a de-emphasis of both object and 
subject moves...to a point where no elements of objectivity and subjectivity – whether in the 
form of conceptual structures, categories of time and space, or some other feature – remain in 
the experience. At this point, the invariant feature of cognition is said to be realized fully by 
the meditator, and this is the full-blown state of Open Presence...one ability developed through 
cultivating Open Presence is the stability of the state – that is, one is not easily perturbed out of 
the state...in Open Presence the stability is not constituted by the fact that other phenomena do 
not pull one way from the object on which one focuses. Instead, stability consists of one‟s 
ability to continue to experience phenomena without objectifying them...the state thus seems to 
cultivate a type of ipseity or bare awareness.
431
 
To phenomenologically explain what is happening here, contemplative phenomenologists 
learn to stabilise attention either through one-pointed focus on an object, or through meta-
stability of attentiveness that does not objectify changing content. Attention itself is in this 
way thematised, but not through turning attention onto itself; it is therefore not a form of 
“objectifying thematisation”. The kind of thematisation at work here is one in which the 
aware-quality of attention becomes the theme (passively) and in this way moves from the 
background to the foreground of experience. This represents a higher form of wakefulness in 
which self-awareness is intensified and accentuated.
432
  
          Attention, then, instead of taking itself as an object, simply rests in its attentiveness 
such that its conscious-making feature remains. In this respect, we can say that the objective-
pole is de-thematised to the point where the luminosity (conscious-making-quality) of self-
awareness stands bare without being grasped by a higher-order state. Pure disclosure, then, is 
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a “disclosing modification rather than a concealing falsification”433 of consciousness, where 
this modification de-emphasises habitual thematic cognitions and non-intentionally 
emphasises the invariant, conscious-making self-awareness. Thus self-awareness is given 
thematically while still being lived-through pre-reflectively (there is no reflective activity 
involved). Therefore, contrary to Zahavi, pre-reflective self-awareness does belong to the 
range of phenomenologically observable experiences, because it can be thematically 
examined (which we have defined as cognitive access) in a way best described as 
recognition, apperception, or even gnoseological awareness. 
          To review the argument so far: I began in chapter 3 by clarifying the role first-person 
methods play in neurophenomenology. I then introduced the phenomenological and 
contemplative method and showed that (i) neurophenomenology has turned to the 
contemplative method because of its practical expertise (something which the 
phenomenological method has neglected); (ii) the methodological steps of the 
phenomenological method and the contemplative method share a logic; (iii) contemplative 
phenomenologists can train their attention skills to a relevant degree. Following this, in 
Chapter 4, I explored the common agreement that exists between phenomenologists and 
myself: that we can have cognitive access to the intentional domain of consciousness through 
first-person methods. I then considered nine objections to first-person methods. I responded 
to seven of them in turn. In the midst of this, I provided some reasons to reject 
representationalism. 
          In this chapter, I have responded to the eighth objection against first-person methods: 
How can we thematise self-awareness without objectifying it? To answer this question, I 
discussed higher-order representational theories of mind to clarify the conscious-making 
feature of self-awareness. This resulted in a final refutation of such theories on traditional 
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phenomenological grounds. I also discussed in greater detail the differences between 
reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness, as well as the difference between reflection and 
pure reflection. On the basis of these discussions, I developed the thesis that cognitive access 
is a matter of thematically lived-through acquaintance with our phenomenal life. 
          Finally, I left behind my agreement with continental phenomenology (that we can 
successfully examine perceptual types of experience) and offered my “Theory of Disclosing” 
as an account of cognitive access, which considers non-perceptual types of experience to be 
observable. 
          The fact that we can have first-personal, cognitive access to non-perceptual types of 
experience has serious consequences for the theoretical framework of continental 
phenomenology and neurophenomenology, including Thompson‟s continuity thesis. 
          In my next and final chapter, I will talk about such a non-perceptual type of experience 
and the consequences that follow from it. In this way, I will also respond to the ninth and last 
objection to first-person methods, namely that there exists no such thing as a non-perceptual 
type of experience. 
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Chapter 6 
Contemplative Mind and “Discontinuity”:  
The Challenges of Pure Consciousness and 
Phenomenal Selfhood 
 
It would seem quite odd to say if you described who you are (“what is your real self?”) to 
respond: “It is my primal protention-retention.”434 
 John Dunne 
Now I‟d like to say more about the fundamental nature of the mind. There is no reason to 
believe that the innate mind, the very essential luminous nature of awareness, has neural 
correlates, because it is not physical, not contingent upon the brain. So while I agree with 
neuroscience that gross mental states correlate with brain activity, I also feel that on a 
more subtle level of consciousness, brain and mind are two separate entities.
435
 
 Tenzin Gyatso, The Dalai Lama 
In this final chapter I will draw on my forays into Varela‟s and Thompson‟s philosophy of 
life, neurophenomenology, and first-person methods to explain why (i) we should doubt that 
time-consciousness really accounts for self-awareness and (ii) there is a conceptual 
discontinuity between (contemplative) mind and life. 
          To this end, this chapter will focus on a non-perceptual type of experience that can be 
found in phenomenological accounts of consciousness derived from the contemplative 
method. I will show that such accounts are antithetical to the most basic assumptions 
entertained by continental phenomenology about the fundamental nature of consciousness. In 
addition, I will point out how significant such a non-perceptual type of experience is for our 
understanding of phenomenal selfhood. It will become clear that a proper understanding of 
this type of experience necessitates some discussion of selfhood, and vice versa.  
                                                          
434
 John Dunne, “The Reflective Self: Panel Discussion (Recorded at Columbia University on March 1st, 
2008),” and colleagues Evan Thompson, Georges B.J. Dreyfus, and Dan Zahavi, 
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-2855932336893877011&hl=en&emb=1# (accessed July 31, 2010), 
min. 1:00:35-1:00:51. 
435
 The Dalai Lama, “Human Nature: On the Luminosity of Being,” New Scientist 178:2396 (May 24, 2003): 42. 
138 | P a g e  
 
          I will proceed by showing that we can clarify controversies surrounding the existence 
and non-existence of self (ātman), especially in the matter of the Buddhist doctrine of not-self 
(anatta/anātman), if we understand how non-perceptual experience and phenomenal selfhood 
inter-relate. This will lead me to distinguish a (ego-) “self” present in the dualistic structure of 
ordinary, phenomenal experience from a (non-egological) “Self” associated with the 
contentless luminosity of pure consciousness (non-perceptual experience). 
          To accomplish this, I will first introduce the non-perceptual type of experience that I 
have alluded to so frequently throughout this thesis. I will then discuss this type of experience 
in the context of the ego/self and phenomenal selfhood. I will direct this discussion towards 
the controversies surrounding the existence or non-existence of self and the Buddhist doctrine 
of anatta. Finally, I will consider what this means for continental phenomenology and 
Thompson‟s continuity thesis. I will argue that prima facie (i) continental phenomenologists 
are wrong about the fundamental nature of consciousness; and (ii) Thompson‟s continuity 
thesis cannot be maintained when we consider the nature of consciousness from the 
viewpoint of the contemplative mind. On the basis of these two points, I will recommend 
neurophenomenological research into non-perceptual types of experience to (i) adjudicate 
between continental and contemplative phenomenology; and (ii) see whether or not we can 
support Thompson‟s idea that there is deep continuity between life and mind. 
6.1 Pure Consciousness: A Non-perceptual Type of Experience 
In Chapter 2, I distinguished two basic kinds of experience: heteronomous and autonomous.  
          Heteronomous experiences are perceptual types in which intentionality is operative in a 
narrow (with subject-object structure) or broad manner (without subject-object structure, but 
open and affected by the world). Such experiences are other-determined, and our subjectivity 
is open.  
          Autonomous experiences are non-perceptual and lack any kind of operative 
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intentionality. This denotes an even more radical absence of intentionally than we can find in 
experiences that lack a strict subject-object structure, such as moods and feelings, which are 
broadly intentional. Non-intentional experiences differ because they are self-determined. In 
this type of experience our subjectivity is self-enclosed. 
          Traditionally, continental phenomenologists believe that experience is “Janus-faced” 
because it is necessarily both intentional and self-aware. Thus self-awareness only occurs 
alongside intentional experience, because this conscious-making feature is built into, and thus 
requires, the intentional acts of consciousness. Dan Zahavi says: 
From a phenomenological perspective, or from a Husserlian perspective, or for that matter 
also for – I think – Hussards, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, there would be something 
misleading about understanding reflexivity and intentionality as two separate issues. They 
must be brought together, and I think that this is to some extent spelt out when they 
emphasise, for instance this is something Heidegger would pronounce very clearly, he would 
say that self-experience [self-awareness] is something that only occurs together with world-
experience [intentionality].
436
 
This statement tells us that many well-known phenomenologists believe that subjectivity 
must be open, and that there is no experience of “self” (-awareness) divorced from an 
experience of the world. They conclude this on the basis of philosophical analysis of 
experience. 
          However, contemplative phenomenologists who emphasise a more rigorous, practical 
approach to the epoché (as part of the phenomenological method) conclude differently when 
they investigate consciousness. They offer us prima facie phenomenological evidence that 
objectifying processes can be de-emphasised, and in this way the intentional activities of 
consciousness come to recede.
437
 When the fluctuations of consciousness recede to a 
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sufficient degree, self-awareness remains as the only theme, and without intentional 
(temporal) content. In this way, the reflexivity of awareness – where reflexivity does not 
entail any fissuring of consciousness – is the phenomenal “content” of the lived-through 
condition.
438
 This kind of content is unlike any other, because it is not “about” anything 
external to the subject. The state is worldless.  
          This may also be described as a “contentless” form of consciousness, where 
“contentless” represents the denial of objectified and intentional content. It is a negation of 
the mind-world relation, where “world” is conceived to be that which is external to the 
subject and cannot be encompassed by him (the transcendent). Forman defines such a non-
perceptual type of experience as “what persists when the human being persists without 
content.”439 In this context, a synonym of consciousness ought not to be “„awareness of 
anything (intentional) at all‟, but rather „awareness per se‟ which can (and usually does) 
become aware of things.”440 This is a kind of state of awareness identified by contemplative 
phenomenologists as the most basic form of consciousness.
441
 Forman defines the encounter 
with this basic form of consciousness, or awareness per se, as a “pure consciousness event” 
(this phrasing avoids the problems we encounter with the terms “experience” and “of”).442 
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          The phenomenal quality of this type of experience is the conscious-making feature of 
self-awareness itself, which is a necessary a priori condition to perceptual types of 
experience. In this event, we encounter awareness only which is pure, silent, and empty of all 
“phenomenal” objects or presentations of a transcendent world (external reality to the 
subject). Rather, it is a “settled” condition that nevertheless remains alert, but not through 
intentional activity (or time-consciousness for that matter). Thus pure subjectivity is also 
described as “the mind [that] has become completely „settled‟ while nevertheless remaining 
alert”. It is a state in which “one steps outside of all activity of perception” but still remains 
“silent and fully awake inside”.443 This entails that self-awareness is the conscious-making 
capacity of human beings independent and prior to all activity of perception.    
            Let us consider some accounts of such pure consciousness events: 
PCE 1: 
Without knowing what to expect, I began to drift down into deeper and deeper levels of 
relaxation, as if I were sinking into my chair. Then for some time, perhaps for a minute 
or a few minutes, I experienced a silent inner state of no thoughts; just pure awareness 
and nothing else; then again I became aware of my surroundings.
444
 
PCE 2: 
The second report describes how, if pure consciousness events are undergone regularly, such 
experiences can mature over time. It is one of the most detailed and precise descriptions 
Forman has come across: 
There would just be a sort of complete silence void of content. The whole awareness 
would turn in, and there would be no thought, no activity, and no perception, yet it was 
somehow comforting. It was just there and I could know when I was in it. There wasn‟t a 
great “Oh, I am experiencing this.” It was very natural and innocent.  But I did not yet 
identify myself with this silent, content-free inner space. It was a self-contained entity 
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that I transcended to and experienced. 
          Then, with increased familiarity, and contingent on the amount of rest I had, the… 
process became more and more natural. At this point I began to appreciate that this inner 
space was not an emptiness but simply silent consciousness without content or activity, 
and I began to recognize in it the essence of my own self as pure consciousness.  
Eventually, even the thin boundary that had previously separated individuality from 
unbounded pure consciousness began to dissolve. The “I” as a separate entity just started 
to have no meaning. The boundaries that I put on myself became like a mesh, a net; it 
became porous and then dissolved; only unbroken pure consciousness or existence 
remains. Once I let go of the veil of individuality, there is no longer “I perceiving” or “I 
aware.” There is only that, there is nothing else there. In this state the experiencer is not 
experiencing as it normally does. It is there ready to experience, but the function has 
ceased. There is no thought, there is no activity, there is no experiencer, but the 
physiology after that state is incredible. It is like a power surge of complete purity.
445
 
PCE 3:  
I had been meditating alone in my room all morning when someone knocked on my 
door.  I heard the knock perfectly clearly, and upon hearing it I knew that, although there 
was no “waking up” before hearing the knock, for some indeterminate length of time 
prior to the knocking I had not been aware of anything in particular. I had been awake 
but with no content for my consciousness. Had no one knocked I doubt that I would ever 
have become aware that I had not been thinking or perceiving. The experience was so 
unremarkable, as it was utterly without content, that I simply would have begun at some 
point to recommence thinking and probably would never have taken note of my 
conscious persistence devoid of mental content.
446
  
PCE 4: 
When Shear is prompted about the pure consciousness event, he provides following helpful 
analysis: 
By all accounts it is not like anything. For it has no content in it at all to make it more 
like any one thing than any other. And in as much as it contains no content at all, no 
colours, no images, sounds, thoughts, anticipations, etc. – or even any subjective 
manifold where such content could be located – whatever one can imagine is necessarily 
irrelevant to it… Nevertheless, while the experience cannot be imagined, its defining 
characteristic – the complete absence of empirical content – can readily be specified 
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conceptually. This allows us to think about the experience coherently, even if we can‟t 
imagine it. The seemingly merely negative definition of the experience might seem odd 
or contrived, if one has never had the experience. Nevertheless it is still useful. For if one 
has never had the experience, one can recognize that one has never had any experience 
corresponding to this odd definition, and by the same token, after having the experience, 
one can, by all reports, equally recognize that one has had it. Thinking about the 
experience in this (or any other) way is, of course, useless for gaining it, as traditional 
texts often emphasize.  But the definition will serve as a useful beginning point for 
scientific investigation into the status of the experience itself.
447
 
From the above reports we can extract following salient features: (i) the conscious event is 
conscious simpliciter, because (ii) the conscious-making feature of self-awareness persists 
despite (iii) the absence of intentionality and any temporal or objectified object; and (iv) the 
state is characterised by an absence of the world such that the self-aware condition is not 
determined by it in any way. The conscious event is therefore worldless and self-enclosed.  
          Traditionally, self-awareness is said to be conscious because intentional acts are 
implicitly self-aware. This can be depicted as follows: 
 
However, the contemplative method yields prima facie evidence that self-awareness is 
independently conscious. Buddhist phenomenologists call this innate conscious-making 
feature “Luminosity”.448 A lived-through encounter with awareness per se can be illustrated 
with the help of a different model: 
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          Contemplative methods have progressive steps in place to disclose pure consciousness 
and to thematise pre-reflective self-awareness. Dunne discusses those steps within the context 
of a meditative state called “Open Presence” (Rig-pa Chôg-zhag) cultivated in Tibetan 
Buddhism.
449
 The steps are: 
(1) to develop concentration on an object; 
(2) to cultivate awareness of subjectivity in such a way that the object is de-emphasised. 
Once step two is accomplished the practitioner gains “phenomenal access” (thematic 
acquaintance) to the reflexivity of awareness. 
(3) To de-emphasise subjectivity articulated in terms of an (ego-) “I” located in the past 
and present (to enhance the access to reflexivity); 
(4) to fully realise the Luminosity or Awareness that makes all cognitions possible (the 
invariant conscious-making feature), and in which no elements of subjectivity and 
objectivity remain in the experience. 
In the final step, the content of the experience “does not appear as an object over against a 
subject [no reflection or self-othering], and the experience also does not involve a sense of 
subjectivity that is articulated by [traditional] structures”.450 Thus we have a non-objectifying 
and thematic acquaintance with awareness itself through a non-perceptual and non-intentional 
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condition.  
          The methodological steps from above can be illustrated with the help of Dunne‟s 
schematic diagram:
451
 
Stage Object Subject Reflexive 
Awareness 
    
1 + - - 
2 - + + 
3 - - + 
4 Ø Ø + + 
 
In the above diagram we can see the interplay of emphasis and de-emphasis through which 
features of consciousness are moved into the background (thematised) or pulled forward to 
the foreground (un-thematised) in the “subject‟s” phenomenal life. What is important here is 
that the thematic process is a passive one. Rather than relying on objectifying and reflecting 
activities to attend to the unthematic background, the thematic process relies on de-
emphasising the foreground of experience to thematise that which is invariably and implicitly 
already in the background. 
          Once the condition of pure consciousness sets in the ego-pole is lost. Subjects report 
the absence of a sense of localised ipseity, as well as perspectival givenness that accompanies 
the ordinary, first-person mode of experiencing. This raises questions about phenomenal 
selfhood. 
    6.2 Egological vs. Non-egological Consciousness: 
          Phenomenal Selfhood, Self-awareness, and the Buddhist Doctrine of Anatta            
In order to understand pure consciousness, we need to take into account the fact that to 
phenomenally encounter it entails that we live through a state devoid of objectified content, 
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and in which our familiar sense of self is lost. Thus the absence of subject-object structure 
affects not only the object-pole of consciousness, but also its ego-pole. In what sense, then, 
can such a state be held to be self-enclosed? To answer this question, we need to discuss in 
greater detail the subject of selfhood.  
          There is no consensus on what it means to be a self. In fact, Strawson summed up the 
discussion on the self in 1999 by enumerating twenty-one different concepts of self.
452
 Here, I 
intend to discuss selfhood in a phenomenological context in order to consider egological and 
non-egological theories of consciousness alongside the issue of ipseity (selfhood, as derived 
from the Latin, ipse
453
) in pure consciousness. 
          To begin, I believe it is helpful to follow Albahari‟s example and distinguish between 
the “self” and a “sense of self”.454 This distinction is an apt move from a phenomenological 
point of view, because it allows us to continue discussing the phenomenology of experience 
(the experiential phenomenon of a sense of self), while leaving open the question of whether 
or not the self itself (as a substantial entity) really exists. This means that we can have a sense 
of self even if the self as an entity does not exist (the term “sense” is therefore not a success 
term in this context
455
).  
          Abahari‟s distinction is also helpful, because it allows us to concentrate on what is 
most central for this project: the relationship between consciousness simpliciter (pre-
reflective self-awareness) and phenomenal selfhood. The question about this relationship is 
whether self-awareness is an awareness of a self, or whether it is the self-aware (conscious-
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making) feature of experience itself, that is, the awareness that experience has of itself.
456
  
          To address this relationship between consciousness and phenomenal selfhood, I aim to 
clarify the question of whether self-awareness is egological or non-egological. This is 
important for the following reason: According to Dunne, contemplative practitioners can 
experience pre-reflective self-awareness, in the form of reflexivity only (the self-aware and 
conscious-making feature of subjectivity), without introducing any transitivity (subject-object 
structure characteristic of reflection). Hence Dunne argues that in such a state, there is no pre-
reflective, minimal sense of subjectivity; no subject is present.
457
 What does this mean? Is the 
sense of minimal subjectivity the same thing as the sense of a subject-self, and does this sense 
necessarily entail a transitive structure of consciousness?  
          Before we can answer these questions, we must first discuss egological and non-
egological theories of consciousness. The distinction between the two amounts to whether or 
not it is meaningful to speak of a subjectless or egoless self-awareness.
458
 
          An egological theory of consciousness claims that when I listen to a melody, then I am 
(i) intentionally directed towards the melody that is being heard and (ii) I am also aware that 
the melody is being heard by me, that is, that “I” am hearing it. We can thus say that Dunne 
holds an egological view of self-awareness, because for him it entails a subject-self. He 
contrasts this with pure reflexivity as a distinct non-egological condition of consciousness. 
          A non-egological theory of consciousness claims that we should conceive self-
awareness to simply be the acquaintance that consciousness has with itself. We should thus 
say that there is awareness of experiencing, or there is hearing the melody, rather than the 
melody being heard by me. Such conscious acts lack “I”-awareness. 
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          Sartre is famous for adopting a non-egological perspective of consciousness. In his 
view, we can only know through (self-) othering (via an epistemic duality). We have already 
discussed this in the context of examining self-awareness: self-othering denotes a polarisation 
of reality which gives birth to the (ego-) self – a polarisation that is not present in pure 
consciousness. Thus Sartre believes that pre-reflective self-awareness has no egological 
structure. Experiences which are lived-through in an absorbed way have no ego-dimension. It 
is only when a distancing and objectifying attitude is adopted that the ego appears. However, 
the appearance of the ego is merely one of an object, not a subject. This means that when we 
reflect upon experience, the reflecting component remains without egological structure. There 
is no I-consciousness involved; only a consciousness of I arises.
459
   
          In this process, reflection plays an important role. Sartre believed that it is reflection 
that gives rise to the ego as an object of consciousness. This can be explained by pointing out 
that when we reflect, we thematise what is pre-reflectively already implicit in our experience. 
During thematisation, we continue to be aware of the intentional object of experience, but our 
experience is thereby modified. The object is “recognised” rather than merely “registered”, 
and in this way takes on a conceptual dimension. Through modification, experience is finally 
owned or experienced by a subject (ego). In this way, “thematised experience acquires an 
egological structure” because “reflection situates the experience within an egological 
context”.460 Sartre‟s view, then, is a non-egological one: pre-reflective subjectivity is 
subjectless and egoless, while reflective experience is egological. Thus Sartre‟s view 
contrasts with Dunne‟s who argues that pre-reflective subjectivity includes a minimal sense 
of a subject or ego (it might also be possible that they are simply talking past each other!). 
          Zahavi does not share Sartre‟s view. He believes that Sartre operates with too narrow a 
concept of ego. According to Zahavi, we can describe “the very first-personal mode of 
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givenness of an experience as its most basic form of egocentricity”.461 If we accept this, then 
the ego does not stand apart from the flow of experiencing, but is inbuilt into its very 
structure. Zahavi thus argues that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty get it wrong when they 
distinguish between the phrases “there is a perception of a chair” and “somebody perceives a 
chair”. According to Zahavi, they overlook a crucial detail: 
When I and my alter ego simultaneously perceive a chair, both of these prereflective 
perceptions might be anonymous in the sense of lacking an explicit thematisation of the ego. 
But they are not anonymous in the sense of being undifferentiated... there remains a vital 
difference between the two individuated perceptions. Only one of them is given in a first-
personal mode of presentation for me, and I would be unable to perceive the chair if that were 
not the case. I take this to be a decisive and sufficient argument against the nonegological 
theory of consciousness.
462
 
What Zahavi is saying is that the first-personal givenness of experience permits us to 
distinguish between “my” own experiences and the experiences of others. On the one hand, 
first-personal givenness describes how phenomenal awareness of experiencing is occurring to 
“me”, where “me” means that there is at least something it is like to experience what is being 
phenomenally disclosed – it is not happening in the dark. On the other hand, the first-personal 
mode of experiencing that occurs to others is phenomenally unavailable to me. There is 
nothing it is like for “me” to live through their experiences. Their experiences are in fact 
“fundamentally inaccessible to me”. Zahavi refers to this quality as the “primary presence of 
experience”.463 In this way, he argues that we should accept consciousness as possessing a 
fundamental egocentricity (prior to any designation of “personal”).464 
          From this discussion we can phenomenologically distinguish two levels of 
egocentricity (selfhood): (i) The proprietary sense of self that is present in I-consciousness. It 
denotes the feeling of ownership of experience, which is conceptualised as given to me as 
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mine. This is the subject-self that is present in reflected and thematised experience. (ii) The 
minimal self or core self which grants consciousness of oneself in the sense that one is simply 
conscious of an experience in its first-personal mode of givenness. For Zahavi, this is a 
matter of having first-personal access to one‟s own experiential life. The continental 
phenomenologist Henry also believes that this is the most basic form of selfhood: it is one 
determined by the very self-manifestation of experience.
465
 It is also what separates the 
experience as something lived-through instead of being inaccessible (as the experience of 
someone else). This is the experiential sense of self that Zahavi considers most fundamental, 
because whatever lacks this dimension cannot be called a self.
466
 
          This raises the question whether Zahavi‟s minimal egological stance of consciousness 
(the mere self-manifestation of experience in its first-personal mode of givenness) is actually 
harmonious with Dunne‟s non-egological view of pure reflexivity,467 which is devoid of a 
subject and intentional experiencing. This is important because Dunne says that this pure 
reflexivity (i) lacks even a minimal sense of subjectivity and (ii) is devoid of intentional 
mental acts (subject-object structure). He also affirms that it is experienced, although in an 
intransitive (non-dual) way. If we accept both Dunne‟s and Zahavi‟s emphasis on 
experiential access, however, Dunne‟s view and Zahavi‟s view come closer to each other, 
because Zahavi‟s account requires of subjectivity only that it is experientially given.    
          At this point we might raise three further questions: (i) In what sense does Zahavi‟s 
account capture what we mean by selfhood – even phenomenal selfhood? (ii) Can the first-
personal mode of givenness – which is necessarily perspectival (indexical and positional: it 
has a point of view) – really be equated with just the self-aware and conscious-making 
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feature of experience, which allows experience to be aware of it-self? (iii) According to 
Zahavi and Thompson, first-personal givenness is nothing other than the self-awareness of 
intentional acts. The structure of self-awareness is furthermore that of the threefold structure 
of time consciousness, and this entails that self-awareness depends on intentional experience. 
But this does not seem to be true in the kind of pure reflexivity Dunne is talking about (i.e., 
the pure consciousness event). We can then ask whether first-personal givenness is really 
necessarily transitive? If not, are there other modes of givenness in which experience can 
manifest itself that do not entail Zahavi‟s minimal sense of self (i.e., intransitive first-personal 
givenness of transitive experiencing)?    
          Dunne argues, after Dharmakirti, that pure reflexivity has no subject-object structure. It 
is neither perspectival in this sense nor positional. It de-emphasises both object-pole and ego-
pole. The kind of phenomenal givenness involved is not of the same structure as Zahavi‟s 
pespectival and positional first-personal mode of experiencing. Dunne says that if you live 
through a pure consciousness event, then you 
do not have first-personal access in the sense that it does not present itself as being your 
experience as opposed to somebody else‟s experience... That is actually a primary feature of 
that experience and this also correlates to some degree across [contemplative] traditions. 
Thus, you can induce these states and they involve complete loss of a sense of self and hence 
also a sense of there being a subject – that I am observing something.468  
This means that from an empirical standpoint we have prima facie phenomenological 
evidence (first-person data) that we can have cognitive access to the fundamental nature of 
consciousness, and that this is non-egological, because it is neither perspectival nor 
positional. It does not display a localised sense of ipseity that would indicate a subtle fissure 
in self-awareness. Any such fissure would give rise to an ego-pole and an awareness of a self. 
Thus the conscious-making feature does not contain Zahavi‟s minimal, core sense of self.            
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          The question now is whether the first-personal mode of givenness in general entails 
indexicality. It is clear that Dharmakirti and Dunne wish to say, when they state that pure 
reflexivity does not have even a minimal sense of subjectivity, that it has no subject-pole 
which functions as the locus of perspectival experience. Dunne in fact says: “I am pushing 
against the notion that it is necessary, in order for phenomenological theory to operate, to 
have an essentialist perspective on that structure [of perspectival givenness]. I do not see why 
this is necessary.”469 He re-affirms that non-dual, pure reflexivity is non-positional, non-
perspectival, and non-local (that there is no “here-ness” to the experience). In his view – and 
that of contemplative practitioners – perspectival givenness is not the only mode in which 
phenomenal life must operate, contrary to the claims of continental phenomenologists. What 
does this say about phenomenal selfhood?  
          I believe that a sophisticated distinction between (i) a minimal, core sense of (ego-) 
self, which only operates with a dualistic structure of consciousness; and (ii) a non-egological 
but phenomenally lived-through subjectivity, which operates with a non-dualistic structure of 
consciousness, is capable of shedding light on long-lasting debates surrounding the existence 
and non-existence of self, especially in the matter of Buddhist philosophy and objectors to the 
doctrine of not-self (anatta/anātman). Let us briefly consider some implications of this 
possibility. 
          First, I want to point out some misunderstandings about the Buddhist teaching of not-
self. Many interpretations of Buddhism (popular and academic) present the Buddhist system, 
or even the Buddha himself, as having literally denied the existence of Ātman. For example, 
“[The] Buddhist anatta or no-self doctrine rejects not only selves but the Self.”470 
Contemporary views of Buddhist teachings also claim that the doctrine of anatta demarcates 
“authentic” from “inauthentic” Buddhism. In this manner, Malalasekera claims that the 
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doctrine of anatta (not-self) is thought to be the unique discovery of the Buddha that also sets 
Buddhism apart from “all other religions, creeds, and systems of philosophy.”471 Thus on the 
one hand, many interpret the Buddha‟s doctrine of anatta to be an unqualified denial. On the 
other hand, we find the view that the doctrine of anatta is what defines “authentic” 
Buddhism.  
          For my purposes, I will refer to views that present the Buddhist philosophical system to 
(1) deny all notions of Ātman (without considering issues of definition of both Ātman and the 
Buddhist absolute), and (2) depend on the doctrine of anatta for its authenticity, as “received 
views”472 of Buddhism. Whenever interpretations of Buddhism are fixated on the doctrine of 
anatta in this way (as an unqualified negation and definitive characteristic), we encounter an 
instance of “ātma-phobia”, which declares all talk about the nature of selfhood to be un-
Buddhist. 
          I speak of a phobia because Buddhism does deny that various notions apply to a self, 
but the Buddhist system only judges the notions analysed by the Buddha in the Samyutta 
Nikāya to be impermanent and not-of-the-self (anatta). Therefore, it is actually incorrect to 
hold that Buddhism denies the existence of the S/self itself. It is important to point out that 
nowhere in authoritative Buddhist texts is the self ever denied existence. The Buddha in fact 
made explicit that we should refrain from both positing the existence and the non-existence of 
the self. All the Buddha ever did in the famous Samyutta Nikāya 22.59 (the analysis of not-
self) was to identify possible notions of self and to declare them as “not-of-the-self”, “not-
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self”, or in his own words, “this I am not”, and “this is not my Self”.473  
          Furthermore, following Ruegg, Schmithausen, and Harvey, I affirm that a sensitive 
approach does allow one to engage in “self-talk” in a Buddhist framework, contrary to the 
ātma-phobic rut a lot of discourse on Theravāda Buddhism has manoeuvred itself into. As 
Ruegg points out, “in evaluating the interrelation of the theory of the tathāgatagarbha with 
the ātmavāda, everything depends on just what the Buddhist and Brāhmanical philosophers 
mean by the word ātman.” 474 In this respect, Mahāyāna Buddhism demonstrates a high level 
of sensitivity and accuracy in their reflections on the absolute and selfhood. They take into 
account the fact that their theories can work if their notions of the absolute and the S/self are 
appropriately defined and separated from inconsistent formulations. This philosophical 
sophistication of the Mahāyāna allows them to engage in “self-talk” without compromising 
their original position that the ego-self or soul has no substantial existence (nairātmaya and 
śūnyatā).475 
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          I contend that at least some Vedic notions of Ātman are in fact compatible with the 
Buddhist doctrine of tathāgatagarbha (Buddha-Nature) because they do not contradict the 
doctrine of nairātmaya (i.e., non-substantiality).476 Ruegg has also adamantly argued that the 
Mahāyāna is capable of employing “self-talk” because theory and definition coincide in such 
a way that they can use the term Ātman to refer to the supreme nature of a Buddha.477 Chen 
gives a few good explanations for this: 
Asanga did indeed mention “Sudhātman,” “Mahātman” and “Paramātman” in his 
Mahayanasutralamkara… The verse in which these terms appear reads like this: “The 
Buddhas‟ immaculate Self obtained through the emptiness which leads to the realization 
of nairatmya is called the „Paramātman‟ [Supreme Self]. Because the Buddhas are 
completely free from any false conception of ātman, they obtain the „Mahātman‟ [Great 
Self].
478
 
In a similar way, after all false ideation about the self is removed, the supreme nairatmya 
(which is the vimala tathata) realized by the Buddhas is then called the “Mahātman,” and 
“Paramātman.479 
It therefore turns the nairatmya into a Supreme Ātman. Being unattached to any entities or 
conceptions of the ego, this supreme Ātman should not be confused with the empirical ego 
generally conceived in the five skandhas or the ātman advocated by heretics… In short, 
the nairatmya attained by the Buddha is the very essence of his Ātman which is called the 
Paramātman or the Mahātman.480 
Chen‟s pointers clearly distinguish the ego-self from a notion of Self that identifies what is 
absolutely real and stands outside of the domain of samsāra (which the Buddha transcends 
with the onset of nirvāņa). This notion of Self remains untouched by the Buddha‟s famous 
analysis of not-self in the Samyutta Nikāya.481 
          It stands to reason that Buddhism relies heavily on phenomenology and the correction 
                                                          
476
 This rests on the fact that when we wish to evaluate “the interrelation of the theory of the tathāgatagarbha 
with the ātmavāda, everything depends on just what the Buddhist and Brāhmanical philosophers mean by the 
word ātman”. This also holds true for the Buddha-Nature. David Seyfort Ruegg, Buddha-nature, Mind and the 
Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective: On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism in 
India and Tibet (University of London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1989), 20. 
477
 Ibid, 44. 
478
 Shu-Hui J. Chen, “Affirmation in Negation: A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory in the Light of the 
Bodhisattva Practices” (PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1998), 393. 
479
 Ibid., 394. 
480
 Ibid., 400. 
481
 Thanissaro Bhikkhu, transl. from Pali, “Samyutta Nikāya 22.59. Pañcavaggi Sutta: Five Brethren (aka: 
Anatta-lakkhana Sutta: The Discourse on the Not-self Characteristic),” 
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.059.than.html (accessed October 5, 2010). 
156 | P a g e  
 
of our ordinary and mistaken phenomenal experience for liberation.
482
 In this way, the 
Buddhist approach to the self is to try and find the one thing that is invariant; all else is 
denied the nature of Self.
483
 To find this invariant structure is to become phenomenally 
acquainted with it through a kind of cognitive access that discloses this invariable feature in a 
non-perceptual way, best described as recognition or gnoseological awareness. In such a 
state, as we have already discussed, the ego-pole is absent and any perspectival access (a 
polarising, indexical, or positional stance) to experience. However, it is still 
phenomeonlogically lived-through in a mode of givenness that is non-dual and without even 
a minimal sense of (ego-) self. 
          Now if we accept Zahavi‟s account of the self, then experience has an implicit 
phenomenal sense of self in two respects: (i) it is phenomenally lived-through; and (ii) it is 
phenomenally lived-through with a perspective or with the help of a position. (ii) Gives rise 
to the ego-pole, but (i) does not – as the pure consciousness event suggests. Pure 
consciousness is thus phenomenally lived-through, but without egocentricity (subject-pole). 
Additionally, pure consciousness is also characterised as luminosity without content (an 
immaculateness of mind without defilements, as some Mahāyāna texts refer to it484) and might 
qualify to be identified as the “Self”, because it is the invariant structure of the mind. It is also 
important to appreciate that Buddhist philosophy (both Theravada and Mahāyāna) affirms the 
reality of an unrestricted and luminous awareness which stands outside of the analysis of the 
five skandhas (the components of a person that are denied to be of the nature of self).
485
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          Hence we can distinguish a (ego-) self from a Self that stands outside of the dualistic 
structure of ordinary, phenomenal experience. In this way, we can agree with Zahavi that a 
minimal sense of (ego-) self must entail perspectival givenness, just as Sartre affirmed that 
duality and the fissuring of consciousness gives rise to the ego. We can also coherently 
endorse the idea that pure consciousness transcends this notion of phenomenal selfhood, 
although we might still wish to refer to it as Self (however, with a different meaning, similar 
to the way Vedic philosophy and some strands of Mahāyāna Buddhism employ the term Self 
to refer to a higher-tier Self).
486
 This higher-tier Self entails the continuation of phenomenal 
awareness, but without an individual and separate sense of ego (as an objectified 
existence).
487
  
          To sum up: (i) the phenomenal event of pure consciousness transcends egocentricity; 
(ii) it is meaningful to speak of a subjectless or egoless pre-reflective self-awareness (where 
“self” denotes the acquaintance that consciousness has with itself rather than an ego-identity); 
(iii) Zahavi‟s notion of a minimal, core self remains unchallenged to speak about the 
phenomenal sense of individuated and separate selfhood involved in intentional experience; 
(iv) by adding another level of selfhood to Zahavi‟s already articulated two-tier distinction of 
self (proprietary and minimal), we might be able to make more sense of the debates 
surrounding selfhood, especially the popular interpretation of the Buddhist doctrine of not-
self and opposing views that equate a nonegolgical “Self” with the fundamental invariant 
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structure of consciousness; (v) when discussing the nature of self and the phenomenal sense 
of self, then it is important to consider different modes of phenomenal givenness in relation to 
distinct perceptual and non-perceptual types of experience. 
          Pure consciousness thus points toward the non-egological nature of consciousness, at 
least in its most fundamental form. The luminosity of awareness is non-positional, non-dual, 
and without a salient subject-pole, but still phenomenally lived-through in a non-perceptual 
and thematic fashion. This is compatible with the view that there is no self-experience 
without world-experience, but only if “self” is understood as some form of lower-tier 
egocentricity. However, if we wish to say that non-dually lived-through phenomenal 
awareness should be identified as our higher-tier “Self”, then this entails recognising it as the 
ineliminable invariant of phenomenality that is without egocentric nature. 
          This brings me to the next stage of my argument, in which I will show that pure 
consciousness not only transcends egocentricity, but that it also “transcends” Thompson‟s 
idea of life. Furthermore, I contend that egocentricity and Thompson‟s definition of life go 
hand in hand, neither of which have a place in pure consciousness. Therefore, the non-
perceptual type of experience discussed introduces a conceptual discontinuity between 
(contemplative) mind and life (as defined in Chapter 1). 
6.3 Pure Consciousness, Time-Consciousness and Discontinuity 
In this section, I will first discuss the implications of pure consciousness for the continental 
notion of time-consciousness, which is put forward as an account of how consciousness is 
self-aware in two senses: (i) that consciousness is acquainted with itself coherently over time; 
and (ii) that we have a sense of self and identity that persists over time (our sense of self has 
temporal extendedness). I have already discussed the connection of self-awareness to our 
conscious making-feature and to our phenomenal sense of selfhood. Now I will talk about 
how (i) and (ii) relate to the continental (philosophical) thesis of inner time-consciousness 
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and its contemplative (empirical) antithesis, pure consciousness. Second, I will tie this 
discussion to Thompson‟s thesis that there is a deep continuity between mind and life, to 
show that pure consciousness is antithetical to this vision of continuity. 
6.3.1 Self-Awareness and Selfhood: Luminous or Dynamic?  
In Chapter 1, I explained how continental phenomenologists wish to account for self-
awareness in terms of the dynamic, threefold structure of time-consciousness: primal 
impression, retention, and protention. I also explained how continental phenomenologists 
believe that the structure of time-consciousness requires intentional experience to be 
operative, and that in this way self-awareness is built into time-consciousness, because it is 
the implicit, conscious-making feature of intentional acts. Therefore, time-consciousness is 
an account of self-awareness that depends on intentional experience for its existence. This is 
also true of phenomenal selfhood. Continental phenomenologists contend that there is no 
self-experience without world-experience. Finally, the structural analysis of time-
consciousness serves to account for our temporally extended sense of self.  
          In contrast, contemplative phenomenologists report that self-awareness – the non-dual 
acquaintance consciousness has with itself – does not depend for its existence on intentional 
experience. Pure consciousness is innately luminous and also referred to as “Self” (or else as 
the immaculate “Mind”, or the innate “Mind”, etc.), but in a qualified sense: it is without 
egocentricity.  
          From a continental point of view, the self is intimately linked to time-consciousness, 
because our awareness of self is built into intentional experience (minimal and proprietary 
sense of self), which in turn gains temporal extendedness by virtue of partaking in the 
dynamic process of impression-retention-protention. Zahavi says: 
There has been a certain ambiguity in the use of the term phenomenology of self because 
people have been using the term in two rather different ways. On the one hand, it has just 
been used synonymously with what is a common sense understanding of self. Others, 
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including myself, have meant something different, namely the minimal notion of self that 
phenomenologist have tried to spell out. Of course these two descriptions are rather different. 
Now if you take the latter description, then what I take phenomenologist to have been trying 
to articulate is not unrelated to the issue of primal impression-retention-protention because 
that structure is supposed to be informative of the first-personal presence, and that is 
precisely what is identified as self.
488
 
Zahavi‟s point is supported by the continental view that time-consciousness is the most 
fundamental invariant structure of consciousness: it is therefore the structural invariant 
identifiable with selfhood.
489
 
          There are two points that must be raised against this idea that the self can be spelt out 
in terms of inner time-consciousness.  
          First, Dunne asks whether it is coherent to respond to the question, “What is my real 
self?” by saying, “It is my primal protention-retention.”490 Dreyfus shares this doubt when he 
considers the possibility that certain brain activities may one day be discovered to participate 
in the realisation of the dynamic, threefold structure of inner time-consciousness. He 
contends that we would still not wish to identify the self with these brain structures. 
          Second, and more compellingly, the question must be raised whether the dynamic 
structure of time-consciousness could break down. In this case it would turn out not to be the 
most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness. Thompson actually considers this. He 
says:  
One could say that prereflective self-awareness falls out of and is entailed by inner time-
consciousness... [But] we can ask: Can that structure break down?... In Husserl‟s Ideas there is 
the famous passage where Husserl considers the break down of consciousness so that there is 
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no longer any consciousness of a continuously existing world with this sense of presencing to 
self. One way of reading that passage is that Husserl is entertaining the possibility that there 
could be a break down in the synthesising activity of consciousness that is so radical that even 
that structure would fall apart.. consciousness would become like William James says it is not 
(in his Principles of Psychology): “Consciousness is not like a glow-worm-spark!” However, it 
is conceivable that there could be a radical breakdown so that there would only be this kind of 
episodic glow-worm-spark with no temporal synthesis whatsoever - that would be a profound 
alteration of an invariant...If we take at face value certain ways of describing the empirical 
claim about reflexivity [pure consciousness]...where there is no longer temporal consciousness 
or temporal synthesis at work, then that would suggest as an empirical claim that there is a kind 
of consciousness in which that kind of structure is no longer present.
491
 
In this passage, Thompson considers the possibility that inner time-consciousness may 
not be the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness. This also challenges 
the idea that it is an adequate candidate for selfhood, if we want to hold onto the idea 
that our self is an invariant feature of our very existence.  
          Pure consciousness is just such a type of experience, which breaks down the 
dynamic threefold structure of time-consciousness. If we join Thompson in admitting 
the prima facie phenomenological evidence on pure consciousness, which according 
to Thompson‟s own neurophenomenological approach guides and constrains our 
investigation of consciousness, then we face two options.  
          First, we are forced to reconsider our definition of selfhood, if we still wish to 
hold onto the view that our self must be the most basic and invariant feature of our 
existence. In this case our understanding of (at least) phenomenal selfhood would have 
to become divorced from egocentricity.  
         Second, we can maintain an identity relation between selfhood and egocentricity, 
but this forces us to reject the idea that selfhood is an invariant feature of our 
existence. Selfhood in this scenario would turn out to be contingent and not a 
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fundamental constituent of (at least) our phenomenal existence because our 
phenomenal life persists when our self dissolves. This would denote the breakdown of 
the primal impression-retention-protention structure of temporal consciousness. 
          Thus pure consciousness has serious implications for a complete account of 
phenomenal selfhood. Not only does it change our understanding of the self-ego 
relation, and introduce the possibility of various levels of egocentricity or selfhood, 
but it also challenges our common sense view that we in fact are our-selves and 
require them for our (phenomenal) life. In this way, the phenomenality of pure 
consciousness shows that we do not require a salient phenomenal sense of self for 
phenomonenal life. In the next section, I will show that non-egological, pure 
consciousness (the contemplative mind) also presents a challenge to Thompson‟s 
continuity thesis.  
6.3.2 Pure Consciousness and Life  
Recall that according to Thompson, (biologically) living systems are dynamically self-
organising and cognitive. The self-organising feature is the biological root of identity, which 
is a group of related processes that represent a salient and operationally closed unity. The 
operational closure in turn defines a phenomenological domain of interaction (cognition), 
which determines what is encompassed by the self and what transcends its closure (world). 
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The same principles are operative on a phenomenological level of selfhood.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of phenomenological selfhood, Thompson has relied on the continental analysis of 
pre-reflective self-awareness and time-consciousness to articulate the dynamic structure of 
primal-impression-retention-protention and intentional acts to account for lived systems and 
phenomenal selfhood.  
          On this basis, Thompson argues that there is a deep continuity between the living body 
(Körper) and the lived body (Leib), or between life and mind. The continuity holds because 
neurophenomenology can offer a common model to explain both domains. This model is 
dynamic systems theory. 
 
 
 
 
In this illustration we can see that dynamic systems theory is mapped onto both biology 
(autopoiesis) and phenomenology (inner time-consciousness). The dynamic processes on 
both sides of the divide also account for a unified definition of selfhood that is egological 
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(polarised) and autonomous (self-organising). Dynamic systems theory is therefore the 
bridging strategy of neurophenomenology. 
          However, Varela also formulated the “working hypothesis” of neurophenomenology, 
which we need to re-consider at this point. 
Phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their counterparts in cognitive 
science relate to each other through reciprocal constraints.
492
 
By “reciprocal constraints” Varela means that phenomenological analysis of (the structure of) 
experience should inform scientific research of consciousness, and vice versa.
493
 This means 
that precise first-person data constrains analytic and interpretive work on physiological 
processes:
494
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          This is one of the most fundamental methodological insights of neurophenomenology, 
and the methodological remedy Varela put forward to respond to the hard problem of 
consciousness. To this end, neurophenomenologists have also turned to contemplative 
phenomenologists to augment the first-person component of neurophenomenology. Thus 
neurophenonomenology is committed to taking serious prima facie evidence derived from 
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first-person methods. 
          Now Thompson‟s strategy has been to rely on the continental analysis of the structure 
of inner time-consciousness to establish continuity between mind and life: 
 
 
 
          However, neurophenomenology is committed to taking into account the 
phenomenological evidence derived from the contemplative method, which offers a different 
account of the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness, namely that it is 
“pure”, “undifferentiated”, “still”, and independent of intentional acts. It is inherently 
“luminous”, similar to James‟ analogy to a glow-worm-spark. Thus the prima facie, empirical 
evidence available from trained contemplative phenomenologists looks like the following: 
 
 
 
If “Nph1” cannot be explicated in terms of dynamic systems theory (“Nph2”), then it follows 
that neurophenomenology cannot rely on the framework of dynamic systems theory to 
develop common structural levels of description between “Nph1” (phenomenology) and 
“Nph3” (biology): 
 
 
 
I do not intend to convey by this illustration that “consciousness does not equal brain 
processes”, but that consciousness does not have an analogous pattern of organisation to 
biologically living systems. Therefore, when we consider the contemplative mind, then it 
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introduces a strong conceptual discontinuity between the living (life) and the lived (mind). 
          The luminous nature of awareness (pure consciousness) also transcends Thompsons‟s 
definition of life, because it is neither dynamically individuated, to give rise to a self and 
world, nor cognitive – where “cognitive” means relating and interacting with a transcendent 
environment (however, this does not exclude a kind of cognition that has access to 
phenomenality itself that is self-contained).  
          Thus I conclude that the prima facie empirical evidence of pure consciousness: (i) 
falsifies the continental position that inner time-consciousness is the most fundamental 
invariant structure of consciousness; (ii) disallows Thompson to speak of a “deep continuity 
between life and mind”; and (iii) presents an important feature of consciousness that needs to 
be considered when engaging in “self-talk”. 
6.3.3 Pure Consciousness and Future Neurophenomenological Research 
I have come to a radical conclusion about the implications of pure consciousness for both 
continental phenomenology and Thompson‟s continuity thesis between life and mind. 
Although this presents a significant challenge to Thompson‟s project, I think that it actually 
opens up a promising pathway for his overall work. I will briefly discuss why this is the case, 
and recommend further research in this direction.  
             First, the possibility of pure consciousness is indeed a potential defeater for 
Thompson‟s attempt to account for continuity between life and mind, because it challenges 
the theoretical bridging strategy of neurophenomenology (dynamic systems theory). 
However, I do not think that the neurophenomenological method itself is in any way at 
question. In fact, I agree with Bayne that the neurophenomenological method is actually “an 
excellent model of how the science of consciousness ought to proceed”, even though it 
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cannot shed light on the hard problem of consciousness.
495
 Furthermore, I believe that 
neurophenomenology is actually a perfect research paradigm to empirically approach the 
problems I have pointed out. 
          Second, Thompson is open to the possibility of pure consciousness and even suggests 
that it might be an empirically tractable question.
496
 Dreyfus and Dunne agree with this.
497
 
Let us consider this possibility.  
          It is conceivable that neurophenomenology can work with individuals who claim to be 
able to thematically examine pre-reflective self-awareness (enter into states of pure 
consciousness). The typical strategy would be to frontload phenomenology into the 
experimental design, and in this way work with the subjects to develop adequate descriptions 
of their own cognitive contexts. These phenomenological descriptions could then be mapped 
onto biological processes of the subjects, both in the brain and in the overall physiology 
beyond the brain. If the experiences of different levels of phenomenal selfhood, their 
correlating structures of consciousness, and their associated biological processes are 
correlated with each other, then the extent to which a minimal (bodily) sense of self is present 
in pure reflexivity could be determined. 
          If we were to discover networks active that realise bodily self-awareness – the 
experience of being present in the world in a interoceptive and visceral sense – then we 
would have biological grounds for judging the kind of experience at question to legitimately 
involve a minimal sense of self. This would support egological views of consciousness. 
          However, if we would discover something novel that shows no signs of bodily self-
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awareness (for example, patterns of activity for which we would have to develop new models 
of description), then the way would be open to make a case for pure consciousness on 
biological grounds. This would support non-egological views of consciousness. 
          In this way, a neurophenomenological approach is promising and allows us to conduct 
research that would be significant for following reasons: (i) it would allow us to adjudicate 
between continental and contemplative phenomenological accounts of consciousness; (ii) it 
would allow us to judge whether or not Thompson‟s continuity thesis should be accepted or 
discarded on the basis of dynamic systems theory; (iii) it would introduce a new way of 
examining questions about (phenomenal) selfhood; and (iv) we could re-visit the debates 
surrounding the Buddhist doctrine of not-self with a new theoretical and experimental 
attitude. 
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Conclusion 
 
The motivation for neurophenomenology... [is] to gain a deeper understanding of human 
experience by making contemplative phenomenology a partner in the scientific 
investigation of consciousness.
498
 
  
 Evan Thompson 
In this project, I have challenged Thompson‟s thesis that there is a deep continuity between 
mind and life from three points of view: 
(1) the nature and potential of first-person approaches to consciousness; 
(2) the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; 
(3) the egological or non-egological nature of consciousness and selfhood. 
In Chapter 1, I offered a methodological theme for my project, namely Varela‟s and 
Thompson‟s neurophenomenological approach to the study of consciousness, which has 
emerged from the enactive paradigm of cognitive science. To clarify Thompson‟s position, I 
outlined his philosophy of biology and life, which entertains the idea that life can be defined 
in terms of (biologically) living systems and (phenomenologically) lived systems.  
According to Thompson, both are autonomous (self-organising) and cognitive 
(intentional). He also believes that the common reference to the notion of a “body” (living 
and lived bodies) helps to re-contextualise the relationship between consciousness (mind) and 
nature (life). Finally, with the help of dynamic systems theory (autopoiesis) and continental 
phenomenology (time-consciousness), he points out that we can illuminate the biological and 
the phenomenal domain under one common model of description. Thompson argues that this 
shows a deep continuity between life and mind. 
          In Chapter 2, I explored the ground upon which I agree with continental 
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phenomenology on the different structures of experience: (i) the objective (intentional) 
principle of consciousness; (ii) the correlational structure between mind and world; and (iii) 
the openness of subjectivity, which follows from our subjectivity being intimately coupled to 
the world. I then discussed two different types of intentionality, one narrow and the other 
broad, to explain how continental phenomenologists conceive of the relationship between 
self-awareness and intentional experience. I showed that continental phenomenologists 
believe that self-awareness requires intentional mental acts for its existence. This in turn 
supports their thesis that subjectivity is always open; it is at least broadly intentional, and 
never self-enclosed. Thus, from the viewpoint of continental phenomenology, all of our 
experience is in some form or another necessarily intentional.  
At this point, I left the plateau of consensus with continental phenomenologists. I first 
outlined two different types of experience, on whose existence I agree with continental 
phenomenologists: (i) perceptual types of experience, either indogenous (internal) or 
exogenous (external), with a clear subject-object structure (narrow intentionality); (ii) 
perceptual types of experience without a clear subject-object structure, which are nonetheless 
cognitive in a minimal sense, because they remain open and related to the subject‟s world 
(otherness).  
I then put forward a third type of experience that differs from the above two, which 
continental phenomenologists deny: a non-perceptual type of experience, with no subject-
object structure, in which subjectivity is self-enclosed, worldless, and thus self-determined. I 
defined such an experience as autonomous, in contrast to the first two types of experience, 
which are heteronomous (other-determined). The chapters that followed offered good reasons 
for adopting my view that non-perceptual types of experience do exist, and that we do in fact 
have cognitive access to them.  
          In Chapter 3, I discussed first-person methods, by looking at the phenomenological and 
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contemplative methods as a subspecies of the epoché. I showed: (i) that neurophenomenology 
is turning to the contemplative method to aid the continental method, because the latter lacks 
the pragmatic expertise in the epoché to investigate experience directly; (ii) that both the 
phenomenological method and the contemplative method share a logic; (iii) that 
professionally trained subjects in contemplative methods have at their disposal cognitive 
faculties that are more precise and more reliable. This means that attention is a trainable skill, 
which (iv) means that contemplative phenomenologists are best equipped to examine non-
perceptual types of experience.  
          In Chapter 4, I continued to focus on first-person methods, and considered nine 
sceptical objections to the claim that first-person methods offer reliable access to our 
phenomenal life. I responded to the first seven of these objections in the same chapter. I 
concluded that the phenomenological and contemplative methods I presented in Chapter 3 
cannot be equated with the classic understanding of introspection (objection 1). Therefore, 
the methods considered are not part of a failed project. Contrary to what this objection would 
make us believe, I showed that we can in fact phenomenologically attend to the intentional 
domain of consciousness (objection 2); and that such attention is decidedly not unreliable as a 
method to describe lived-through experience (objection 3).  
I then reviewed representationalism to clear the way for a phenomenologial view of the 
mind (and eventually my “Theory of Disclosing” to account for cognitive access of non-
perceptual types of experience). This set the stage for me to respond to objections 4, 5, and 6. 
I showed that the phenomenological method is not solipsistic, because subjectivity is 
embedded in an independently existing reality (objection 4). This in turn entailed that the 
epoché does not exclude the world, but attends to it with a more attentive, phenomenological 
attitude (objection 5).  
          Next, I responded to the challenge of objection 6: If the objects we intend are merely 
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internal mental representations, then our mind requires no external world, and this would lead 
to idealism. Furthermore, an internalist conception of mind may render first-person 
approaches solipsistic. I responded to this by discussing the distinction between (i) 
methodological solipsism and (ii) idealism. I followed Husserl to argue that a “pure” 
(worldless) form of consciousness does not negate an externalist view of the mind. This 
opened the way to affirm the existence of a pure (worldless) form of consciousness, as well 
as the human ability to examine it by first-person methods, without falling prey to the 
criticisms of methodological solipsism or metaphysical idealism.  
          Finally, I responded to objection 7 by showing that even if meta-awareness alters 
intentional experience, this does not make it impossible for us to examine lived-through 
intentional experiences and their intentional subject matter. Therefore, in the case of 
intentional experience, the impact of observation does not compromise the project of 
studying conscious experience form a first-person point of view. 
        In Chapter 5, I responded to objection eight: Can phenomenological reflection reveal the 
pre-reflective structure of self-awareness without distorting the experience? To respond to 
this question, I discussed another major methodological issue: the use of higher-order 
representational theories of mind to clarify the conscious-making feature of self-awareness. 
Here, I refuted such theories on traditional phenomenological grounds. I then discussed the 
differences between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness, as well as the difference 
between reflection and pure reflection. I proposed that cognitive access is a matter of 
thematically lived-through acquaintance with our phenomenal life.  
At this point, I left my agreement with continental phenomenology that we can 
successfully examine perceptual types of experience and offered my non-representational 
“Theory of Disclosing”. This theory includes non-perceptual types of experience in the class 
of “observable experiences”.  
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The fact that we can have first-personal, cognitive access to non-perceptual types of 
experience has serious consequences for the theoretical framework of continental 
phenomenology and neurophenomenology. I turned to this in Chapter 6, which fell into five 
main parts.  
First, I focused on a non-perceptual type of experience that can be found in 
phenomenological accounts of consciousness derived from the contemplative method: the 
“pure consciousness event”. Its salient features are: (i) that it is conscious simpliciter, because 
(ii) the conscious-making feature of self-awareness persists despite (iii) the absence of 
intentionality and any temporal or objectified object; and (iv) the state is characterised by an 
absence of the world, such that the self-aware condition is not determined by it any way (the 
experience is autonomous; the conscious event is worldless and self-enclosed).  
I then showed how contemplative methods take progressive steps to disclose pure 
consciousness. The steps are: 
(1) to develop concentration on an object; 
(2) to cultivate awareness of subjectivity in such a way that the object is de-emphasised; 
(3) to de-emphasise subjectivity articulated in terms of an (ego-) “I” located in the past 
and present (to enhance the access to reflexivity); 
(4) to fully realise the luminosity or awareness that makes all cognitions possible (the 
invariant conscious-making feature), and in which no elements of subjectivity and 
objectivity remain in the experience. 
I concluded that the above contemplative approach prima facie demonstrates that we can 
have a non-objectifying and thematic acquaintance with awareness itself through a non-
perceptual and non-intentional condition.  
         Second, I proceeded by discussing the significance of this non-perceptual type of 
experience for our understanding of phenomenal selfhood. The absence of a subject-object 
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structure affects not only the object-pole of consciousness, but also its ego-pole. To this end, I 
reviewed egological and non-egological theories of consciousness (whether or not it is 
meaningful to speak of a subjectless or egoless self-awareness). I then considered the 
distinction between two levels of egocentricity (selfhood): (i) the proprietary sense of self 
that is present in I-consciousness, which denotes the feeling of ownership of experience; (ii) 
the minimal self or core self, which grants consciousness of oneself in the sense that one is 
simply conscious of an experience in its first-personal mode of givenness, and denotes access 
to our own experiential life. 
          Third, I questioned the minimal egological stance of consciousness, because it is not 
harmonious with pure reflexivity (pure consciousness) in two senses: (i) pure consciousness 
lacks even a minimal sense of subjectivity; and (ii) pure consciousness is devoid of 
intentional mental acts (subject-object structure), but it is still a phenomenal occurrence (it is 
experienced). Purely reflexive self-awareness is thus neither perspectival nor positional, and 
de-emphasises both object-pole and ego-pole.  
This means that we have prima facie empirical (phenomenological) evidence that we 
can have cognitive access to a kind of consciousness that is fundamental and non-egological. 
I concluded: (i) that pure consciousness transcends egocentricity; (ii) that it is meaningful to 
speak of a subjectless or egoless pre-reflective self-awareness (where “self” denotes the 
acquaintance that consciousness has with itself rather than an ego-identity); (iii) that the 
notion of a minimal, core self remains unchallenged if we speak about the phenomenal sense 
of individuated and separate selfhood involved in intentional experience; (iv) that we should 
add to the proprietary and minimal senses of selfhood a third level, which grants us 
acquaintance with our lived-through phenomenal life, but without egocentricity (a subject-
pole); (v) that this additional level of selfhood enables us to make more sense of the debates 
surrounding the popular Buddhist doctrine of not-self, where pure reflexivity may represent 
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the fundamental invariant structure of consciousness that the Mahāyāna sometimes refers to 
as the higher-tier “Self”; (vi) that it is important, in discussing the nature of phenomenal 
selfhood, to consider different modes of phenomenal givenness active in distinct types of 
experience. 
          Fourth, I moved the debate about selfhood and self-awareness to the level of time-
consciousness. I reviewed how the self is explicated in the continental tradition via the notion 
of time-consciousness. I showed that this analysis is challenged by the prospect of pure 
consciousness, because it is a type of experience that breaks down the dynamic threefold 
structure of time-consciousness. In this way, pure consciousness presents us with two 
options: (1) to reconsider our definition of selfhood and phenomenal selfhood, which would 
have to be separated from egocentricity; (2) to maintain an identity relation between selfhood 
and egocentricity, which would force us to reject the idea that selfhood is an invariant feature 
of our existence.  
          Thompson has relied on time-consciousness to establish his continuity between life and 
mind, using the primal-impression-retention-protention analysis to establish a similar 
dynamical mode of description for both the biological and phenomenal domain. The fact that 
pure consciousness breaks down the dynamic threefold structure of time-consciousness thus 
also has serious consequences for Thompson‟s continuity thesis. Now, however, we see that 
we have phenomenological evidence (which neurophenomenology is committed to taking 
seriously) that the innate mind (pure consciousness) is decidedly not dynamic and intentional 
in structure. Therefore, there is a conceptual discontinuity between the domain of the living 
(open, dynamically self-organising and intentional) and the lived domain of the immaculate 
mind (closed, still, and non-intentional), and between the contemplative mind and life. 
          Fifth and finally, I completed this project by pointing out that this is actually a 
promising situation for neurophenomenology. With further research, this approach could (i) 
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adjudicate between continental and contemplative phenomenological accounts of 
consciousness; (ii) judge whether or not Thompson‟s continuity thesis should be accepted or 
discarded on the basis of dynamic systems theory; and (iii) introduce new ways of examining 
questions surrounding (phenomenal) selfhood. 
          In this project I intended to challenge Thompson‟s thesis that there is a deep continuity 
between mind and life on from three perspectives: 
(1) the nature and potential of first-person approaches to consciousness; 
(2) the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; 
(3) the egological or non-egological nature of consciousness and selfhood; 
I conclude that prima facie: 
(1) first-person methods give us cognitive access to the objective and subjective domain 
of consciousness; 
(2) continental phenomenology is mistaken about the most fundamental invariant 
structure of consciousness; 
(3) consciousness qua awareness per se is non-egological. 
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